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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 19, 2011, the Supreme Judicial Court appointed R.J. Cinquegrana of Choate, Hall & 
Stewart LLP as its special counsel for the purpose of conducting a confidential and independent 
preliminary inquiry relating to the District Court Department.1  On October 25, 2011, the scope 
of the assignment was expanded to include the Boston Municipal Court Department.2  This 
report has been prepared under the supervision of the Court and is submitted pursuant to those 
directives.3 
We were asked to determine the rate of acquittal in jury-waived trials on charges of operating 
under the influence (“OUI”) of drugs or alcohol, and to examine whether that rate differs from 
the national average and from the rate of acquittal in other criminal cases in Massachusetts.4  In 
addition, we were asked to explore whether the acquittal rates of certain judges in those 
departments of the Trial Court are substantially greater than the statistical average and, if so, to 
identify possible reasons for the disparity.  The Court directed that this was to be a preliminary, 
fact-finding inquiry, not a disciplinary inquiry, intended to produce independent findings that the 
Court will consider in determining whether any further actions are appropriate.   
Although the inquiry was prompted by an investigation then being conducted by the Boston 
Globe Spotlight Team, it has not been confined to the matters discussed in the articles published 
on October 30, November 6, November 16, and December 4, 2011 in the Boston Globe 
(hereinafter, “the Spotlight Series”).  We have reviewed the Spotlight Series reports, and we took 
that information into consideration in conducting our analyses, but it was not our purpose to 
affirm or rebut the contentions in those reports.   
The Court acknowledged the “delicate nature” of this inquiry when it announced this 
assignment:  
Our system depends on judges being able to decide a case fairly but 
independently, without fear or favor.  A judge is obligated to find a criminal 
defendant not guilty if the government has not proved the case beyond a 
reasonable doubt; at the same time, a judge must find a defendant guilty where the 
                                                 
1
 A copy of the Court’s October 19, 2011 letter is Attachment 1.  
2
 A copy of the Court’s October 25, 2011 letter is Attachment 2. 
3
 This report was prepared by R.J. Cinquegrana, Diana K. Lloyd, and Joseph H. Zwicker, partners at Choate, Hall & 
Stewart LLP, and Ginger Hsu, a senior associate at the firm.  (Mr. Zwicker left the firm in August 2012.)  Mr. 
Cinquegrana is the Co-Chair of the firm’s Litigation Department and its Government Enforcement and Compliance 
Practice Group.  He is a former Middlesex County Assistant District Attorney, Assistant United States Attorney, and 
Chief Trial Counsel for the Suffolk County District Attorney.  Both Ms. Lloyd and Mr. Zwicker previously served 
as Assistant United States Attorneys, and Ms. Lloyd and Ms. Hsu previously served as Special Assistant District 
Attorneys in Suffolk County.  We have been assisted by six associates (Christine J. Bang, Lisa B. Flynn, Kevin J. 
Ma, Jacqueline K. Mantica, Ashley M. Quigless, Rebecca A. Wilsker) and paralegal Brando R. Twilley.  The firm 
has donated over 4,000 hours to this pro bono assignment.  This is a corrected version of the report first submitted to 
the Court in September 2012.   
4
 We use the term “OUI” to refer to cases in which defendants were charged with operating under the influence of 
either drugs or alcohol, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24.  
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crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Public confidence in the 
judiciary depends on its belief in the integrity of the judicial process, judges and 
their decisions.  To preserve the public’s trust and confidence, the courts must be, 
and must appear to be, fair and impartial in all cases.  We have asked Mr. 
Cinquegrana to conduct the preliminary inquiry in a manner that respects each of 
these principles.5   
We have been mindful of these principles in the course of our work.  In a jury-waived trial, a 
judge’s duty is to confine his attention to the facts in the trial record and apply the relevant law to 
an analysis of only those facts.  The court must hold the government to its burden of proof and 
apply the reasonable doubt standard, which is a high bar to conviction.6  When sitting as the trier 
of fact, the decision of a judge to acquit a defendant is unreviewable at law, and properly so, in 
order to protect individuals from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same criminal offense.7   
While this assignment required the computation of average acquittal rates, we have not attempted 
to identify a “correct” rate by reviewing the record of OUI trials and imposing our own 
judgment.  We have disagreed with the outcome of some of the cases we reviewed, but we 
cannot base any findings on such disagreements alone.  It would be impossible to review the trial 
record of a sufficient sample of cases to draw meaningful conclusions about the differences 
between our evaluations and the outcomes reflected in the data we collected.  Even if we could 
do so, another reviewer probably would differ in the evaluation of many of the cases.   
We offer a word of caution regarding the statistics in this report.  They indicate a volume and 
rate of acquittals that are higher in certain courts and before certain judges, and a volume and 
rate of convictions that are higher in other courts and before other judges.  This information can 
be used to identify disparities in the handling of OUI cases in different settings, and it may be 
helpful in evaluating whether systemic changes should be made.  However, it would be a 
dangerous precedent to base any evaluation of individual judicial performance on these statistics.  
First, as explained below and in Attachment 4, the statistics were generated from information 
contained in the electronic case management systems currently used by the courts.  That 
information is entered from paper dockets, which remain the official court records.  When  
samples of paper dockets were compared to the electronic data, data entry errors were found and 
corrected, but more errors certainly remain.  More importantly, to hold judges accountable based 
on the computation of averages which may appear satisfactory to one side or the other would 
impair the independence of the judiciary and subvert its role as the neutral arbiter in the 
administration of justice according to constitutional principles.   
                                                 
5
 Statement of the Supreme Judicial Court, October 31, 2011 (Attachment 3). 
6
 See Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850).  The citations in this report conform to the Supreme 
Judicial Court’s Official Reports Style Manual, 2012 Edition.   
7
 Although the Massachusetts Constitution does not have an explicit double jeopardy clause, “this Commonwealth 
has long recognized a State common law and statutory prohibition against double jeopardy.”  Powers v. 
Commonwealth, 426 Mass. 534, 537 n.5 (1998); see G. L. c. 263, § 7 (“A person shall not be held to answer on a 
second indictment or complaint for a crime of which he has been acquitted upon the facts and merits . . . .”).  
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II. SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION 
Our first task was to determine whether we could obtain reliable data on OUI dispositions in 
Massachusetts courts.  The Spotlight Series reported statistics based on data from the 
Commonwealth’s 11 district attorneys.  Each district attorney provided data from a different time 
period.  Some of those data sets did not include jury trials, and none included pleas.  It was 
necessary to obtain a larger database for the same time period in as many courts as possible, in 
order to comply with the Court’s directive to compute an average acquittal rate in bench trials; 
compare the acquittal rates of judges to that average; and attempt to identify possible reasons for 
any disparity.  
This was no small task, and it required thousands of hours of work.  The Spotlight Series had 
reported correctly that the necessary statistics were not then available from the courts.  We asked 
whether the District Court Department (“the District Court”) and the Boston Municipal Court 
Department (“the BMC”) maintain information that could be used to generate the required 
statistics.8   
We looked to the MassCourts computerized case management system, which was implemented 
beginning in 2006 and is still being refined.  MassCourts is used in 60 of 62 courts in the District 
Court and seven of the eight courts in the BMC.  It is a web-based system that stores electronic 
data concerning the scheduling and disposition of cases.  It was designed to function as a case 
management system, not for the purpose of collecting and analyzing statistical data.  Thus,  
statistics on OUI offenses are not routinely computed and maintained in MassCourts. 
However, thanks to the substantial efforts of the staffs of the Trial Court and the Massachusetts 
Sentencing Commission, we were able to obtain MassCourts data for the District Court (except 
for the Brockton and Barnstable District Courts)9 and all of the BMC courts except the Central 
Division (in downtown Boston) for OUI dispositions which occurred between January 1, 2008 
and March 31, 2012.  In addition, we were able to obtain similar data for the BMC Central 
Division from CourtView, a separate computerized system used by that court alone.  We 
collected, audited, and analyzed the data using the methods that are described in detail in 
Attachment 4. 
After we received this data, we asked the staff of the Sentencing Commission to assist us in 
analyzing it, and the staff of the Trial Court to audit it.  The Sentencing Commission reviewed 
selected data fields from MassCourts and CourtView and converted that information into a 
useable format.  The Trial Court staff conducted an audit by visiting each court and checking the 
MassCourts and CourtView entries against the paper docket sheets from about one-third of all of 
                                                 
8
 These are the two departments of the Massachusetts Trial Court where almost all OUI cases are heard.  A small 
number of OUI cases are brought to the Superior Court Department, usually in connection with motor vehicle 
homicide cases or cases involving subsequent OUI offenders, or in the Juvenile Court Department.  We did not 
review any Superior Court or Juvenile Court cases or data. 
9
 The Brockton and Barnstable District Courts do not currently use the MassCourts system.  As discussed further in 
Attachment 4, we were therefore unable to extract data from these courts and they are not included in any of our 
analyses. 
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the OUI bench trials and one-tenth of all of the OUI cases that were included in the data we 
collected.   
Finally, in connection with the Trial Court’s audit, we obtained copies of the police reports and 
docket sheets for 1,835 cases, representing approximately one-third of the bench trials included 
in the data, chosen randomly.  We reviewed all of these dockets and made some adjustments to 
the data as a result of that review.  See Attachment 4.  
This effort resulted in the collection of data regarding 63,440 OUI cases.  We divided the data 
into two parts for analysis.  First, we segregated the data regarding dispositions between 
January 1, 2008 and September 30, 2011 (the “Time Period,” during which 56,966 OUI cases, 
which we refer to as the “Database,” were disposed of), and used that information to compute 
the majority of the statistics in this report.  We selected this interval in order to collect a 
sufficient number of OUI dispositions to identify meaningful averages and disparities.  We were 
advised that by January 1, 2008 most of the courts in the District Court and BMC were using 
MassCourts.  September 30, 2011 was the latest date, prior to the start of our data collection, at 
which we could be confident that disposed cases had been entered into MassCourts.   
Second, in an attempt to compare experience in the courts before and after the Spotlight Team’s 
inquiry, we looked at dispositions in two six-month periods before and after that inquiry was 
being conducted: October 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011 (before, containing 6,858 cases within the 
Database); and October 1, 2011 to March 31, 2012 (after, consisting of an additional 6,474 
cases).   
With usable data in hand, we sought the advice of experts in the evaluation of statistics in order 
to analyze it.  We were fortunate to obtain the pro bono services of Paul Greenberg and Marc van 
Audenrode of Analysis Group, a leading consulting firm that provides economic, financial, and 
business strategy consulting to law firms, corporations, and government agencies.10  With the 
assistance of Analysis Group, we used the Database to tabulate conviction and acquittal rates in 
each of the Commonwealth’s 14 counties.  In addition, we tabulated statistics for 60 of the 62 
courts in the District Court, the eight courts in the BMC, and all of the judges in those 
Departments who handled OUI cases during the Time Period. The results of this statistical 
compilation are presented in the tables that are contained in Attachment 5.11  
The second part of our mandate was to identify disparities demonstrated by the statistics and, if 
possible, the reasons for those disparities.  In order to avoid arbitrary distinctions, we relied on 
the expertise of Analysis Group, which used standard statistical techniques to identify disparities 
as explained in Attachment 6.  
The Court has asked us to identify judges by numbers in the tables contained in this report and in 
Attachments 4 and 6, and to identify all 217 judges in the Database by name, and corresponding 
number, in Table A3 in Attachment 5. 
                                                 
10
 See Analysis Group, at http://www.analysisgroup.com. 
11
 The OUI cases in the Database were heard by 217 judges in the District Court and BMC who handled at least one 
case during the Time Period.  They are identified in Table A3 in Attachment 5. 
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We identified factual, legal, and procedural issues affecting the trial of OUI cases by reviewing 
docket sheets, police reports, and trial recordings chosen from samples of cases taken from 
various courts.  We also reviewed the trial recordings of many of the cases discussed in the 
Spotlight Series.  We discussed our observations with judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers 
(we sometimes refer to them generally as the “participants” in the trial process), and we applied 
all of this learning to an assessment of the statistics generated from the data we collected.  Where 
appropriate, we compared the law governing OUI cases in Massachusetts with the law in other 
states. 
In keeping with our mandate that this was not to be a disciplinary inquiry, and to avoid any 
impact on individual defendants, we did not make inquiry about specific cases.12  The Court did 
not give us the power to compel the production of documents or the testimony of witnesses, and 
all of the information we collected was provided voluntarily. 
We appreciate the cooperation and assistance of Chief Justice Lynda Connolly of the District 
Court and her staff; Chief Justice Charles Johnson of the Boston Municipal Court and his staff; 
Craig Burlingame, Chief Information Officer, Mark Prior, Team Leader of the MassCourts Data 
Management Team, and William Marchant, Chief Financial Officer, and their colleagues at the 
Trial Court; Linda Holt, Research Director, and Lee Kavanagh, Research Analyst, of the 
Massachusetts Sentencing Commission; Analysis Group; each of the Commonwealth’s 11 
district attorneys and members of their staffs; and the judges and defense lawyers who agreed to 
speak with us.   
III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Our purpose in carrying out this assignment was to develop reliable data and a method for 
analyzing it that would provide meaningful insights.  Our concern was that the computation of 
statistics regarding OUI outcomes, if taken out of context, could be misleading and lead to 
inaccurate conclusions.  For example, a number of judges had 100% bench trial acquittal rates, 
but only in a small number of cases.  As we explain in our findings, we ultimately determined 
that the bench trial acquittal rate of a court or judge should be evaluated together with the rate of 
jury waiver and the volume of cases heard.  Thus, perhaps the first lesson learned from this 
assignment is that useful statistics regarding the outcomes of criminal cases are very difficult to 
assemble and must be interpreted with great care. 
We were able to obtain data sufficient to compute the averages requested by the Court.  In 
addition, we arrived at methods for evaluating bench trial acquittal rates beyond their face value, 
                                                 
12
 We note the Court’s recent establishment of a judicial deliberative privilege, which protects “judges from the post 
hoc probing of their mental processes [ensuring] the integrity and quality of judicial decision-making.”  In re 
Enforcement of a Subpoena, 463 Mass. 162, 168 (2012).  The privilege is “narrowly tailored but absolute” and 
applies to a “judge’s mental impressions and thought processes in reaching a judicial decision, whether harbored 
internally or memorialized in other nonpublic materials, [as well as] confidential communications among judges and 
between judges and court staff made in the course of and related to their deliberative processes in particular cases.”  
Id. at 174.  The privilege does not cover a judge’s memory of “nondeliberative events” from cases in which the 
judge participated; inquiries into whether a judge was subject to “improper ‘extraneous influences’ or ex parte 
communications during the deliberative process;” or legal proceedings in which the judge is a witness or otherwise 
personally involved.  Id. at 174-75. 
 REPORT TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 
OCTOBER 2012 
 
 
6 
 
and for identifying significant disparities among courts and judges.  We developed insights into 
the way OUI cases are administered and tried, which led us to recommend changes in governing 
statutes that would simplify the trial of these cases and give greater effect to the refusal of 
breathalyzer tests; the management of the courts, to avoid the appearance of leniency in 
connection with jury waivers; and the training of judges, to achieve a more uniform treatment of 
these offenses.  Those recommendations are explained in Part IX.    
We divided our findings into five parts: conviction and acquittal rates (Findings #1-3); disparities 
among courts and judges (Findings #4-9); comparisons to other states and other types of offenses 
in Massachusetts (Findings #10-11); reasons for high acquittal rates (Findings #12-14); and a 
specific focus on breathalyzer evidence (Findings #15-16).   
A. Conviction and Acquittal Rates 
The statistics in this report, which are based on almost 57,000 dispositions over 45 months, show 
that 77% of OUI cases were resolved against the defendant, either by plea (including admissions 
to sufficient facts) or trial; 13% resulted in acquittals, either before a judge or jury; and 10% 
resulted in some other disposition, usually a dismissal for reasons unrelated to the merits of the 
case.  When the cases were resolved in a jury trial, 58% of the defendants were acquitted.  When 
judges considered the merits of OUI cases in bench trials, 86% were acquitted. 
It stands to reason that the overall conviction rate would not be replicated in cases that go to trial, 
since it is affected largely by pleas, which occurred in 73% of the cases in the Database.  In 
addition, comparing the results in jury trials and bench trials also may not be appropriate.  Most 
participants told us that the cases resolved in jury trials are different, often stronger cases for the 
Commonwealth, than those which are resolved in bench trials.  
B. Disparities Among Courts and Judges 
Even if the cases resolved in bench trials were among the weakest cases in our Database, this 
would not account for the fact that in some courts, and before some judges, the bench trial 
acquittal rate was significantly higher than the 86% statewide average, in a high volume of cases.  
This disparity in bench trial acquittal rates was generally accompanied by a similar disparity in 
jury trial waiver rates: that is, where judges had a high volume of bench trial acquittals, they 
received more jury waivers.  Thus, some judges amassed a record which may have assured that 
they would continue to receive jury waivers, because they were perceived as more favorable to 
defendants, rightly or wrongly, and therefore more likely to acquit. 
We found this most apparent in Worcester County, where the county-wide bench trial acquittal 
rate was 97%.  In two courts there, East Brookfield and Fitchburg, that rate was over 97% and 
was accompanied by a jury trial waiver rate almost three times the statewide average.  Those two 
courts had the lowest overall conviction rate in the state, 53% and 55% respectively.    
Although we have catalogued our own observations of the factors that make some OUI cases 
difficult to prove, as well as the observations we heard from participants, they do not fully 
explain the rate of waivers and acquittals in Worcester County, and no one we met with could 
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offer a complete explanation.  That said, no one we interviewed alleged that such high acquittal 
rates are the product of corrupt influence on judges.    
We also found much higher conviction rates in other courts, but not because the judges there 
convicted defendants in high numbers in bench trials.  In those courts, defendants rarely elected 
bench trials, choosing either a jury trial or a plea.  Some judges in those courts may have had a 
high bench trial acquittal rate, but only in a small number of bench trials.  The court with the 
highest conviction rate in the state was Newburyport (91%), where the jury trial waiver rate was 
less than 1%. 
Thus, there were significant disparities in OUI outcomes among courts during the Time Period.  
With regard to judges, through the use of standard statistical techniques developed by Analysis 
Group, we identified judges associated with high waiver and acquittal rates, on the one hand, and 
low waiver rates on the other.  Out of the 217 judges who heard at least one case in the Database, 
there were 33 judges in the group associated with high waiver and acquittal rates (18 of whom 
sat regularly in Worcester County, where the overall conviction rate was 67%, the lowest for a 
county in the state except Nantucket).  There were 20 judges associated with low waiver rates in 
the second group (13 of whom sat regularly in either Essex or Middlesex County, where the 
overall conviction rates were 86% and 78%, respectively).   
Finally, in a comparison of two six-month periods before and after the Spotlight Series 
investigation was conducted, the statistics show that the number of bench trials declined 
significantly, and the bench trial acquittal rate declined slightly. 
C. Comparisons to Other States and Other Massachusetts Offenses 
We did not find national averages for comparison to the statistics in this report.  We did find 
reports on OUI conviction rates in other states, which show that the Massachusetts OUI 
conviction rate, based on our Database, was within a range of similar results in those states.  
With regard to other Massachusetts offenses, we determined that it would not be useful to repeat 
the extensive effort applied here to an analysis of other types of offenses, which present a variety 
of different factors affecting outcomes.  We did find data indicating that the rate of dismissal in 
other Massachusetts criminal cases is significantly higher than in OUI cases, confirming what 
most participants told us, that prosecutors seldom dismiss OUI cases.  It is reasonable to infer 
that this would have an impact on OUI acquittals.   
D. Reasons for High Acquittal Rates 
There was general agreement among the prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers we 
interviewed about the factors that can make OUI cases difficult to prove.  The results of field 
sobriety tests are difficult to interpret objectively, and they often are reported in court in a rote 
and repetitive manner.  Breathalyzer test results can be attacked based on delay and the method 
of administration of the test.  Prosecutors may be overburdened and sometimes less experienced 
than defense lawyers.  Evidence of an accident or bad operation may be easily explained by other 
factors, and inadmissible field tests, properly used to make arrest decisions, sometimes form a 
major part of the evidence.  Some complain that evidence of the refusal to take a breathalyzer or 
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field sobriety test should be admissible, although this may be more relevant to jury trials than 
bench trials. 
Nevertheless, no one we interviewed could explain how any combination of these factors could 
result in the acquittal of virtually every OUI defendant who chose a bench trial, as we found in 
certain courts, such as those in Worcester County, and before certain judges. 
E. Breathalyzer Evidence 
Clearly, breathalyzer evidence is of paramount importance in OUI cases, because it is an 
objective measure of impairment.  However, we found that breathalyzer results over the legal 
limit, admitted at bench trials, sometimes do not result in convictions.  No one offered us a 
complete explanation for this finding.  In cases involving delay in the administration of 
breathalyzer tests, we infer that judges may be applying their knowledge of scientific principles, 
derived from other cases, regarding extrapolation of breathalyzer results backward to the time of 
operation, although we found little support for this view among participants.  Our analysis of the 
use of breathalyzer evidence led us to our first recommendation, regarding a change in the OUI 
statute to eliminate the issue of delay in the administration of these tests. 
IV. LAW GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF OUI CASES 
In order to place the analysis and findings in this report in context, we summarize the important 
legal principles governing the trial of OUI cases in the Commonwealth. 
To establish a violation of the Massachusetts OUI statute, the Commonwealth must prove three 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant operated a motor vehicle; (2) the 
operation occurred on a “public way”; and (3) the defendant operated the vehicle while under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol13 or while having a blood alcohol level of .08% or greater.  See 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).   
A person operates a motor vehicle whenever he or she is in the vehicle and intentionally 
manipulates some mechanical or electrical part of the vehicle, like the gear shift or the ignition, 
which alone or in sequence, will set the vehicle in motion. See Commonwealth v. Uski, 263 
Mass. 22, 24 (1928).  Operation is most evident when a defendant is driving a motor vehicle, but 
courts have also found that a defendant is operating a vehicle when it is parked but the engine is 
running or the key has activated its electrical system.  See Commonwealth v. Eckert, 431 Mass. 
591, 599-600 (2000); Commonwealth v. Ginnetti, 400 Mass. 181, 183-184 (1987); 
Commonwealth v. Sudderth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 319-321 (1994).   
To prove the public way element, the Commonwealth must provide evidence that the offense 
occurred “upon any way or in any place to which the public has the right of access, or upon any 
way or in any place to which members of the public have access as invitees.”  G. L. c. 90, § 24 
(1) (a) (1).  A “way” is defined as “any public highway, private way laid out under authority of 
statute, way dedicated to public use, or way under the control of park commissioners or body 
                                                 
13
 Most OUI trials involve consumption of alcohol, and in our general discussions of the offense in this report we 
refer to cases based on alcohol consumption as a matter of convenience. 
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having like powers.”  G. L. c. 90, § 1.  In determining whether a road is a public way, a judge or 
jury may consider whether the road is paved, whether it is maintained by the state or town, and 
whether there are street lights, street signs, or fire hydrants present on the way.  See 
Commonwealth v. Mara, 257 Mass. 198, 208-209 (1926) (“Curbings, concrete paving, electric 
lights and hydrants in a street are commonly the result of the expenditure of public money for the 
public use and convenience.”); Commonwealth v. Muise, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 964, 965 (1990) 
(“indicia of accessibility to the public are paved roads, the absence of signs prohibiting the public 
access, street lights, curbing, abutting houses or businesses, crossroads, traffic, signs, signals, 
lighting, and hydrants.”).  Roads and parking lots have also been considered to be “public ways” 
if “members of the public have access [to them] as invitees or licensees.”  Commonwealth v. 
Kiss, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 247, 249 (2003); see Commonwealth v. Hart, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 235, 
237 (1988).  Some cases do turn on this element, for example, when an arrest is made on a 
private driveway or in a private development. 
To prove the third element of the offense, a prosecutor may present evidence that the defendant 
operated his or her motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (the “under the influence” 
or “impairment” theory of guilt) or that the defendant had a blood alcohol level of .08% or 
higher at the time of operation (the “per se” theory of guilt).  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1); 
Commonwealth v. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 811 (2007).  If the Commonwealth chooses to 
proceed on the impairment  theory of guilt, it need not supply evidence that the defendant’s 
consumption of alcohol actually rendered his operation of the vehicle unsafe.  The 
Commonwealth need only prove that the defendant’s alcohol intake diminished his capacity to 
operate a motor vehicle safely.  See Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. 169, 173 (1985).  
Circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s impairment is enough to satisfy this element.  
Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 354 (1993).  Evidence commonly offered by the 
prosecution during an OUI trial to show impairment includes: (1) a police officer’s testimony 
regarding observations of the defendant, including the defendant’s statements, appearance, 
performance on field sobriety tests and operation of a motor vehicle; (2) witness testimony 
concerning the defendant’s operation or sobriety; (3) video recordings of the defendant during 
the booking process; and (4) the results of a breathalyzer test. 
Police officers often administer “field sobriety tests” before an OUI arrest to determine whether 
the defendant was under the influence.  The most common of these tests are the nine-step walk 
and turn test, the one-leg stand test, recitation of the alphabet, and counting to a certain number.  
While lay testimony concerning these tests is admissible, Commonwealth v. Schutte, 52 Mass. 
App. Ct. 796, 800-801 (2001), evidence concerning another common field sobriety test, the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus test,14 is inadmissible without expert scientific testimony.  See 
                                                 
14
 Nystagmus is an involuntary jerking or bouncing of the eyeball that occurs when there is a disturbance of the 
vestibular (inner ear) system or the oculomotor control of the eye.  Horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) refers to a 
lateral or horizontal jerking when the eye gazes to the side.  In the impaired driving context, alcohol consumption or 
consumption of certain other central nervous system depressants, inhalants or phencyclidine, hinders the ability of 
the brain to correctly control eye muscles, therefore causing the jerk or bounce associated with HGN.  As the degree 
of impairment becomes greater, the jerking or bouncing, i.e., the nystagmus, becomes more pronounced.  This is 
assessed in the horizontal gaze nystagmus test.  American Prosecutors Research Institute, Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus--The Science & The Law: A Resource Guide for Judges, Prosecutors and Law Enforcement, Section 1, 
at http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/enforce/nystagmus/ (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012).  
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Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 188 (1997).  See discussion in Finding #13, infra.  
Preliminary breath tests, which may be given at traffic stops and road blocks, are inadmissible as 
well because they employ fuel cell and not infrared technology.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24K (stating 
that breath test results shall only be valid when performed using “infrared breath-testing 
devices”).   
Evidence that a defendant refused to perform any of these field sobriety or chemical tests is 
inadmissible.  See Commonwealth v. McGrail, 419 Mass. 774, 780 (1995) (refusal of field 
sobriety tests); Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1211 (1992) (refusal of chemical tests).   
Where the Commonwealth proceeds under the per se theory, the prosecutor must prove that the 
defendant’s blood alcohol level was .08% or higher at the time of operation of  a  motor vehicle.  
Commonwealth v. Rumery, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 685, 688 (2011) (“[T]he properly admitted 
reading of 0.08, by itself, permitted the jury to conclude that the defendant had a blood alcohol 
level that was above the legal limit.”).   
The admissibility of breathalyzer test results depends on the Commonwealth’s theory of guilt.  
They are admissible when the Commonwealth proceeds under the per se theory, or under both 
theories, without expert testimony to interpret the results.  However, if the Commonwealth 
proceeds solely under the impairment theory, the Court has ruled that expert testimony is needed 
to “establish[] a relationship between the test results and intoxication” before the test results can 
be admitted in evidence.  Colturi, 448 Mass. at 818.  We discuss this aspect of the law at length 
in Finding #16. 
V. ANALYSIS OF STATISTICAL DATA 
A. Data Compilations From MassCourts and CourtView 
We conducted the detailed analysis of MassCourts and CourtView data that is summarized in 
Attachment 4 in order to reduce that information to a useable measure of the number of pleas 
(including admissions to sufficient facts), bench trials, jury trials, and other dispositive events in 
OUI cases handled by each judge during the Time Period.15  For our purposes, we focused on the 
following data fields in MassCourts: “Disposition Date,” “Disposition Method,” “Disposition 
Code,” and “Disposition Judge.”  The “Disposition Method” describes the type of proceeding at 
which the case was terminated, including a bench trial, jury trial, or plea hearing.  The 
“Disposition Code” describes the result, including guilty on a plea, a continuance without a 
finding (“CWOF”),16 a guilty verdict, or a not guilty verdict.  MassCourts contains many data 
entry options related to these and other events, and much of the necessary work involved 
                                                 
15
 Unless otherwise indicated, the data referred to in this discussion is for the Time Period. 
16
 A CWOF requires the defendant to admit sufficient facts for an OUI conviction.  The case is continued for a 
specified period during which the defendant is on probation.  If the defendant complies with the conditions of 
probation, the case is dismissed.  If the defendant violates the conditions, the CWOF disposition may be modified to 
a guilty finding.  We considered a CWOF to be a disposition adverse to the defendant regardless of whether the 
CWOF was ultimately dismissed.  See Finding #1. 
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devising a method for consistently grouping the options into useable categories, as described in 
Attachment 4.17  
It should be noted that the analyses in this report pertain to the manner in which OUI cases are 
disposed of, and therefore each case in the Database was assigned to the court in which it was 
finally disposed, not where it originated.  Thus, the statistics may not reflect the number of cases 
originating in a court where cases scheduled for a jury trial are sent to another court (even if they 
ultimately result in a bench trial because of a jury waiver).  Throughout this report, the term 
“court” refers to the court that disposed of the OUI charge.   
From this simplified data, we computed the following totals and percentages for each judge, each 
court and county, and statewide: 
• Pleas (including subtotals for CWOFs, and guilty findings) 
• Bench Trials (including subtotals for CWOFs, guilty and not guilty findings) 
• Jury Trial Waiver Rate 
• Bench Trial Acquittal Rate 
• Jury Trials (including subtotals for CWOFs, guilty and not guilty verdicts) 
• Jury Trial Acquittal Rate 
• Other Dispositive Events18 
• Total OUI Cases 
• Conviction Rate (for counties and courts) 
We used this information to compile the following tables: 
• TABLE A1 - County Data and Statewide Totals 
• TABLE A2 - Court Data 
• TABLE A3 - Judge Data 
• TABLE A4 - Pre- and Post-Spotlight Series Data 
These tables are contained in Attachment 5.  The data limitations explained in Attachment 4 
lead to two caveats which are noted in these tables.  First, those judges who sat at any time in the 
Brockton or Barnstable District Courts, where we have no data, are marked with a single asterisk 
(*), and the totals for those judges are based on their cases only outside those two courts.  
Second, for those judges who sat at any time in the BMC Central Division (even if they sat more 
often in other courts), we have data identifying their bench and jury trials, and their pleas and 
other dispositions outside the Central Division, but not for their pleas and other dispositions in 
the Central Division itself.  Therefore, those judges are designated by a double asterisk (**) and 
we did not compute waiver rates for those judges, because that rate depends on a comparison of 
bench trials to the total of trials and pleas. 
                                                 
17
 We followed a similar process to analyze the CourtView data for the BMC Central Division, as described in 
Attachment 4.  There was no data available for the Brockton and Barnstable District Courts in MassCourts, and we 
did not attempt to derive data directly from those courts.   
18
 Other dispositive events consist primarily of cases resolved by dismissal, nolle prosequi (a declaration that the 
prosecution declines to prosecute the case), or pretrial probation. 
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We calculated bench trial acquittal rates by dividing the number of cases tried by a judge 
resulting in an acquittal by the total number of cases tried by that judge, resulting in either an 
acquittal or a conviction.  For the purpose of calculating this ratio, we considered a CWOF 
entered after a bench trial to be a conviction, based on the assumption that the court found 
sufficient facts to support a guilty finding in these cases.19  See Finding #1.  The statewide bench 
trial acquittal rate was 86%.20   
We used the same method to calculate jury trial acquittal rates, which averaged 58% statewide. 
We calculated jury trial waiver rates by dividing the number of bench trials conducted by a judge 
by the total number of pleas and trials handled by that judge.  Because this ratio is intended to 
identify the percentage of cases in which a judge was asked to evaluate the merits of a case, 
compared to the total number of cases disposed of on the merits, cases falling under the “Other” 
dispositive events category (i.e., cases resolved by dismissal, nolle prosequi, and pretrial 
probation) are not included in the denominator in the waiver rate calculations.  The statewide 
average waiver rate was 12%. 
We calculated conviction rates by dividing the total dispositions adverse to a defendant (guilty 
and CWOF, whether by plea or trial) by the total number of OUI cases.  Statewide, 77% of all 
cases resulted in a disposition adverse to the defendant.  While not separately computed in the 
tables, the percentage of all cases resolved statewide by pleas versus trials was: pleas, 73%; 
bench trials, 10%; and jury trials, 6%.  Other dispositions, mostly dismissals, account for about 
10%.21  
The 10% of cases counted under the “Other” dispositions category in our tables include 
dismissals represented by a variety of Disposition Codes in MassCourts, which may represent 
dismissals on the merits or for procedural reasons, on motion of the Commonwealth or of the 
defense.  They also include other dispositions such as pretrial probation.  We are confident that 
the vast majority of these cases resulted in dismissals, but we did not attempt to determine the 
exact number of each type, which would have required a review of the docket sheet for every 
case.   
We also undertook to determine whether there was any difference in the disposition of OUI cases 
before and after the Spotlight Series investigation.  See Finding #7.  For the pre- and post-
Spotlight Series comparison, we chose two discrete intervals, from October 1, 2010 through 
March 31, 2011 (before) and October 1, 2011 through March 31, 2012 (after).  Although the 
                                                 
19
 Courts are not permitted to enter CWOFs over the Commonwealth’s objection after a trial has occurred.  
Commonwealth v. Norrell, 423 Mass. 725, 727 (1996).  We do note, however, that in 63 instances, the docket sheets 
indicate that a CWOF was entered in connection with a bench trial, and in two instances in connection with a jury 
trial.  We cannot determine from MassCourts or from the docket sheets in these cases whether judges entered these 
CWOFs after or instead of trials.  For the purpose of our analysis, we took the docket sheets at face value and 
assumed that the CWOFs were entered after trial. 
20
 Our calculation of the statewide acquittal rate does not include data from the Barnstable or Brockton District 
Courts, as previously noted. 
21
 All of the percentages we calculated have been rounded to the neareset 1%.  The percentages do not always total 
100% because of rounding. 
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Spotlight Series articles were published between October 30 and November 13, 2011 (with 
follow-up articles and a Globe editorial appearing later in November), most participants we 
interviewed told us that the existence of the investigation was well known in the courts by mid-
2011.   
The Database from which these tables are derived contains 56,966 dispositions entered in 
MassCourts and CourtView over 45 months.  We questioned whether the transfer of information 
from paper docket sheets to those electronic case management systems resulted in errors.  For 
that reason, we asked the Trial Court staff to conduct the audits explained in Part II and 
Attachment 4, and we conducted our own limited audit using a random one-third sample of 
bench trials, as explained therein.  We corrected the Database whenever possible and reviewed 
these issues with Analysis Group as the data compilations and statistical analyses were prepared.  
While our analysis of the one-third sample of bench trials indicates that some unidentified 
random errors likely remain, we are advised by Analysis Group that the error rate is low enough 
that it does not undermine the integrity of the data analysis.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
statistical comparisons reported here are reliable and do not require any further adjustments. 
B. Comparison to Data From the District Attorneys 
We contacted each of Massachusetts’s 11 district attorneys.  They provided us with the 
information they had given to the Spotlight Team in response to its information requests. 
According to the Spotlight Series, the district attorneys’ data showed the following acquittal rates 
after trial in each district:22 
Table 1.  District Attorney Data Given to the Boston Globe 
District Attorneys’ Data 
(by district) 
Bench Trial 
Acquittal Rate 
Jury Trial  
Acquittal Rate Time Period 
Berkshire 71% 60% 2005-2010 
Bristol 77% 58% 2009-2011 
Cape & Islands 79% 59% 2006-2011 
Essex 57% 35% 2005-2011 
Hampden 47% (combined) 2006-2010 
Middlesex 83% 62% 2006-2011 
Norfolk 86% 71% 2006-2010 
Northwestern 84% 54% 2009-2011 
Plymouth 86% 56% 2005-2010 
Suffolk 88% 69% 2005-2010 
Worcester 85% n/a 2010 
 
                                                 
22
 Farragher, For drunk drivers, a habit of judicial leniency, The Boston Globe (Oct. 30, 2011).  Note that where the 
term “district” is the same as the name of a county, that indicates a district attorney whose jurisdiction covers only 
one county.  Other counties are combined into districts covered by the same prosecutor, as follows: the Cape and 
Islands District includes Barnstable, Dukes, and Nantucket counties; and the Northwestern District includes Franklin 
and Hampshire counties.   
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Note that the time periods covered by the data are not consistent.  They range from one year 
(2010, for Worcester County) to over six years (2005-2011, from Essex County).   
The MassCourts and CourtView data covered the time period from January 1, 2008 to 
September 30, 2011.  This data shows acquittal rates after trial, for the Time Period, as displayed 
in the following table: 
Table 2.  Summary of MassCourts and CourtView Data by County 
MassCourts/CourtView Data 
(by county) 
Bench Trial 
Acquittal Rate 
Jury Trial  
Acquittal Rate Time Period 
Berkshire 61% 63% 1/1/08-9/30/11 
Bristol 84% 62% " 
Cape & Islands District: 79% 56% " 
Barnstable 78% 54% " 
Dukes 83%  0% " 
Nantucket 67% 71% " 
Essex 81% 56% " 
Hampden 85% 57% " 
Middlesex 80% 54% " 
Norfolk 80% 57% " 
Northwestern District: 83% 57% " 
Franklin 76% 63% " 
Hampshire 87% 51% " 
Plymouth 80% 42% " 
Suffolk 88% 64% " 
Worcester 97% 63% " 
 
Note that the bench and jury trial acquittal rates listed in Table 2 for the Cape & Islands and   
Plymouth County do not include data from the Barnstable and Brockton District Courts, for the 
reasons discussed in Attachment 4.23 
                                                 
23
 Where possible, we compared the data we received from the district attorneys (which was provided to the Globe) 
to the MassCourts data for comparable time periods.  In many instances, we found discrepancies between these data 
sets.  For example, we received data for bench trials conducted in 2010 from the Worcester County district attorney.  
This data consisted of 258 cases.  The MassCourts data, however, showed 496 bench trials conducted during this 
time period in Worcester County.  Moreover, according to the MassCourts data, 66 of the 258 bench trials listed in 
the district attorney’s data were not disposed of by bench or jury trial.  In 27 other cases, the district attorney’s data 
was not consistent with the MassCourts data as follows: 
• 11 cases listed by the DA as bench trials were classified as jury trials in MassCourts 
• the disposition judge was different in 16 cases 
• the disposition was different in 2 cases 
Similarly, we received data for bench and jury trials conducted in 2008 and 2009 from the Plymouth County district 
attorney.  This data consisted of 420 cases, including 116 cases from the Brockton District Court, which were not 
included in the MassCourts data.  The MassCourts data showed 476 bench and jury trials conducted during the same 
time period.  In addition, according to the MassCourts data, 49 cases included in the district attorney’s data were not 
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VI. REVIEW OF OUI CASES 
We used the Database to select cases for further review.  We reviewed docket sheets and police 
reports, categorized them, and used them to select trial recordings.  We listened to the recordings 
of 50 District Court trials and identified common issues apparent from those trials.   
A. Bench Trial Acquittals 
As discussed in Attachment 4, in connection with the Trial Court auditors’ review of a random 
one-third sample of cases that were disposed of by bench trial, we asked the audit team to copy 
the docket sheet and police report for each of those cases.  We reviewed a sample of those docket 
sheets and police reports for cases that resulted in an acquittal at bench trial.   
We reviewed cases from the East Brookfield, Eastern Hampshire, Hingham, Lowell and 
Springfield District Courts.  We chose those courts because they are in different counties; the 
volume of bench trials during the Time Period was significant in each court; and the bench trial 
acquittal rates in those courts ranged from the statewide average to far above. 
We tracked the type of evidence contained in the police reports for 292 cases and recorded the 
following information for each case: 
• which field sobriety tests were administered and whether the defendant 
passed, failed or refused each test; 
• whether the defendant took a breathalyzer test and the result of that test; 
• whether there was any evidence of an accident or bad operation of a motor 
vehicle by the defendant;  
• whether the defendant made any admissions regarding consumption of 
alcohol; and 
• whether inadmissible field sobriety tests (HGN and preliminary breath tests) 
were used in connection with the arrest. 
We also reviewed trial recordings of cases from each of the five courts listed above.  We selected 
cases that appeared to be particularly strong cases for the Commonwealth and requested the trial 
recordings for a total of 32 of them.  We received 30 of these trial recordings, which we 
reviewed and analyzed.  (We also listened to the recordings of eight of the cases discussed in the 
Spotlight Series, all of which resulted in acquittals.)   
                                                                                                                                                             
disposed of by bench or jury trial.  The district attorney’s data was also inconsistent with the MassCourts data in 49 
other cases: 
• the disposition was different in 2 cases 
• the disposition judge was different in 14 cases 
• the disposition method was different in 35 cases 
In light of the review and audit of the MassCourts and CourtView data, we did not change our results to be 
consistent with the district attorneys’ data. 
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B. Bench Trial Convictions 
We reviewed a sample of docket sheets and police reports for cases that resulted in a conviction 
at a bench trial.  Because the statewide bench trial acquittal rate is approximately 86%, the 
number of convictions in the random one-third sample copied by the auditors was small.  Thus, 
in order to review a larger sample of cases that resulted in a conviction at a bench trial, we made 
an additional request for copies of the docket sheets and police reports for all cases that resulted 
in a conviction at bench trial from nine courts: the East Brookfield, Eastern Hampshire, 
Hingham, Lowell, New Bedford, Orleans, Peabody, Springfield and Wrentham District Courts.  
We selected those courts for the same reasons discussed above: they are in different counties; the 
volume of bench trials during the Time Period was significant in each court; and the statistics in 
those courts cover a range of bench trial acquittal rates. 
We received the requested docket sheets and police reports from all of those courts except 
Wrentham.  We reviewed the docket sheets and police reports for 108 cases that resulted in a 
conviction at bench trial in the same manner described above.  Our purpose was to select cases 
that appeared to be particularly weak cases for the Commonwealth.  In addition, we selected 14 
cases from the Eastern Hampshire, Hingham, Lowell, New Bedford, Orleans and Springfield 
District Courts for review of the trial record.  We  received the recordings of 12 of these cases, 
which we reviewed.24   
C. Results of This Review 
With regard to the ultimate outcome of the cases, despite our attempts to apply an objective 
approach to sorting and reviewing them, our work became a highly subjective analysis.  Some of 
the cases that resulted in acquittals did, indeed, seem like good candidates for acquittal by any 
measure.  Some could have gone either way, while it appeared to us that others should have 
resulted in convictions.  As for the cases that resulted in convictions, some did not appear that 
much stronger than those resulting in acquittals. 
Of course, the record of these trials revealed that the evidence presented in court was not exactly 
as it appeared in the police reports.  Police officers were sometimes impeached, defenses not 
apparent in the reports were presented, and the advocacy on both sides resulted in more or less 
convincing evidence than what appeared in the written record.   
This work contributed to our findings on the repetitive nature of non-scientific evidence in OUI 
cases (Finding #12); cases in which inadmissible field sobriety tests are used (Finding #13); the 
apparent low utility of the field sobriety tests that are admitted (Finding #14); and breathalyzer 
readings over .08% that do not result in conviction (Finding #15).  In addition, we gained 
insights into the trial of these cases that, together with our interviews of judges, prosecutors and 
defense lawyers, informed our analysis of the statistics.   
                                                 
24
 We did not receive one trial recording and were told that the other was unavailable.   
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VII. DISCUSSIONS WITH JUDGES, PROSECUTORS, AND DEFENSE LAWYERS 
We thought it important to obtain the insights of  judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers.25  At 
the same time, we were conscious of our mandate not to conduct a disciplinary inquiry and wary 
of intruding on the settled conviction or acquittal of any individual defendant.  Therefore, we did 
not conduct interviews about particular trials and did not interview judges about decisions in 
particular cases. We organized our discussions around the following topics, which were not 
exclusive:  
1. The Supreme Judicial Court’s Appointment.  We explained the purpose of our 
inquiry and the specific assignment given to us by the Court.   
2. Acquittal Rates.  We informed the prosecutors generally of the statistics we 
found for their jurisdiction.  We asked for comment on the data and any 
discrepancies between our data and the information the prosecutors provided to 
the Globe. 
3. Assignment of Cases.  We asked about procedures for the assignment of cases 
and acceptance of jury waivers in the relevant courts.   
4. Use of Lobby Conferences.  We asked whether judges conduct lobby 
conferences (see note 38), how they take place, and what information may be 
discussed in these conversations.  
5. Jury Waiver.  We explored the effect of possible changes in the rules and 
procedures governing jury waiver. 
6. Prosecutors’ Policies.  We discussed the policies of district attorneys regarding 
dismissal of OUI cases, whether dismissal rates vary in these and other kinds of 
cases, and whether prosecutors drop OUI charges as part of plea bargains. 
7. Refusal Evidence.  We explored the impact of Massachusetts law regarding the 
inadmissibility of evidence that a defendant refused a field sobriety test or a 
breath test.  
8. Police Work.  We discussed issues unique to certain courts and counties, such as 
the volume of OUI cases and the roadways involved; the use of preliminary 
breath tests, HGN tests, and videotapes on the road and at bookings; and the use 
of field sobriety tests. 
9. Assistant District Attorneys.  We discussed the training and experience of 
assistant district attorneys in OUI cases; whether ADAs have discretion to dismiss 
OUI cases and under what circumstances; and what types of defects in a 
prosecutor’s case may lead to acquittals. 
                                                 
25
 The persons we interviewed are identified in Attachment 7. 
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10. Judges.  We asked participants whether they believe that defense lawyers engage 
in “judge shopping,” how that can be accomplished, and whether the views of 
judges regarding particular kinds of evidence may become known over time.  We 
asked the judges about the statistics we found and to comment on the challenges 
presented when they serve as fact finders in the trial of these cases, including the 
issues we identified regarding the repetitive nature of these cases and the 
evaluation of delay in administering breathalyzer tests.   
11. Conduct of Trials.  We asked about the most common reasons why OUI trials 
result in acquittals; the handling of breathalyzer evidence, including compliance 
with procedural requirements; retrograde extrapolation evidence; and whether 
judges import into a given trial the experience and expertise they learn in other 
trials.  We asked about the level of preparation of prosecutors and police officers, 
and their presentation of typical evidence.  We asked whether judges correctly 
apply the law regarding use of retrograde extrapolation and the Colturi holding, 
and in general about cases in which breathalyzer evidence above .08% was 
admitted and there was an acquittal. 
12. Administrative/Procedural Issues.  We asked whether judges should be rotated 
and whether changes should be made to the case assignment process.  We also 
asked about issues created by pressure to move cases through the system.  
13. Changes in Practice Following Spotlight Series.  We asked whether any aspects 
of the trial process had changed following publication of the Spotlight Series.   
14. Recommendations for Changes.  We asked participants for their 
recommendations for changes regarding the administration and trial of OUI cases. 
We used the information obtained in these discussions to inform our own review of OUI cases 
and our assessment of the statistics generated from the data.   
VIII. FINDINGS 
All of the statistics derived from the MassCourts and CourtView data are contained in the tables 
in Attachment 5.  The standard statistical methods applied by Analysis Group to identify 
disparities in the Database are described in Attachment 6.  The findings below present the 
important averages and disparities apparent from the statistics, together with a discussion of 
factors which may contribute to the statistics.   
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A. Conviction and Acquittal Rates 
1. 77% Of All OUI Cases Statewide Were Resolved Against The Defendant. 
The statistics in this report were computed based on the 56,966 OUI dispositions in the Database 
which took place during the Time Period (between January 1, 2008 and September 30, 2011).26  
When continuances without a finding (CWOFs, see note 16), guilty pleas, and all guilty verdicts 
(after bench or jury trial) are combined, 77% of those OUI cases were resolved against the 
defendant.  This conviction rate27 is similar to the rates in some of the other states where we 
found reports of OUI data.  See Finding #10.  About 13% of the cases resulted in acquittals: 9% 
by judges in bench trials, and 4% in jury trials.  The remaining 10% of the cases involved some 
other form of disposition, usually dismissal.28   
We include CWOFs as a result adverse to the defendant in the computation of conviction rates. 
A CWOF is imposed only after a defendant admits sufficient facts to support a conviction, just as 
in the case of a guilty plea, and is assigned to a driver alcohol education program.  The OUI 
statute makes this form of disposition available for first offenders, and for second offenders 
whose prior offense was ten years or more before their later conviction.   See G. L. c. 90, §§ 24 
(1) (a) (1), 24D.  A CWOF operates as a prior conviction for the purpose of enhanced penalties 
for second and subsequent OUI offenses.  See Commonwealth v. Valiton, 432 Mass. 647, 647-
648 (2000) (holding that the District Court judge was correct in finding that a defendant who 
previously admitted to sufficient facts was subject to penalties for a second offense after his 
subsequent conviction); G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1) (allowing for heightened penalties “[i]f a 
defendant has been previously convicted or assigned to an alcohol or controlled substance 
education treatment, or rehabilitation program by a court of the commonwealth or any other 
jurisdiction because of a like violation preceding the date of the commission of the offense for 
which he has been convicted.” [emphasis added]).29    
With regard to dispositions not on the merits (i.e., dismissals, as opposed to decisions applying 
the reasonable doubt standard to the facts of the case), those fell into the “Other” category 
                                                 
26
 An additional 6,474 cases that were disposed of between October 1, 2011 and March 31, 2012 were used to 
compare the statistics before and after the Spotlight Series referenced in Finding #7, bringing the total of all OUI 
cases collected to 63,440 cases. 
27
 We calculated the conviction rate by dividing the total number of CWOFs, guilty pleas, bench trial convictions, 
and jury trial convictions by the total number of OUI cases, for a given court.   
28
 All of the percentages we calculated have been rounded to the nearest 1%.   
29
 This is consistent with the Court’s recent decision in Souza v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 462 Mass. 227 (2012).  
There, the Court held that an admission to sufficient facts does not operate as a “conviction” with respect to the 
portion of the OUI statute mandating increased license suspensions based on refusal of breathalyzer tests.  Id. at 235.  
However, the Court acknowledged that the language of other parts of the statute did include CWOFs and 
assignments to alcohol treatment or education programs as bases for enhanced penalties.  See id. at 232;  see also G. 
L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1) (allowing for increased penalties if the defendant has already been convicted of an OUI 
offense or if he or she has been assigned to an alcohol treatment program, which is part of the §24D disposition that 
a defendant would receive after a CWOF).  In response to the Souza case, the legislature, through two recent budget 
amendments, has amended the OUI statute to include not only prior convictions but also prior assignments to 
alcohol education programs as a basis for increased license suspensions for breathalyzer test refusals.  G. L. c. 90, § 
24 (1) (f) (1), as amended through St. 2012, c. 139, §§ 99, 100.  
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explained in Attachment 4.  Most of those cases were associated with a Disposition Code 
indicating dismissal, but it is not possible to tell whether these dismissals were the result of a 
request by the Commonwealth or a judicial ruling (which could be based on the 
Commonwealth’s inability to be ready for trial or some other reason, such as a motion to 
suppress eliminating most of the evidence or a ruling based on a discovery violation).  In our 
interviews with participants, we were told that, as a matter of policy, very few OUI cases are 
dismissed voluntarily by the Commonwealth.   
2. When OUI Cases Went To Trial, Judges Acquitted Defendants In 86% 
Of The Cases Statewide, While Juries Acquitted About 58% Of The 
Time. 
When defendants waived a jury trial and chose a bench trial, on average they were acquitted 86% 
of the time.  The bench trial acquittal rates30 for the 217 judges who heard at least one case 
during the Time Period ranged from 0% to 100%.  In general, judges who handled more bench 
trials (the average was 27) had higher bench trial acquittal rates.  See Finding #4.  The overall 
average for jury acquittals was 58%. 
The county with the highest rate of bench trial acquittals was Worcester (97%), and the lowest 
was Berkshire (61%).  Jury acquittal rates in each county ranged from 42% (Plymouth) to 64% 
(Suffolk).31  The participants generally agreed that cases that go before juries for trial may be 
different than those that go before judges.  These jury cases are often stronger for the 
Commonwealth, but defendants nevertheless choose to try them, either because the sentence 
available on a plea is unacceptable or simply because they perceive the chance of success to be 
greater with six jurors.  Although we doubt that we could confirm these reports by an empirical 
review of cases, we accept this logic and have not sought to analyze the difference between 
bench and jury trial acquittal rates in counties or courts.   
3. Bench Trial Acquittal Rates In Worcester County Were Higher Than 
The Statewide Average, The Overall Conviction Rate Was Lower, And 
Two Worcester County Courts Contributed Disproportionally To These 
Statistics. 
In Worcester County, where there were 8,747 OUI cases during the Time Period, the average 
bench trial acquittal rate was 97%, 11 points higher than the statewide average.  All of the courts 
in Worcester County had bench trial acquittal rates over 90%.  In four high OUI volume courts 
(Fitchburg, Westborough, East Brookfield, and Dudley), this rate was 97-98%.   
Bench trials accounted for a larger percentage of the total dispositions in Worcester County: 19% 
compared to the statewide average of 10%.32  The jury trial waiver rate33 was high as well: 21% 
                                                 
30
 We calculated the bench trial acquittal rate by dividing the total number of not guilty findings in bench trials by 
the total number of bench trials for a given court or judge.  
31
 Excluding Dukes and Nantucket, which had only 2 and 14 jury trials during the Time Period, respectively. 
32
 This ratio is different than the waiver rate because it takes into account all OUI cases, whereas the waiver rate 
excludes “Other” dispositions in order to account for only those cases where waiver was an alternative to either a 
plea or a jury trial.   
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compared to the 12% statewide average.  Of the 33 judges with high bench trial acquittal rates 
identified in Finding #5, 18 regularly sat in this county. 
Because of the high percentage of acquittals at bench trial, the conviction rate in Worcester 
County was only 67% during the Time Period (compared to the statewide average of 77%).  The 
conviction rate in other counties with a similar volume of cases (Middlesex County, with 9,768 
cases, and Essex County, with 8,269 cases) was 78% and 86%, respectively, and the bench trial 
acquittal rate in those counties was 80% and 81%, respectively. 
Two courts in Worcester County stand out from the rest of the 68 courts in the District Court and 
BMC.  In East Brookfield and Fitchburg, the waiver rates were 34% and 35%, respectively, 
almost three times higher than the statewide average of 12%.  (The court with the next-highest 
waiver rate was Plymouth, at 24%.)  Thus, more than one-third of all OUI cases in these two 
courts resulted in bench trials, and over 97% of those cases resulted in acquittals.  The overall 
conviction rate in these two courts was 53% and 55%, respectively, the lowest in the state, 
compared to the 77% statewide average. 
These courts handled a greater than average OUI caseload.  On average, the 68 courts in the 
sample handled 838 cases during the Time Period, while these courts handled 1,112 and 1,244 
cases, respectively.  Together they accounted for 751 bench trials, 732 of which resulted in 
acquittals.  Their total bench trials accounted for 13% of all the bench trials in the entire state. 
East Brookfield handles the jury trials for the Dudley District Court, a non-jury court where the 
waiver rate also was high (23%).  Dudley was busier than average (985 cases), and of the 193 
bench trials conducted there, 187 (97%) were acquittals.  Between Dudley and East Brookfield, 
525 out of 538 bench trials resulted in acquittals.  Fitchburg handles the jury trials for 
Leominster, Clinton, Gardner, and Winchendon.  While the waiver rate in Leominster also was 
high (22%), the waiver rate in the others was low (6%, 8%, and 9%, respectively). 
B. Disparities Among Courts and Judges 
4. With Regard To Individual Judges, Bench Trial Acquittal Rates, By 
Themselves, Are Not Meaningful, Without Taking Into Account The 
Volume Of Cases And The Rate Of Jury Waiver.   
88 judges out of 217 had bench trial acquittal rates higher than 86%, many of them at 100%.  
However, those rates are not meaningful, taken by themselves.  In the Time Period, the average 
number of bench trials heard by a judge was 27.  Given the reports of participants that a high 
number of weak cases are moving through the system to bench trials, a 100% acquittal rate in 
only five or ten bench trials is not significant based on the small data sample.   
In order to identify disparities from the averages, we looked beyond bench trial acquittal rates.  
We used three measures to identify judges whose record during the Time Period was unusual: 
bench trial acquittal rate, jury trial waiver rate, and the number of bench trials.  The waiver rate 
                                                                                                                                                             
33
 The waiver rate is the percentage of all cases handled by a judge (pleas plus trials, but not including cases that 
were dismissed or had a disposition included in the “Other” category in our data). 
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is the percentage of all cases handled by a judge (pleas plus trials, but not including cases that 
were dismissed or had a disposition included in the “Other” category in our data, see Part V) that 
were resolved in a bench trial before that judge.  While not an absolute measure and dependent 
on a judge’s particular assignments, a high waiver rate can be associated with judges who were 
perceived to be favorable candidates for waiver by defense lawyers.  The statewide average 
waiver rate was 12%.  Based on these three measures, Analysis Group used standard statistical 
techniques to identify disparities among  judges, as explained in Attachment 6. 
The dispositions in the Database reflect a correlation between high bench trial acquittal rates, 
high volume, and high waiver rates.  For example, for judges who handled at least 100 OUI 
cases, increased bench trial acquittal rates were associated with higher bench trial volume and 
higher waiver rates:  
Table 3.  Bench Trial Acquittal Rates and Waiver Rates  
(Judges With at Least 100 OUI Cases) 
Bench Trial Acquittal Rate 
Number of Judges  
in this Rank 
Average Number 
of Bench Trials 
Average  
Waiver Rate 
50% and below 16 7 4% 
51-60% 5 17 7% 
61-70% 16 24 7% 
71-80% 37 28 10% 
81-90% 41 39 12% 
91-100% 50 50 18% 
Total Number  
of Judges Included: 165   
 
It is reasonable to infer that the higher a judge’s bench trial acquittal rate is perceived by the 
defense bar, the more waivers that will be offered to that judge, and therefore the more bench 
trials that judge will hear.  
5. Some Courts And Some Judges Had A High Volume Of Cases, A High 
Waiver Rate, And A High Bench Trial Acquittal Rate.   
One challenge presented by this assignment was the choice of a method for identifying 
statistically significant disparities in the Database.  While the average bench trial acquittal rate 
was 86%, are rates above 90% unusual?  Those above 95%?  What measure of volume should be 
used to identify those judges who had the greatest impact on the data?  While the average waiver 
rate was 12%, what rate sets a judge apart from others and suggests a more favorable perception 
among defense lawyers?  
There is no precise answer to these questions.  We relied on the expertise of the Analysis Group, 
which used two standard statistical techniques to identify significant disparities, based on judges’ 
bench trial acquittal rates, waiver rates, and case volume.  The first technique identifies judges 
above the upper limit of a 95% confidence interval for each of these measures. (See 
Attachment  6, Table 1).  The second technique identifies judges with significantly higher bench 
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trial acquittal rates.  (See Attachment 6, Table 2.)  The results are combined in the following 
table (an “X” in the columns designated “T#1” or “T#2” indicates that judge was included by 
technique #1 or technique #2, as explained in Attachment 6):34   
Table 4.  Judges Identified Based on High Bench Trial Acquittal Rates,  
Waiver Rates, and Case Volume 
Judge # T #1 T #2 
Total OUI 
Cases 
Handled 
Waiver 
Rate 
Bench 
Trials 
Jury 
Trials 
Bench Trial 
Acquittal 
Rate 
2 X X 180 26% 41 4 100% 
3 X X 183 43% 73 5 97% 
13 X X 206 40% 76 7 95% 
19  X 439 9% 40 6 100% 
25  X 537 8% 39 30 97% 
26* X  343 13% 42 14 90% 
27 X  157 30% 42 9 88% 
41**  X 147  38 7 97% 
50* X  432 22% 87 49 87% 
55** X X 536  71 4 97% 
73  X 240 15% 34 60 100% 
80 X X 330 51% 149 25 100% 
82  X 450 10% 39 7 100% 
85* X X 403 14% 52 14 98% 
87 X  329 39% 116 9 89% 
91 X  337 19% 52 55 92% 
111 X  347 20% 60 1 92% 
113 X X 310 17% 50 13 100% 
122 X X 560 30% 158 63 99% 
131 X  168 29% 45 16 93% 
132* X  500 23% 99 5 91% 
134 X X 183 61% 97 8 95% 
140* X X 468 34% 142 9 94% 
147 X X 589 40% 212 18 98% 
153* X  429 13% 50 38 88% 
158 X X 229 31% 68 80 97% 
166 X X 401 23% 83 59 99% 
201 X X 482 20% 90 58 96% 
203 X X 573 17% 90 28 99% 
                                                 
34
 Note that during the Time Period (which contained approximately 938 business days), the judges marked with a 
single asterisk (*) were assigned to the Brockton or Barnstable District Courts (from which we have no data) for the 
following number of days, based on assignment sheets provided to us by the District Court: #26, 224 days; #50, 22 
days; #85, 36 days; #132, 89 days; #140, 6 days; #153, 14 days; #210, 115 days; and #211, 114 days.  The data in 
the chart is based only on the cases they handled outside those courts.  In addition, the judges marked with a double 
asterisk (**) were assigned to the BMC Central Division, where we have information for each judge on trials but not 
on pleas, for the following number of days: #41, 419 days; and #55, 16 days.  As to the latter two judges, Analysis 
Group re-ran the statistical tests excluding BMC data (thus treating those judges the same way as those who sat in 
Brockton or Barnstable, and using only data from courts with complete data), and found the same result.  
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Judge # T #1 T #2 
Total OUI 
Cases 
Handled 
Waiver 
Rate 
Bench 
Trials 
Jury 
Trials 
Bench Trial 
Acquittal 
Rate 
208 X  378 15% 49 27 92% 
210* X  269 24% 59 5 93% 
211* X  374 13% 39 8 90% 
216 X X 381 32% 113 62 95% 
 
20 of the 33 judges in this table had bench trial acquittal rates of 95% or more.  Six were at 
100%.  All of them were associated with a significant number of bench trials and overall case 
volume.  In terms of waiver rates, 28 of the 33 judges had a waiver rate above the average; 19 
had waiver rates of 20% or more; and 11 had waiver rates of 30% or more.   
18 of the 33 judges listed above regularly sat in the courts in Worcester County.  There is no 
reason to infer that only lenient judges happen to be assigned in Worcester County.  Some 
combination of the factors identified in Finding #12 must be at play in connection with these 
high acquittal rates.  Most of the other judges had either waiver or bench trial acquittal rates 
much higher than the statewide averages, and three of those (#87, #134 and #140) had unusually 
high waiver rates (39%, 61% and 34%, respectively).  Others simply handled a high percentage 
of bench trials where they sat, with bench trial acquittal rates somewhat higher than the statewide 
average, or the averages in the courts where they sat, but it is difficult to draw any inference from 
those differences.   
Judge #25 had a large enough acquittal rate in bench trials to be included in Table 4 on the basis 
of the second test.  However, because he handled a large number of cases and had a large number 
of jury trials as well, he had a low enough waiver rate that he also is included in Table 7 below. 
 
Judges with a track record of acquittals are likely to receive more jury waiver requests from 
knowledgeable defense lawyers.  This, in turn, would lead to a higher volume of bench trials.  
Compared to their colleagues listed in Finding #6, most of these judges were chosen by defense 
lawyers for waiver much more often. 
We should note, however, that there are 18 judges in the Database who had bench trial acquittal 
rates below 85% (which is the lower limit of the 95% confidence interval identified by Analysis 
Group for that metric), and more than 37 bench trials (which is the upper limit of the confidence 
interval for that metric).  These judges had bench trial acquittal rates ranging from 67% to 83% 
(12 were below 80%), and significant variation in their waiver rates.  These judges are: #7*, #21, 
#29*, #42*, #74*, #75, #77, #79, #83*, #118, #123, #126, #137*, #141, #142, #143*, #148*, and 
#191.  None of them sat regularly in Worcester County.  The eight marked with an asterisk (*) 
sat at least some of the time in Barnstable or Brockton, and their data is based only on cases 
outside those two courts. 
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6. In Some Courts And Before Some Judges, Bench Trials Were Relatively 
Rare, And There Was A Disparity Between These Courts And Others In 
Both The Number Of Bench Trials And The Overall Conviction Rate.   
The data also shows a striking disparity in conviction rates between certain courts, where waiver 
rates and bench trial acquittal rates were relatively high, and other courts where they were low.  
In the former, defendants had a much greater opportunity to achieve an acquittal by waiving a 
jury before a judge with a high track record of acquittals.  In the latter, bench trials were a rare 
event during the Time Period, driven by the unusually low rate at which defendants waived juries 
despite high case volume.  This was associated with a significant disparity in the outcomes of 
OUI cases.  For example, in the East Brookfield District Court there were 1,112 OUI cases and 
345 bench trials, 98% of which resulted in acquittals.  The conviction rate was only 53%, the 
lowest in the state.  Conversely, in the Newburyport District Court there were 1,570 OUI cases 
and only four bench trials, three of which resulted in acquittals.  The conviction rate there was 
91%, the highest in the state. 
Below are five courts, with jury sessions, which handled more than 1,000 cases (the average in 
the Time Period was 855), at each end of the conviction rate spectrum: 
Table 5.  Courts with Low Conviction Rates 
Courts With 
Low Conviction 
Rates35 
Total OUI 
Cases 
Number of 
Bench Trials 
Bench Trial 
Acquittal 
Rate Waiver Rate 
Overall 
Conviction 
Rate 
East Brookfield 1,112 345 98% 34% 53% 
Fitchburg 1,244 406 97% 35% 55% 
Worcester 1,998 283 95% 15% 66% 
Plymouth 1,553 325 74% 24% 70% 
Framingham 1,153 232 83% 22% 71% 
Hingham 1,006 192 89% 21% 73% 
 
Table 6.  Courts with High Conviction Rates 
Courts With 
High Conviction 
Rates 
Total OUI 
Cases 
Number of 
Bench Trials 
Bench Trial 
Acquittal 
Rate Waiver Rate 
Overall 
Conviction 
Rate 
Newburyport 1,570 4 75% <1% 91% 
Attleboro 1,546 83 84% 6% 84% 
Lawrence 1,843 108 69% 6% 84% 
Peabody 1,238 85 86% 7% 83% 
Lynn 1,163 58 81% 6% 82% 
 
                                                 
35
 We omitted Westborough from this list, which had 1,129 cases but only had a jury session for part of the Time 
Period.  
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The courts with low conviction rates had high waiver rates.  Those with high conviction rates 
had low waiver rates.   
We also focused on judges who had significant case volume and low waiver rates.  There may be 
many reasons why judges would have low waiver rates, sometimes dependent on what type of 
session assignments they had during the Time Period.  For example, those who sat in assignment 
sessions, civil sessions, or other specialized sessions might not have been presented with many 
opportunities for jury waiver.  However, when Analysis Group applied the same proportion test 
used in Finding #5 (Statistical Test #2, see Attachment 6) to low waiver rates, and restricted the 
application only to those judges who also heard more than the average number of total trials 
(bench plus jury, the statewide average was 44), they identified a number of judges who 
presumably were in a position to receive jury waivers, but whose low waiver rate indicates a 
perception among the defense bar that they were not favorable candidates for waiver.36  
Table 7.  Judges With Significantly Lower Than Average  
Waiver Rates and at Least 44 Trials (Bench or Jury) 
Judge # 
Total OUI 
Cases 
Handled37 
Waiver  
Rate 
Bench 
Trials 
Jury 
Trials 
Bench Trial 
Acquittal 
Rate 
20 520 5% 25 33 84% 
22 333 6% 17 70 71% 
25 537 8% 39 30 97% 
45 545 8% 41 43 85% 
58 1,256 1% 7 64 100% 
65 405 6% 21 29 67% 
89 482 5% 20 37 85% 
102 510 7% 33 133 82% 
115 490 7% 29 22 93% 
119* 462 6% 21 28 86% 
146 474 6% 26 23 88% 
149 223 5% 10 42 70% 
152* 481 7% 29 21 59% 
157 464 6% 27 29 81% 
162* 258 5% 11 49 18% 
170 402 5% 16 40 38% 
171 411 2% 8 56 75% 
                                                 
36
 Note that during the Time Period (which contained approximately 938 business days), judges #119, #152, and 
#162, marked with a single asterisk (*), were assigned to the Brockton or Barnstable District Courts (from which we 
have no data) for 1, 4, and 33 days, respectively, based on assignment sheets provided to us by the District Court.  
The data in the chart is based only on the cases they handled outside those courts.  
37
 This column has been substituted for the column titled “Total Pleas Plus Trials” in Table 3 of Attachment 6, in 
order to provide the same information that is contained in Table 4 above.  This does not affect the validity of the 
statistical analysis described in Attachment 6. 
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Judge # 
Total OUI 
Cases 
Handled37 
Waiver  
Rate 
Bench 
Trials 
Jury 
Trials 
Bench Trial 
Acquittal 
Rate 
192 157 5% 7 43 86% 
194 537 0% 2 54 50% 
199 362 3% 9 68 89% 
 
Note that most of these judges, except those highlighted, indeed had bench trial acquittal rates at 
or below the statewide average, and that judges #58, #171, #192, #194, and #199 had so few 
bench trials that their bench trial acquittal rates are not meaningful.  They were among the judges 
with significant volume but the lowest waiver rates in the state. 
In contrast to the concentration of judges in Finding #5 who sat in Worcester County (with an 
average 97% bench trial acquittal rate), six of the judges in Table 7 regularly sat in Essex County 
(where the average bench trial acquittal rate was 81%, five points lower than the statewide 
average).  Seven sat in Middlesex County, where the rate was 80%, six points lower than the 
average.  These were the three counties with the most OUI cases in the Database (8,747 cases in 
Worcester, 8,269 in Essex, and 9,768 in Middlesex). 
7. There Was A Significant Difference In The Rate Of Bench Trials Before 
And After The Spotlight Series. 
After the Spotlight Series, the number of bench trials declined.  We compared data in two six-
month time periods before and after mid-2011, when the Spotlight Series investigation was being 
conducted.  The time periods were October 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011, and October 1, 2011 to 
March 31, 2012.  See discussion in Part V.  We confirmed what most participants had told us, 
that fewer cases are being heard by judges in bench trials after the Spotlight Series.  We also 
found small changes in the statewide bench trial acquittal rate, the jury acquittal rate, and the 
conviction rate:  
Table 8.  Bench Trials Before and After the Spotlight Series 
Statewide Measure Before After 
Bench Trials 817 454 
Waiver Rate 13% 8% 
Bench Trial Acquittal Rate 86% 81% 
Jury Trial Acquittal Rate 58% 60% 
Conviction Rate 76% 79% 
 
Participants reported that defense lawyers are more reluctant to offer waivers, not that judges are 
explicitly rejecting them.  We do not know whether the changes in the acquittal and conviction 
rates are significant, given the low volume of the data and limited time periods used in this 
before and after sample.  
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8. The Impact Of The Present Rule On Jury Waiver.   
Under Massachusetts law, the defendant has the exclusive option to request a waiver of jury trial 
and elect a bench trial.  See discussion in Recommendation #2.  This has an important effect on 
the statistics discussed above and may contribute to the appearance of “judge shopping” in 
certain settings.   
Some judges receive jury waivers at two or three times the average, while others receive them 
significantly less than the average.  Those who receive a higher percentage of waivers generally 
try more bench trials, and their acquittal rates generally are higher.  A defendant may choose 
between entering a plea and requesting a bench trial based on the perceived predisposition of the 
trial judge.  As indicated above, some courts and judges have amassed a record, perhaps only 
generally understood by the lawyers most familiar with them, which affects that choice. 
At present, the defendant need not make the decision to waive a jury trial until the last minute, on 
the day of trial.  During the trial assignment process, cases scheduled for trial are called, the 
parties appear, and there is an exchange between the judge who assigns cases to trial sessions 
and the parties.  At that time, a judge may obtain a preview of the case, whether in a so-called 
“lobby conference”38 or an open colloquy, on the record, aimed at determining how the case will 
be assigned.  Information about the strengths and weaknesses of the case can be conveyed: how 
many witnesses will be called for the prosecution or defense; whether there is a breathalyzer test; 
whether there will be scientific challenges; whether there are defense witnesses who need to be 
summoned or whose availability may become a practical issue.  All of these factors appropriately 
help a judge to schedule that day’s trial work, but they also give a preview of the case. 
We have heard reports from participants that judges may signal to defense lawyers, during these 
exchanges, that a jury trial waiver would be advisable.  Judges facing pressure to resolve cases in 
busy courts may do so without improper motive, but the appearance created by such a practice 
can be troubling.  We also heard reports that a lawyer may signal to the court that the case would 
be resolved in a bench trial in one session but by a jury trial in another, based on such a colloquy 
or simply on the lawyer’s perception of the reputation of the judge. We were told that this 
practice has occurred less frequently after the publication of the Spotlight Series.   
In courts where there is a high volume of OUI cases, leaving the choice of waiver in the hands of 
the defense up to the day of trial can operate to increase the assignment of bench trials to the 
                                                 
38
 A true lobby conference is an unrecorded conversation among the judge, prosecutor, and defense lawyer about the 
strengths and weaknesses of the case, and about the defendant’s criminal history.  Once prevalent in the District and 
Superior Courts, they are now highly disfavored.  Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 412 Mass. 497, 501 (1992) (“[I]f a 
lobby conference is held, the better practice is to record it, and provide a copy of the recording to the defendant on 
request, so that the defendant may know what was said.”); Commonwealth v. Bowen, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 579, 580 
n.2 (2005) (citing Fanelli, 412 Mass. at 501, and pointing out failure of attorneys to raise concern regarding absence 
of court reporter at lobby conference); Commonwealth v. Gaumond, 14 Mass. L. Rep. 519, 10 n.2 (2002) (setting 
forth reasons to discourage the frequent state court practice of lobbying, including “the unavoidable fact that most 
lobby conferences are in essence ‘back room deals’ that do not involve the defendant, the victim, or the public”).  
Nevertheless, in busy trial sessions judges still may conduct conferences with the lawyers about each case on the 
day’s trial list, often on the record at sidebar. 
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judges with a track record of acquittal after waivers, and thus a de facto reliance on those  judges 
to dispose of the weaker cases, which prosecutors do not dismiss on their own.  
9. We Did Not Receive Any Reports Of Corruption In Connection With 
These OUI Acquittal Rates.  
We discussed with the participants the high acquittal rates published in the Spotlight Series and 
reflected in the statistics compiled for this report.  Although we did hear of instances in which 
complaints had been made to the District Court about certain judges, no one we interviewed 
reported an allegation that high acquittal rates in OUI cases are the product of corrupt 
relationships between lawyers and judges. 
Some participants observed that experienced defense lawyers are more familiar to judges based 
on professional and social interactions, and that their familiarity may give them an advantage in 
the trial of cases and in advocacy regarding dispositions.  While that may be a matter of common 
sense, it does not explain the high acquittal rates we found, especially in Worcester County.  
Beyond the familiar list of reasons why OUI cases may be weak, as discussed in Finding #12, no 
one offered us a convincing reason why bench trial acquittals should occur so much more often 
there.  
As noted previously, we have not been given subpoena power and have been directed not to 
conduct any disciplinary inquiry.  Thus we have not investigated the relationship between any 
particular lawyer and any particular judge. 
C. Comparisons to Other States and Other Massachusetts Offenses 
10. We Found A Range Of OUI Conviction Rates In Other States, Some Of 
Which Were Similar To The Massachusetts Rate.   
We were asked to examine whether the rate of acquittal in OUI bench trials in Massachusetts 
differs from the national average.  However, we were unable to find comparable national 
averages regarding OUI bench trials.  We also searched for data from other individual states. 
While we found reports of overall OUI conviction rates in several states, they cover differing 
time periods.  In addition, we do not know with specificity what data was used to calculate these 
conviction rates or precisely how the rates were computed.  Therefore, the extent to which such 
data can be compared to the Database we collected from MassCourts and CourtView is unclear.   
With that caveat in mind, we found reports on conviction rates from the following states:39 
                                                 
39
 This chart includes only information we were able to find in official state sources.  We also located unofficial 
reports from Alabama and Maine.  In a 2008 PowerPoint presentation, the Alabama Criminal Defense Lawyers 
Association reported a 78% conviction rate in 2006.  Mahaney, ACDLA “4 Corners Seminar” 2008 DUI Update, at 
http://www.1800dialdui.com/cm/40waystobeatadui/cle-dui_update_acdla_2008.ppt (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012).  It 
should be noted that the number of convictions identified in this report based on 18,596 arrests totaled 13,647, which 
actually translates into a 74% conviction rate.  Thus, the 78% figure provided seems to be internally inconsistent 
with other data included in this report.  With respect to Maine, on July 23, 2012, the Portland Press Herald reported 
that between 2002 and 2011, conviction rates for OUI offenses in Maine have varied widely by county, ranging 
from a low of 37% to a high of 83%.  Kim, OUI conviction rates vary widely across Maine, Portland Press Herald, 
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Table 9.  Comparison to OUI Conviction Rates in Other States 
State Year(s) Conviction Rate 
Minnesota40 2010 74% 
Massachusetts 1/1/08-9/30/11 77% 
California41 2007 79% 
Maryland42 2006 79% 
Alaska43 2009 80% 
Florida44 2007 81% 
Kentucky45 2006-2010 85% 
Nebraska46 2010 87% 
                                                                                                                                                             
Jul. 22, 2012, at http://www.pressherald.com/news/oui-convictions-vary-across-maine_2012-07-22.html (last 
viewed Aug. 28, 2012).  According to this article, “[p]rosecutors, defense attorneys and law enforcement officers 
cite district attorneys’ policies, case volumes and the resources of the judiciary in a particular location as some of the 
reasons behind the wide discrepancies.”  Id.  For example, “[s]ome district attorneys have a policy against pleading 
down OUI offense to driving to endanger--a practice that is routine in other counties.”  Id.  
40
 The Minnesota Department of Public Safety reported that the overall conviction rate in 2010 was 74.0%, 
compared to 73.9% in 2009 and 82.4% in 2008.  2010 Minnesota Impaired Driving Facts (2011), at 
https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ots/reports-statistics/Pages/impaired-driving-facts.aspx (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012).  
The report noted that the 2010 conviction percentage “is understated,” and predicted that “[a]s judicial outcomes are 
decided well into the future, the criminal conviction percentage will increase to approximately 85%.”  Id. at Table 
1.01 n.3.  Rates reported for prior years were as follows: 2007, 82.4%; 2006, 82.3%; 2005, 82.5%; 2004, 81.6%.  Id.   
41
 The California Department of Motor Vehicles reported that 78.8% of 2007 DUI arrests resulted in conviction.  
Annual Report of the California DUI Management Information System (2010), at http://www.ots.ca.gov/pdf/ 
publications/dui_2010_mis_ar.pdf (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012).   
42
 The Maryland Highway Safety Office reported the number of DUI arrests that resulted in convictions during the 
11 years from 1996 through 2006.  During this time period, the conviction rate (the proportion of total DUI arrests 
resulting in a conviction) averaged around 81-82%, fluctuating between a high of 83.7% in 1999 and a low of 78.9% 
in 2006.  An Assessment of Maryland’s Driving Under the Influence (DUI) Laws (2008), at http:// 
stko.maryland.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=BzkRrUdfqTQ%3D&tabid=92&.pdf (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012). 
43
 The Alaska Department of Public Safety reported a 80.4% conviction rate in 2009 and a 84.7% conviction rate in 
2008.  DUI Arrest Violations in Alaska, 2000-2009, at http://www.dot.state.ak.us/highwaysafety/assets/pdf/DUI 
ArrestViolations_2000-2009.pdf (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012).  The reported 2009 conviction rate may be artificially 
low, as some of the 2009 arrests listed included cases that had not yet been concluded. 
44
 The Florida National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Technical Assistance Team reported a conviction 
rate of 81.3% in 2007.  Florida Impaired Driving Assessment (2008), at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/safety/ 
highwaysafetygrantprogram/hsgp/pdf/fl%20dui%20assessment%20final%20report%2010%2008.pdf. This figure 
may be artificially high.  According to this report, the 81.3% figure reflects cases where a disposition was recorded.  
Id. at 66.  The report goes on to say, though: “However, when convictions are compared to all [OUI] cases filed in 
2007, a conviction rate of only 54.9 percent is computed. . . . The nature or outcome of these non-disposed cases is 
unclear, but some may be related to juvenile court dispositions, cases where adult defendants were allowed to plead 
to alcohol-related reckless driving (wet reckless) with DUI-like sanctions, and reporting lag time. . . . With these 
substantial numbers of non-disposed cases, it is misleading to claim conviction rates in the 80 percentile range.”  Id.  
45
 Using data obtained from the Kentucky Administrative Office of the Courts, the Kentucky Office of Highway 
Safety reported a conviction rate of 84.9% from 2006 to 2010.  Percentage of Drivers Convicted of DUI Filings (By 
County) (2006-2010), at http://transportation.ky.gov/highway-safety/ documents/dui_conv_rate_2006-2010.pdf (last 
viewed Aug. 28, 2012). 
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State Year(s) Conviction Rate 
Mississippi47 2009 90% 
Michigan48 2010 94% 
 
According to our data, during the Time Period the overall conviction rate in Massachusetts was  
approximately 77%, similar to the rates reported in Minnesota, California, and Maryland, but 
significantly lower than Michigan, whose reported rate was the highest we found. 
We found one more detailed report regarding conviction rates at bench and jury trials in Monroe 
County, New York.  In August 2010, the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle reported: 
[O]f 1,595 non-jury trials for misdemeanor DWI held in the past four years in 
town and village courts and Rochester City Court, defendants were found guilty 
of that charge 14.8 percent of the time. . . . By comparison, in 104 jury trials 
conducted in the same courts over the same period, the conviction rate for 
misdemeanor DWI was 24 percent.49 
The same article also concluded that “someone charged with misdemeanor DWI is 40 percent 
more likely to be convicted of that charge if the case is decided by a jury rather than a judge.”  
While these statistics may not be comparable to the statistics based on the 
MassCourts/CourtView data, note that the Massachusetts bench trial conviction rate was 
approximately 14%, and the jury trial conviction rate was approximately 42%, during the Time 
Period.50 
                                                                                                                                                             
46
 The Nebraska Office of Highway Safety reported conviction rates (convictions as a percentage of arrests) of 
86.5% in 2010, 86.0% in 2009 and 84.2% in 2008.  Nebraska Driving Under the Influence (DUI) Arrests vs. 
Convictions (2012), at http://www.dor.state.ne.us/nohs/pdf/al5arrests.pdf (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012). 
47
 The Mississippi Department of Public Safety reported in 2010 that the DUI conviction rate in 2009 was 90.4% 
and that  the conviction rate hovered around 91% historically.  FY-2011 Highway Safety Plan & Performance Plan 
(2010), at http://www.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/whatsup/safeteaweb/FY11/FY11HSPs/MS_FY11HSP.pdf (last viewed 
Aug. 28, 2012).  This report also noted that while the 2008 conviction rate fell to 86.4%, the rate increased to 90.4% 
in 2009 “after additional judicial and court clerk training.”  Id. 
48
 The Michigan Department of State Police reported a 2010 conviction rate of approximately 94% (calculated by 
adding the total number of conviction for driving while intoxicated and driving while impaired and dividing that 
total (38,278) by the total number of cases in which those offenses were charged (40,920)).  2010 Michigan Annual 
Drunk Driving Audit (2011), at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/msp/2010_audit_for_web_deployment_ 
357302_7.pdf (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012). 
49
 Zeigler, Judges, district attorney clash over DWI cases, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, Aug. 15, 2010, at 
http://www.democratandchronicle.com/article/20100815/NEWS01/8150354/Judges-district-attorney-clash-over-
DWI-cases (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012).   
50
 The first part of the Globe Spotlight Series reported bench trial conviction rates of 75% in Arizona and 64% in 
Colorado and Hawaii.  We conducted online research and spoke with representatives from the Arizona and Hawaii 
state judiciaries and the Colorado Department of Public Safety and were unable to confirm these statistics.  Data 
received from the Director of Public Affairs for the Hawaii Judiciary indicates a bench trial conviction rate between 
44.4% and 54.5% from 2007 through July 12, 2012, much lower than the 64% rate reported in the Globe.  However, 
the reported data only covers a small number of cases--between 99 and 121 cases annually (excluding 2012, which 
was a partial year).  We were unable to locate data either confirming or disputing the Globe’s reported rates for 
Arizona and Colorado.  The Court Services Division of the Arizona Supreme Court, which is responsible for 
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11. We Can Make Only Limited Comparisons To The Disposition Of Other 
Offenses In Massachusetts. 
We were asked to examine whether the rate of acquittal in OUI bench trials differs from the rate 
of acquittal in other criminal cases in the District Court and BMC.  However, the Trial Court 
does not track statewide acquittal or conviction rates by offense category, and we did not ask the 
Trial Court staff to perform the extensive work that would be required to compute reliable 
statistics for non-OUI offenses. 
We did obtain one data extract regarding other offenses, but it has limited relevance.  Before we 
began this assignment, the Trial Court had extracted data from MassCourts regarding all criminal 
charges that were resolved at a trial event in all courts within the District Court and BMC 
(except the Barnstable and Brockton District Courts and BMC Central) during the period January 
2010 through June 2011 (“the Trial Court Extract,” or “Extract”).  See Attachment 9.  Note that 
the data unit in this Extract is a charge, not a case.  One case may have many charges, and in our 
Database we controlled for that fact by selecting only the OUI offense as the lead charge.  In 
addition, the Trial Court Extract includes only charges resolved on the date of a trial event.  It 
does not distinguish between charges resolved by plea or trial.  More importantly, it does not 
include charges resolved prior to the scheduling of a trial event.    
One set of data from the Extract provides some insight regarding a comparison of dismissal rates.  
In the category “Dismissed or Other Non-Conviction” dispositions, this Extract shows that on the 
date of a trial event OUI cases were resolved in this manner 5% of the time.  (Based on the 
“Other” dispositions we derived from the MassCourts and CourtView data, which were not 
confined to dismissals on the date of a trial event, we estimated that overall OUI dismissals were 
10%).  In contrast, for all Chapter 265 offenses (generally, all crimes against the person) this rate 
was 49.1%, and for Chapter 94C offenses (generally, drug crimes) the rate was 44.4%.   
The data in the Extract is based on charges, not cases, and therefore the dismissal rates may be 
related to charge bargaining, whereby some charges are dismissed in exchange for guilty pleas 
on others. Thus, while the Extract has very limited utility, given the restrictions described above, 
it does appear to corroborate what most participants told us about dismissals: prosecutors rarely 
dismiss OUI offenses compared to other offenses.   
D. Reasons for High Acquittal Rates 
12. There Are Identifiable Factors That Contribute To Generally High 
Bench Trial Acquittal Rates In OUI Cases. 
While we do not have supporting data, most participants agreed that OUI offenses are tried in the 
District Courts more than any other.  As a result, judges quickly gain experience with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
compiling data for the state court system, indicated that statewide bench trial acquittal rates for OUI cases are not 
readily ascertained from the state’s current case management system.  Published OUI statistics in Arizona cover 
general data like the number of OUI charges filed and the number of case terminations (without manner of 
disposition).  According to resources reviewed at the suggestion of the Colorado Department of Public Safety’s 
Office of Research and Statistics, Colorado appears to track and publish only general data on OUI filings and the 
state’s DUI probation program. 
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repetitive fact patterns presented by these cases, as well as scientific issues affecting proof of 
impairment or blood alcohol levels.  There was general consensus among participants regarding 
the factors that make many OUI cases “triable”: that is, potential candidates for acquittal.   
OUI trials involve an ever-changing combination of prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and 
police departments who bring varying degrees of ability, experience, and preparation to the task 
of resolving a given case.  The repetitive factual scenarios may be difficult for judges to 
distinguish when they hear large numbers of bench trials.  This in turn presents familiar 
challenges to the advocates on both sides.  Each lawyer seeks to identify and amplify any unique 
fact or circumstance favoring his position.  At the same time, the trial judge seeks to differentiate 
each case from the hundreds of others he may have heard during his career, by listening for 
palpable evidence that is unique and therefore more satisfying in support of a finding, which 
must be measured by the reasonable doubt standard.  
OUI cases typically present some, but not necessarily all, of the following categories of 
evidence: 
• Operation, sometimes involving an accident, observed by a police officer as the 
basis for a stop; 
• Observations of glassy eyes, slurred speech, odor of alcohol, and unsteadiness; 
• Field sobriety tests, such as reciting the alphabet, walking a straight line, and 
standing on one leg; 
• Breathalyzer tests, administered pursuant to state regulations at the defendant’s 
booking; 
• Statements of the defendant regarding consumption of alcohol or the cause of an 
accident; and 
• Statements of witnesses regarding the sobriety of the defendant. 
Judges hear repetitive recitation of observations regarding intoxication.  Most police reports we 
reviewed recount deficient operation of the motor vehicle followed by the litany that the 
defendant’s eyes were glassy or bloodshot and speech was slurred, there was a strong odor of 
alcohol from the defendant’s breath, and the defendant was unsteady on his feet.  These 
observations are offered in virtually every trial, often in the same way.  It appears that these 
observations are often disregarded by judges, unless there is something unique about the 
description that varies from the standard.  For example, where the defendant was “so unsteady he 
could not stand” a judge may take note.  Where the odor of alcohol was only “moderate,” the 
door is opened toward reasonable doubt.  
Given the repetitive nature of this evidence, prosecutors struggle to differentiate one case from 
the next, and to work with police witnesses to avoid presentation of testimony in a rote manner.  
Judges who hear the same description of different cases may tend to discount the significance of 
what they hear.  Meanwhile, defense lawyers take advantage of the repetition to argue that police 
witnesses may not be offering a genuine description of events, but rather one that has been so 
rehearsed in other trials that it loses the ring of truth.   
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While these factors may contribute to the overall high acquittal rate, the second part of our 
assignment was to identify reasons for disparity among judges.  We did not listen to the 
recording of every OUI trial in our sample, and we found the cases so repetitive that it was 
difficult to create a record distinguishing one from another.  We concluded that we could not 
explain statistical disparities by reviewing the trial recordings of samples of cases.   
More importantly, even if we had attempted to do so, our division of the universe of bench trials  
into convictions and acquittals would not necessarily be repeated in an analysis conducted by 
another reviewer, and therefore we cannot question the record of a court or judge based on such 
an exercise.  Reasonable fact finders certainly would vary in their assessment of these cases at 
trial, and some disparity is inevitable.   
That said, it is difficult to understand how almost all of a high volume of bench trials in a busy 
court or before a given judge could reasonably result in acquittals.  As we have said, the data in 
Worcester County stands out.  The record of bench trial acquittals there was 97%, and a large 
number of the judges who stood out based on high acquittal and waiver rates regularly heard 
cases there.  In two Worcester county courts, East Brookfield and Fitchburg, almost one-third of 
all of the cases resulted in bench trial acquittals.  
While we cannot say whether the cases in such courts happen to be weaker, the prosecutors more 
overburdened and inexperienced, or the defense bar more skillful, some combination of these 
factors must be at play in these cases.  In addition, judges hearing large numbers of repetitive, 
sometimes weak cases may become more critical of the routine evidence they hear, or they may 
be less discerning of the differences among triable cases and apply the reasonable doubt standard 
more strictly.  The judges with a track record of acquittals after waivers receive still more 
waivers, hear more repetitive cases, and thus may become more skeptical than their colleagues of 
the routine evidence presented in these trials.   
13. Many OUI Arrests Are Based, In Part, On Inadmissible Evidence. 
In a group of 400 cases in which we reviewed the police reports and docket sheets, the reports 
indicate that police routinely used two tests in the field that are not admissible at trial: the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) test,51 and so-called “preliminary breath tests” (“PBT”).52 
HGN test results are admissible only if supported by expert testimony because “the HGN test 
relies on an underlying scientific proposition.”  Sands, 424 Mass. at 188.  They are rarely offered 
at trial by prosecutors.  In our case review, we did not see a trial in which HGN test results were 
offered, and prosecutors uniformly reported that they seldom offer this evidence because they do 
not have access to appropriate experts.  
PBTs are not admissible because of the type of technology they employ.  General Laws c. 90, 
§ 24K states that breathalyzer test results shall only be deemed valid when performed using 
                                                 
51
 See note 14, supra. 
52
 Preliminary or portable breath test (PBT) devices, similar to breath test instruments, are used roadside by the 
investigating officer to (1) detect the presence of alcohol; and (2) provide the officer with a blood alcohol content 
(BAC) reading.   
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“infrared breath-testing devices.”  A PBT is not an infrared device.  It utilizes fuel cell 
technology to detect the presence of alcohol in the breath.  Fogarty & Nardone, The 
Massachusetts Prosecutors’ Manual: Operating Under the Influence, Fourth Edition, 25 (2010). 
Thus, in many cases without breathalyzer test results, the arrest determination may be made 
based largely on factors that are inadmissible at trial.  If there is no accident (PBTs are often used 
at roadblocks, where the reason for the stop has nothing to do with bad operation), no defense 
admission, and only mixed results on administered field sobriety tests, the inadmissible tests may 
constitute the majority of the evidence on which the arrest is based, and, without them, proof of 
impairment may be very difficult.  As we have said, prosecutors are reluctant to dismiss any OUI 
case, leaving it to judges to assess the record in such cases and enter a finding, which usually is 
not guilty. 
We discussed the use of inadmissible tests with participants.  More than one reminded us of the 
holding in Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745 (1984), that “there is a special relationship 
between a police officer who negligently fails to remove an intoxicated motorist from the 
highway, and a member of the public who suffers injury as a result of that failure,” and imposing 
tort liability on Ware for that resulting injury.  Id. at 762.  The Court noted one policy argument 
made by Ware, that “imposing liability on police officers for negligence in making this ‘often 
impossible judgment task’ will lead police officers to arrest drivers whenever they suspect 
intoxication rather than not arrest them and risk a negligence action against the public 
employer.”  Id. at 762.  The Court found this consideration “speculative at best” and “not 
relevant to the issue whether the police have a duty.”  Id.  Nevertheless, in light of this holding, 
police officers may be reluctant to decline making an arrest once a driver has failed one or both 
of these inadmissible tests, even if the admissible body of evidence is not robust.  
14. Standard Field Sobriety Tests Are Not Highly Predictive Of Guilt Or 
Innocence In Cases That Go To Trial. 
In the same group of 400 cases in which we reviewed police reports and docket sheets, we 
attempted to keep a tally of each defendant’s score on the typical field sobriety tests that are 
admissible: the nine-step walk and turn test, standing on one leg, reciting the alphabet, and 
counting.  We found that many police officers conclude that a defendant has failed one or more 
of these tests when his performance was less than optimal but not entirely deficient.  For 
example, a defendant who stood on one foot for 20 seconds rather than the required 30 seconds 
was deemed to have failed the one-leg stand test.  Similarly, a defendant who did not walk heel-
to-toe as instructed on three steps was deemed to have failed the nine-step walk and turn test.  
These failing grades often can be challenged successfully at trial.   
In Finding #12 we noted that the repetitive fact patterns presented in OUI cases make it difficult 
to evaluate each trial record on its own merits.  Based on our review of trials and discussions 
with participants, it is particularly difficult to present a narrative summary of the results of field 
sobriety tests in a unique way in different trials.  We discussed the use of video evidence with the 
participants we interviewed.  While some police departments in Massachusetts preserve a video 
recording of the booking process, we were informed that video recordings of roadside stops are 
rarely available in OUI trials.  We are aware that roadside video recording systems are used in a 
number of other states.  While we have not researched the feasibility of creating video recordings 
 REPORT TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 
OCTOBER 2012 
 
 
36 
 
of roadside field sobriety tests here, this is an area where such evidence would provide a more 
objective trial record for evaluation by judges and juries. 
E. Breathalyzer Evidence 
15. Breathalyzer Readings Above .08% Do Not Necessarily Result In 
Convictions On The “Per Se” Portion Of The OUI Statute.   
In light of the weaknesses often associated with testimonial evidence described above,  
breathalyzer evidence is critically important in OUI cases.  Although participants reported that 
most cases with significantly high breathalyzer readings result in pleas, we found a number of 
cases in which trial judges entered acquittals, even on the per se portion of the statute, where the 
breathalyzer reading was greater than 0.08% and there was no expert testimony offered to 
impeach that result. 
For example, out of one group of 292 cases resulting in acquittals, we reviewed police reports 
which indicated that a breathalyzer test of .08% or above was obtained in 57 cases (20%).  The 
docket sheets for these cases indicate that the tests were suppressed in eight cases, leaving 49 
cases (17%) in which the tests presumably were available at trial.  (We could not tell from our 
review of the docket sheets, however, whether breath tests were discredited at trial or ultimately 
kept out of the trial through a motion in limine that was not recorded on the docket.)  In a 
separate review, out of 38 acquittals at bench trials in which we reviewed the trial recordings, 
breathalyzer test results over .08% were admitted in 18 cases.  None of those cases involved 
expert testimony attacking the breathalyzer evidence. 
Participants told us that many defense attorneys wait to attack breathalyzer tests at trial, during 
argument and cross-examination, without bringing a motion to suppress prior to trial which 
might be more costly and would reveal a defense strategy.  However, when they have not shown 
the test to be inadmissible based on failure to comply with regulatory requirements in the 
administration of the tests,53 their tactics often focus on the impact of delay on the evaluation of 
the test result, seeking to convince judges to give it little weight as evidence of the defendant’s 
blood alcohol level at the time of operation.  They may rely on other evidence indicating sobriety 
(such as a favorable videotape of the booking process) or impeaching the Commonwealth’s 
proof on impairment (e.g., by cross-examination of  police officers regarding their training in 
detection of impairment).   
When we interviewed participants about this finding, we asked about the hypothesis that judges 
may be applying scientific knowledge regarding “retrograde extrapolation” (discussed below), 
gained from other OUI trials, when they evaluate defense tactics aimed at the issue of delay.  A 
few agreed but most did not.  Yet they could not explain why such acquittals would occur if the 
test results were admitted properly.  As discussed below, we did find that Massachusetts statutes 
and case law do not provide sufficient guidance to fact finders in evaluating delay related to 
breathalyzer tests. 
                                                 
53
 501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2.00 (2010). 
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16. There Is Little Guidance Regarding The Evaluation Of Delay In The 
Administration Of Breathalyzer Tests.   
In light of the apparent rejection of breathalyzer test results over .08% in some bench trials, we 
studied the guidance found in statutes, case law, and model jury instructions regarding the 
evaluation of delay in the administration of breathalyzer tests.  We found a lack of clear guidance 
on the issue, which may lead to inconsistent evaluation of this evidence.   
(a) Statutory ambiguity. 
Prior to its amendment in 2003, the Massachusetts OUI statute did not include a per se provision. 
However, it did include a “presumption” that a defendant “was under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor” if the breathalyzer test reading was .08% or above.  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e) 
(1994 ed. & Supp. 1995).  While the statute used the term “presumption,” the Court interpreted 
this language as creating a “permissible inference” that the jury could employ in determining 
whether a defendant was impaired.  Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 400 Mass. 524, 532 (1987) 
(citing Commonwealth v. Moreira, 385 Mass. 792 (1982)). The Court interpreted the statute in 
this way in order to avoid impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.  See 
Moreira, 385 Mass. at 796-797. 
In 2003, the Legislature deleted the “presumption” from the statute and added a clause to 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1) making it a per se violation to operate a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level 
of .08% or higher.54  See Colturi, 448 Mass. at 811-812 (citing St. 2003, c. 28, §§ 1, 4).  Thus, 
the statutory basis for the “permissible inference” created in Mahoney has been eliminated, and 
there is no statutory guidance regarding evaluation of breathalyzer test results over .08% under 
the new per se portion of the statute.55  
(b) Judicial interpretation of the two-pronged statute. 
In Colturi, the Commonwealth appealed a District Court’s rulings that would have required 
expert testimony before admission of breathalyzer test results under the new per se portion of the 
statute, and in trials under both portions of the statute.  Colturi, 448 Mass. at 810.  The Court 
                                                 
54
 In October 2000, President Clinton signed the Department of Transportation’s Appropriations Act for FY 2001, 
which included a provision requiring all states to enact per se drunk driving laws by 2004 or lose their federal 
highway construction funds.  See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Final Report: Legislative History 
of .08 Per se Laws, Introduction, at http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/pub/alcohol-laws/08History/1_ 
introduction.htm (last viewed  Aug. 28, 2012).  As of May 2001, all states except Massachusetts had enacted per se 
laws for OUI offenses.  Id.  The 2003 amendments to the Massachusetts OUI statute were enacted in response to this 
mandate.   
55
 For test results less than .08%, some statutory guidance remained intact following the amendments.  See G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (1) (e) (“If such evidence is that such percentage was five one-hundredths or less, there shall be a 
permissible inference that such defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor. . . . [I]f such evidence is 
that such percentage was more than five one-hundredths but less than eight one hundredths there shall be no 
permissible inference.”).  As the Court noted in Colturi, “[t]he only change of substance to the statutory scheme was 
the elimination of the statutory ‘permissible inference’ in §24 (1) (e) that a person with a blood alcohol test result of 
.08 or more ‘was under the influence of intoxicating liquor,’ and its replacement with a per se violation for operating 
a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level at that same level.”  Colturi, 448 Mass. at 815.  
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held that whether expert testimony is required depends on the Commonwealth’s theory of guilt.  
If the Commonwealth proceeds based on the per se portion of the statute, or on both parts of the 
statute in the alternative, the court may admit breathalyzer test results without expert testimony, 
provided that the test was administered within a “reasonable time” after the defendant operated a 
motor vehicle.  Id. at 816-817.  Referring to the law in other states as a guide, the Court 
concluded that three hours is a presumptively reasonable period of time, but noted that “[t]he 
facts and circumstances in particular cases may establish that a lesser or greater time period 
ought to be applied.”  Id. at 817.  The Court left this determination to the discretion of the trial 
judge.  Id.  
However, if the Commonwealth proceeds only under a theory of impaired operation, it “must 
present expert testimony establishing a relationship between the test results and intoxication as a 
foundational requirement of the admissibility of such results.”  Id. at 817-18.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Hubert, 453 Mass. 1009, 1009 (2009) (reversing defendant’s conviction 
because the trial judge improperly admitted breath test evidence without expert testimony when 
the defendant was only charged under the impairment portion of the statute); Commonwealth v. 
Belliveau, Mass. App. Ct., No. 09-P-2010, at 1 (Dec. 31, 2010) (Rule 1:28 Decision).56  
While Colturi established a three-hour guideline for the admissibility of breathalyzer test results, 
it does not provide guidance as to how a fact finder is to evaluate the passage of time without 
expert testimony.  Colturi states only that the passage of time goes to the weight of the 
breathalyzer evidence and not its admissibility.  See Colturi, 448 Mass. at 813; see also 
Commonwealth v. Durning, 406 Mass. 485, 494 n.11 (1990); Commonwealth v. Marley, 396 
Mass. 433, 438 (1985).  In Marley, decided before Colturi, the Court held that a defendant is not 
entitled to a jury instruction that delay may adversely affect the results of a blood alcohol test 
without expert testimony to support the request.  Marley, 396 Mass. at 439.57   
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Hanuschak, Mass. App. Ct., No. 11-P-1464, at 5 (Apr. 30, 2012) 
(Rule 1:28 Decision), the Appeals Court reversed a District Court judge’s decision to overturn a 
jury verdict in a case that suggests that there is still confusion regarding how breathalyzer 
testimony is to be evaluated.  The jury had convicted the defendant under the per se portion of 
the statute, but the trial judge overturned the verdict, stating: “[t]here was no expert testimony 
                                                 
56
 Belliveau is a summary decision under Appeals Court Rule 1:28, and thus may not be cited as binding precedent. 
57
 On at least three occasions since Colturi, the Appeals Court has affirmed guilty verdicts under the per se theory of 
liability in cases where neither party introduced retrograde extrapolation evidence to support or negate the results of 
defendant’s chemical test.  See Commonwealth v. Felton, Mass. App. Ct., No. 09-P-2124, at 3 (Feb. 14, 2011) (Rule 
1:28 Decision) (“[T]he lower test result (.08) itself established a per se violation, and the defendant put forth no 
evidence at trial to challenge the accuracy of that reading.”); Commonwealth v. Rumery, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 685, 688 
(2011) (“the properly admitted reading of 0.08, by itself, permitted the jury to conclude that the defendant had blood 
alcohol level that was above the legal limit.”); Commonwealth v. Scott, Mass. App. Ct., No. 09-P-1404, at 2 (Jul. 7, 
2010) (Rule 1:28 Decision) (“Based on the 4:20 A.M. breathalyzer result of .08 blood alcohol, the jury could have 
concluded that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was .08 at the time he was driving.”).  In Scott, without offering 
any extrapolation evidence, the defendant argued that his blood alcohol level had increased during the hour that 
elapsed between the time he was stopped by police and when he submitted to a breathalyzer test.   Mass. App. Ct., 
No. 09-P-1404, at 2.  The Appeals Court stated that “it was up to the jury to accept or reject the defendant’s 
theory[.]”  Id.  The court then found that because the defendant did not produce any expert witness testimony, the 
jury reasonably rejected his theory “as was within their province to do so.”  Id. at 3-4.   
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about extrapolation between operation time and when the blood alcohol level [sic], and after the 
jury finding insufficient evidence to establish impairment, the court has significant concerns 
about the state of the evidence for that prong[.]” See id. at 4.  The Appeals Court held that the 
trial judge erred in requiring the Commonwealth to present retrograde extrapolation evidence, in 
light of Colturi’s holding that it is not required.  Id. (“Such [retrograde extrapolation] testimony, 
however, is not required in a prosecution for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level 
of 0.08 or more if the breathalyzer test was administered within a reasonable amount of time 
after the driver’s last operation of a motor vehicle.”).   
(c) Evaluating the passage of time requires scientific proof. 
Generally, determining changes in blood alcohol levels over time depends on the science of 
“retrograde extrapolation”--the process whereby a scientist may infer that a person’s blood 
alcohol level was rising or falling prior to the time of the test, and what the actual level may have 
been at an earlier time, taking into account factors such as body weight and the time of 
consumption of each drink.58  Retrograde extrapolation evidence is admissible and can be used 
by the fact finder to interpret a breath test.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, Fourth, 35 Mass. App. 
Ct. 655, 662-663 (1993) (“Contrary to the suggestion of the defense, there is no express 
prohibition . . . against receipt of retrograde extrapolation evidence.”).59   
However, retrograde extrapolation is not a matter of common sense or experience, and therefore 
it is not information of which a judge, sitting as the trier of fact, may take judicial notice.  See 
Nantucket v. Beinecke, 379 Mass. 345, 352 (1979) (“Matters are judicially noticed only when 
they are indisputably true.  Matters of common knowledge or observation within the community 
may be judicially noticed because they so qualify.”); Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 378 Mass. 
751, 754-755 (1979) (“The right of a court to take judicial notice of subjects of common 
knowledge is substantially the same as the right of jurors to rely on their common knowledge.”); 
Commonwealth v. Kirk, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 229 (1995) (“[J]udicial notice, which is 
ordinarily reserved for matters of common knowledge and matters verifiable by authoritative 
sources, cannot be taken of material factual issues that can only be decided by the fact finder on 
competent evidence.” [citations omitted]); Commonwealth v. Smythe, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 
353 (1987) (“Certainly the reliability of chemical tests and the application of scientific principles 
and formulae are matters outside the common knowledge of jurors, and an expert’s opinion 
could be of assistance to them.”); see also Mass. G. Evid. § 201 (b) (providing guidance that “[a] 
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to resources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”). 
Even if judges were allowed to take judicial notice of such scientific information, they would 
likely be required to announce its use before doing so.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 201 (d) (requiring 
                                                 
58
 Retrograde extrapolation is, “a mathematical calculation used to estimate a person’s blood alcohol level at a 
particular point in time by working backward from the time the blood alcohol test was taken, taking into 
consideration rates of both absorption and excretion.”  Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 453, 459 (2001). 
59
 In fact, Colturi suggests that this type of evidence should be required on the issue of admissibility--as opposed to 
weight--if there is a delay of more than three hours between the defendant’s operation and the administration of the 
chemical test.  Colturi, 448 Mass. at 816.  
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that a party have the opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of judicial notice determination);  
United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 570-571 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that the 
federal district court judge erred in taking judicial notice of a fact, in part because he did not give 
the parties notice or an opportunity to be heard concerning the propriety of that decision).  We 
did not see such an announcement in any of the cases we reviewed.   
In Colturi, the Court noted that if the Commonwealth were to proceed solely on the impairment 
portion of the statute and offer a breathalyzer reading over .08%, “without evidence of its 
relationship to intoxication or impairment and without the statutorily permissible inference of 
intoxication eliminated by the 2003 amendments, the jury would be left to guess at its meaning.”  
Colturi, 448 Mass. at 817-818.  Based on our review of cases and discussions with participants, 
judges may be left to perform similar guesswork under the per se portion of the statute when they 
attempt to weigh this evidence by relating a delayed reading to the defendant’s blood alcohol 
level at the time of operation without the benefit of expert testimony.  
Our case review and discussions with participants confirm that expert testimony is rarely offered 
in OUI trials.  Instead, defense lawyers often cross-examine police officers based on their 
training on scientific principles, in an attempt to inject those concepts into the record in support 
of an attack on the weight to be given to breathalyzer test results.  Police officers may be 
impeached based on their training, but they are not qualified as experts in the science of 
retrograde extrapolation, and such cross-examination is not a substitute for expert testimony.  
See discussion in Recommendation #3, infra.   
The Colturi Court may have intended to allow judges and juries to use their own understanding 
of alcohol absorption over time when weighing this evidence.  However, just as a breathalyzer 
test result does not support any inference about the degree of impairment without expert 
testimony, a breathalyzer result cannot support an inference about a blood alcohol level at the 
time of operation, without expert testimony, unless the two are simultaneous.  It is indeed a 
matter of common sense that people become more sober after they stop drinking, but that would 
support an inference that a delayed result represents a lower, not higher, level than at the time of 
operation, and thus provides no explanation for the rejection of such results that we observed.  It 
may also be a matter of common sense that a person’s intoxication, and therefore blood alcohol 
level, rises after consumption of alcohol, supporting an inference of a lower level at an earlier 
time of operation.   
However, the manner in which these two factors intersect to explain a given result is not a matter 
of common sense.  If a judge were to add scientific knowledge outside the trial record to inform 
the court’s judgment as to whether the Commonwealth has met its burden in connection with the 
use of this evidence, that would be error.  See Care and Protection of Zita, 455 Mass. 272, 282 
(2009) (finding that the trial judge erred in relying on knowledge outside of the record which she 
had gained from an earlier proceeding involving one of the parties, stating that “[w]hile a judge 
may take judicial notice of the fact that he sat on a related case and also may take judicial notice 
of the docket entries in the prior case, he may not judicially notice facts or evidence brought out 
at the prior hearing.” [citations omitted]); Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 423 Mass. 841, 848 (1996) 
(“A judge’s reliance on information that is not part of the record implicates fundamental fairness 
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concerns. . . .  Thus, a judge may not rely on his private knowledge of particular facts that are not 
matters of which he can take judicial notice.” [citation omitted]).60 
(d) Without a basis in case law, the Model Jury Instructions do not 
provide sufficient guidance in evaluating delay in the 
administration  of breathalyzer tests.   
The applicable model jury instructions, which provide guidance for judges in bench trials, 
address this issue only obliquely.  See Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District 
Court § 5.300 (ed. 2009 and 2011 supplement) (hereinafter “Jury Instructions”).  Supplemental 
Jury Instruction 5 is the only Instruction which addresses the passage of time.  It states: 
In deciding whether the test given to the defendant to measure the alcohol level in 
his (her) blood is reliable evidence, you may consider a number of factors, 
including: 
• when the test was given; 
• the qualifications of the person who gave the test, and your assessment of his 
(her) credibility; 
• the pre-test procedures that were employed; 
• whether the testing device was in good working order at the time the test was 
administered; 
• whether the test was administered properly; 
• and any other factors you believe are relevant. 
(emphasis added) Jury Instructions § 5.300, Supplemental Instruction 5 at 16.  Judges are 
advised to give this supplemental instruction when “there is a challenge whether the breath test 
was properly administered,” but there is no additional explanation as to what kind of challenge is 
necessary.  Id. at 11.  Most of the listed factors in the instruction go to the manner of 
administration of the test, not to the timing.  It is not clear whether the word “when” refers to the 
required 15-minute observation period before the administration of a breathalyzer test, which is a 
requirement of admissibility, or to the delay between operation and test, which goes to the 
weight of the test results.  Nor is it clear from the advice to judges how to deal with “challenges” 
                                                 
60
 Additionally, judges may be erroneously accounting for a .01% margin of error for breath tests machines that does 
not exist.  In Rumery, the Appeals Court attempted to clarify that a fact finder should not take into account this 
margin of error when considering a defendant’s breath test results.  78 Mass. App. Ct. at 689-690.  In that case, the 
defendant argued that the trial judge erred when he did not instruct the jury that breathalyzer machines had an 
“inherent margin of error of 0.01 per cent.”  Id. at 688.  The Appeals Court held that the trial judge did not err in 
refusing to give the instruction because: (1) the .01 margin of error relates to the calibration standard and not to a 
margin of error for breathalyzer machines generally, (2) the judge was not obligated to explain the intricacies of 
breath test machines once the breath test results were validly entered into evidence, and (3) if an instruction on 
margin of error was required, “experts would be required in every OUI prosecution to provide complex testimony 
regarding each particular machine’s statistical variance,” which would be too large a burden on litigants and jurors.  
Id. at 689-690.  Thus, judges should not take a .01% margin of error into account when interpreting a defendant’s 
breath test results.  Nevertheless, it is possible that they do so when they acquit a defendant whose reading was .08% 
or slightly above.   
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based merely on an argument made by counsel regarding the impact of delay, versus properly 
admitted expert testimony on retrograde extrapolation.61   
In addition, both Colturi and the Jury Instructions may create confusion in connection with the 
admission of breathalyzer evidence in trials under both portions of the statute.  Colturi’s 
requirement that expert testimony is a “foundational prerequisite” for admission of breathalyzer 
evidence in impairment-only cases is difficult to reconcile with its allowance of such evidence 
without experts in trials under both portions of the statute.  It seems that the Court anticipated, in 
two-pronged trials, either that the admission of breathalyzer results over .08% would lead to a 
conviction, or that the jury would find, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the results 
reflect a reading lower than .08% at the time of the offense, and therefore the statutory inferences 
in G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e) would apply.  Colturi, 448 Mass. at 817.  However, the Court did not 
address the scenario in which there is an acquittal on the per se prong, despite admission of a 
reading of .08% or greater, and the statutory inferences are not available because of the absence 
of evidence in the record supporting a finding that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was 
something less than .08% at the time of the offense.  In such cases, a jury would either “be left to 
guess at [the breathalyzer results’] meaning,” as the Court warned in impairment-only cases, id. 
at 818, or it would be left only with the general rule of admissibility found in the statute: i.e., that 
breathalyzer evidence “shall be deemed relevant and admissible” without further guidance.  G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (1) (e). 
It appears that the Jury Instructions attempt to address this dilemma.  Instruction I, for use when 
a defendant is charged under both prongs of the statute, provides in part: 
The use you may make of the defendant’s (breath) (blood) test will differ 
depending upon whether you are considering evidence that he (she) operated a 
motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or greater, or operated 
while under the influence of alcohol. 
In deciding whether the Commonwealth has proved that the defendant had a 
blood alcohol level of .08 percent or greater, at the time of operating the vehicle, 
you may consider evidence of a (breath) (blood) test of .08 or greater if you 
believe that evidence is reliable. 
In deciding whether the Commonwealth has proved that the defendant was under 
the influence of alcohol at the time of operating the vehicle, you may consider 
whether a (breath) (blood) test showed that the defendant had consumed any 
                                                 
61
 The Jury Instructions direct judges that, if there is a challenge as to whether the breath test was properly 
administered or a challenge as to the scientific accuracy of the test, they may give Supplemental Instructions Four or 
Five, respectively.  However,  the supplemental instruction for challenges as to whether the breath test was properly 
administered is Supplemental Instruction Five and the supplemental instruction for scientific accuracy challenges is 
Supplemental Instruction Six.  Supplemental Instruction Six merely states that “[i]f the Commonwealth has failed to 
prove that the [breath test] that was given to the defendant is scientifically accurate, then you may not consider the 
test result in determining whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.”  Jury Instructions § 5.300, Supplemental 
Instruction 6 at 18.  This instruction does not provide any guidance about what kind of evidence might make the test 
scientifically inaccurate.  It is also unclear from this instruction how this type of challenge differs from the one 
anticipated in Supplemental Instruction 5. 
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alcohol. However, evidence of a positive (breath) (blood) test is not sufficient by 
itself to prove that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. 
(emphasis added) Jury Instructions § 5.300 at 4.  Without expert testimony, use of the 
emphasized portion of the charge above would go beyond Colturi’s requirement that expert 
testimony is a “foundational prerequisite” as to the impairment prong, Colturi, 448 Mass. at 818, 
although it is consistent with the general statutory provision that such results “shall be admissible 
and deemed relevant to the determination of the question of whether such defendant was at the 
time under the influence of intoxicating liquor.”  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e).  In effect, this 
instruction seems to create a compromise that avoids the alternative of instructing the jury to 
consider the breathalyzer evidence on one prong but ignore it on the other.   
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS   
1. Revise The Per Se Offense. 
Other states have created a different definition of the per se offense, which avoids trial issues 
regarding the passage of time.  In those states, the offense is not defined as operation with the 
prohibited blood alcohol level, but rather as having the proscribed blood alcohol level within a 
specified time after operation.  Under such a statute, a fact finder would not be required to 
evaluate the passage of time between operation and test: the test reading by itself would be 
sufficient.  In those jurisdictions, defendants maintain the right to challenge the accuracy of the 
reading and the method of administration of the test. 
We have identified fifteen states with per se OUI statutes which provide that the offense is 
committed when the defendant is found to have a prohibited blood alcohol level within a 
specified time after operation.  See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 28.35.030(a)(2) (2010) (making it 
unlawful for a person to operate a vehicle if the result of a “chemical test taken within four hours 
after the alleged operating or driving . . . is 0.08 percent or more”); Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-
391(a)(5) (2009) (0.08% within 3 hours); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1381(A)(2) (2012) (0.08% within 
two hours).62   
Courts in some of these states have held that retrograde extrapolation evidence is irrelevant in 
this context, because the defendant’s blood alcohol level at the time of operation is not an 
                                                 
62
 In addition to the states cited above, Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wyoming have this type of per se OUI statute.  See Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1301(2)(a) (2011); Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 4177(a)(5) (2012); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1567(a)(2) 
(2011); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189A.010(1)(a) (2010); Minn. Stat. § 169A.20(5) (2009); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 484C.110(1)(c) (2003); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-102(C)(1) (2010); N.D. Cent. Code § 39-08-01(1)(a) (2009); Okla. 
Stat. tit. 47, § 11-902(A)(1) (2012); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3802(a)(2) (2006); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 46.61.502(1)(a) 
(2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b)(ii) (2012).  While the OUI statutes in the District of Columbia and Utah do 
not have a specific time limit for their per se offenses, they do state that the relevant time for evaluating the results is 
the time at which the test is conducted.  See D.C. Code § 50-2201.05(b)(1)(A)(i)(I) (2009) (“No person shall operate 
or be in physical control of any vehicle in the District . . . [w]hen the person’s alcohol concentration at the time of 
testing is 0.08 grams or more[.]”); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502(1)(a) (2010) (“A person may not operate or be in 
actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the person . . . has sufficient alcohol in the person’s body that 
a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater 
at the time of the test[.]”).   
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element of the offense.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Duda, 923 A.2d 1138, 1149 (Pa. 2007) (“As 
explained above, the criminal conduct is not continuing to drive until one’s BAC reaches 
between 0.08 and 0.10 percent, but driving after drinking enough alcohol to cause one’s BAC to 
reach that level within the specified time after driving. . . .  [A]ny proofs tending to extrapolate 
the defendant’s BAC to the time of driving would be irrelevant.”).63  Courts that have considered 
the question have rejected the contention that these statutes create unconstitutional mandatory 
presumptions or burden shifting.  See Arizona v. Poshka, 109 P.3d 113, 117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2005) (“[Defendant’s] contention that the statute creates an irrational and irrebuttable 
presumption of guilt similarly fails because the two-hour rule is not a presumption, but, rather, a 
definition of the offense.  The state has not been relieved from proving that the defendant’s BAC 
was .08 or greater within two hours of driving.” [citations omitted]).64  
Other states have opted to create a rebuttable presumption of intoxication if a chemical test is 
.08% or higher and was completed within a certain period after defendant operated his or her 
vehicle.  See, e.g., Cal. Veh. Code § 23152(b) (2012) (“In any prosecution under this 
subdivision, it is a rebuttable presumption that the person had a 0.08 percent or more, by weight, 
of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the person had 0.08 percent or 
more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test 
within three hours after driving.”).65  However, there is a question as to whether such a 
presumption would survive constitutional challenge in Massachusetts.  See Moreira, 385 Mass. 
at 797.  
                                                 
63
 See also Arizona v. Poshka, 109 P.3d 113, 117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“Under the current statute, that a 
defendant’s BAC at the precise time of driving may not have reached the proscribed level is irrelevant.  Rather, a 
defendant’s BAC need only have reached .08 within two hours of driving.”); State v. Baker, Del. Super. Ct., No. 
0803038600, 3 (Apr. 8, 2009) (unpublished decision) (“Before the four-hour prohibition’s enactment, a defendant 
sometimes argued that the reason the defendant failed the blood tests was because the defendant’s BAC only crossed 
the limit between the arrest and the test.  Section 4177(a)(5) eliminated that defense.”); State v. Chavez, 214 P.3d 
794, 796 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (“Because the recent amendment to Section 66-8-102(C) renders retrograde 
extrapolation irrelevant in cases such as this, where test results are obtained within three hours . . . the district court 
properly excluded the expert’s testimony to the extent that it was offered for this purpose.”); State v. Manwaring, 
268 P.3d 201, 210 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (“Because, as we have explained, Defendant’s BAC at the time he operated 
his motorcycle was irrelevant to whether Defendant had the requisite BAC for conviction under subsection (1)(a), it 
was not a fact in issue, and consequently, expert testimony would not have aided the jury.”).   
64
 See also Valentine v. Alaska, 215 P.3d 319, 323 (Alaska 2009) (noting that, in response to a previous case in 
which retrograde extrapolation evidence allowed defendant to escape conviction, the legislature amended its OUI 
law “to redefine the blood-alcohol-level theory of the DUI offense in terms of a defendant’s blood alcohol at the 
time that the defendant took a properly administered chemical test rather than at the time of driving.”); State v. 
Finch, 244 P.3d 673, 679 (Kan. 2011) (“The State need not prove a defendant’s actual blood- or breath-alcohol 
concentration at the time of the test or at the time of driving, and it need not prove alcohol’s actual adverse impact 
on a defendant’s driving; but mere proof of an Intoxilyzer reading of .08 or above within 2 hours of defendant’s 
driving does not automatically necessitate conviction. The inclusion of the ‘as measured’ language in 8-1567(a)(2) 
since the statute was amended to add it in 1990 does not inoculate the State’s proof from defense challenge.”); Duda, 
923 A.2d at 1149 (finding that while extrapolation evidence is irrelevant, the defense may still submit evidence “to 
cast doubt on the accuracy of the Commonwealth’s test results”). 
65
 See also Iowa Code § 321J.2(12)(a) (2011) (“The alcohol concentration established by the results of an analysis of 
a specimen of the defendant’s blood, breath, or urine withdrawn within two hours after the defendant was driving or 
in physical control of a motor vehicle is presumed to be the alcohol concentration at the time of driving or being in 
physical control of the motor vehicle.”); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 9-30-6-2, 9-30-6-15 (2001); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, 
§ 1204(3) (2007).   
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2. Change Procedures For Accepting Jury Waivers. 
Some have recommended that the current rule on jury waiver, which gives defendants the 
exclusive right to waive a jury and request a bench trial, should be changed to require the consent 
of the prosecutor.  That is the federal rule and the rule in some other states.  Although the current 
rule contributes to a perception of leniency, where judges who receive waivers in large numbers 
enter a high rate of acquittals, such a change may not be necessary.  More strict enforcement of 
existing procedural rules in the District Court and BMC regarding jury waiver would address 
complaints of “judge shopping” in connection with the trial assignment process, while avoiding a 
rule change applicable to all offenses that could have unanticipated consequences.  
Except in first degree murder cases, Massachusetts statutes give the defendant the exclusive right 
to request waiver of a jury.  See G. L. c. 263, § 6;66 G. L. c. 218, § 26A;67 Mass. R. Crim. P. 
19(a) (“A case in which the defendant has the right to be tried by a jury shall so be tried unless 
the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court[.]”); Commonwealth v. 
O’Brien, 371 Mass. 605, 606-607 (1976) (finding that G. L. c. 263, § 6 clearly precludes the 
defendant from waiving a jury in the trial of an indictment for murder in the first degree).  Based 
on our discussions with participants, it appears that judges rarely reject proffered waivers in OUI 
cases.  More importantly, judges generally permit waivers to be filed on the day of trial, even 
after there has been a colloquy between the court and counsel indicating which judge is available 
to try the case.  We heard several reports that defense lawyers may indicate, in that setting, that 
the defendant would waive a jury in one session but not another.  Faced with pressure to dispose 
of cases in a busy court, judges may acquiesce and assign the case to a session where the case 
will be resolved in a jury-waived trial much more quickly than in a jury trial.  Thus, judges who 
are perceived to be more favorable to the defendant end up handling more bench trials, and in 
turn some of those judges establish a record which perpetuates this selection process.   
In theory at least, a rule requiring prosecutorial consent to jury trial waiver would result in a 
more balanced selection of trial judges.  However, most participants told us that this would result 
in clogged court dockets and greater delays in scheduling jury trials.  More importantly, it is 
difficult to see how a rule change could be effected for only one category of offenses, or only in 
certain departments of the trial court.  The potential impact on other courts and other offenses 
may outweigh any potential benefit. 
Such a rule change would be constitutionally permissible.  While a defendant’s right to a jury 
trial cannot be impaired, we are not aware of case law guaranteeing waiver as an option to 
                                                 
66
 G. L. c. 263, § 6 states, in relevant part: 
Any defendant in a criminal case other than a capital case, whether begun by indictment or upon 
complaint, may, if he shall so elect, when called upon to plead, or later and before a jury has been 
impaneled to try him upon such indictment or complaint, waive his right to trial by jury by signing 
a written waiver thereof and filing the same with the clerk of the court. 
67
 G. L. c. 218, § 26A states, in relevant part: 
Trial of criminal offenses in the Boston municipal court department and in the district court 
department shall be by a jury of six persons, unless the defendant files a written waiver and 
consent to be tried by the court without a jury. 
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defendants.  See Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 134 (2007) (“Both the Federal and 
State Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to be tried by a jury.  However, 
neither the Federal nor the State Constitution provides the right to waive a jury trial.” [citations 
omitted]); see also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 26 (1965) (“We can find no evidence 
that the common law recognized that defendants had the right to choose between court and jury 
trial.”).68 
Many participants agreed that the current Massachusetts rule provides the defendant with a 
valuable safeguard, offering the opportunity to avoid a jury trial in cases where public opinion or 
sympathies might be unduly prejudicial, or where technical or legal issues are best left to 
resolution by a judge rather than a jury.69  Although we have not located any Massachusetts 
cases commenting on such a situation, in a state where judges do not stand for election they 
should be uniquely capable of presenting such an alternative, without fear of political 
repercussions. 
There is a less drastic alternative to requiring prosecutorial consent: a procedural requirement 
that jury waiver must be accomplished before the assignment of a trial date.  This modification 
would serve to avoid the appearance of “judge shopping” on the day of trial, and it seems likely 
that it could be implemented as a matter of court administration without the need for legislative 
change.  This would preserve the option for defendants to avoid a jury where public pressures or 
sympathies might impact a trial, or where the case turns on a purely legal issue, while depriving 
them of the ability to do so in order to aim for a favored judge.70   
                                                 
68
 More than half of the other states require either the state’s consent, or both the state and the court’s consent, 
before allowing a defendant to waive a jury trial.  See Attachment 8.  Eleven states, including Massachusetts, 
require the court’s approval of a jury waiver, and only seven states allow a jury waiver based solely on the 
defendant’s request.  Id.  In Oregon and West Virginia, a defendant who does not demand a jury trial is deemed to 
have waived that right.  ORS § 156.110 (2011); W. Va. Code Ann. § 50-5-8(a) (2012).  In federal court, both the 
prosecutor and the court must consent in order for a defendant to waive a jury trial.  See Patton v. United States, 281 
U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (stating that “before any [jury] waiver can become effective, the consent of government 
counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the 
defendant.”); see also United States v. Leja, 448 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting rule from Patton); Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 23(a) (“If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury unless: (1) the defendant waives a 
jury trial in writing; (2) the government consents; and (3) the court approves.”). 
69
 Cf. Singer, 380 U.S. at 37-38 (acknowledging in dicta that even in the federal system where both parties must 
consent to a waiver, there may be some circumstances including “passion, prejudice [and] public feeling” where “a 
defendant’s reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling that the Government’s insistence on a 
trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial.”); United States v. Ceja, 451 F.2d 399, 
401 (1st Cir. 1971) (upholding federal district court’s denial of defendant’s request for bench trial but also 
“assum[ing] without so deciding that proof of circumstances set out in Singer dicta would warrant granting the 
defendant a trial to the court notwithstanding prosecutor’s objection.”); United States v. Panteleakis, 422 F.Supp. 
247, 250 (D.R.I. 1976) (allowing defendant’s jury waiver over prosecutor’s objection due to complex nature of 
evidence in case).   
70
 Other states have instituted a time limitation on jury waivers.  In Iowa, the defendant can waive a jury trial within 
30 days of arraignment, or within 10 days after the completion of discovery, but not later than 10 days prior to trial.  
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.17(1).  After these deadlines, the consent of the prosecutor is required.  Id.  The Iowa Supreme 
Court has indicated that this time limitation is important for judicial economy in the trial courts and a matter of 
legislative prerogative.  See State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 814, 816 (Iowa 1993) (citing State v. Lawrence, 344 
N.W.2d 227, 230 (Iowa 1984); State v. Siemer, 454 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Iowa 1990)).  In Louisiana, a defendant can 
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As we have said, it appears that the current practice is to allow waivers up to the day of trial.  
There is some support for this practice in relevant statutes.  General Laws c. 218, § 26A 
precludes acceptance of a waiver until after the completion of a pretrial conference and 
disposition of discovery motions, while G. L. c. 263, § 6 permits waiver “before a jury has been 
impanelled.”  See Commonwealth v. Collado, 426 Mass. 675, 677 (1998) (“[A] defendant 
wishing to waive a jury trial must do so before the jurors are empanelled.”).  Rule 19 of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure contains no reference to a time limitation, although it 
does contain the proviso that “[t]he court may refuse to approve such a waiver for any good and 
sufficient reason[.]”  
However, existing rules in the District Court and BMC contemplate the receipt of waivers at an 
earlier time in the process.  Rule 4 of the District/Municipal Courts Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides that the court “shall not compel the defendant’s decision on waiver of jury trial until all 
discovery issues have been resolved[.]”  Unless discovery is not complete, at the pretrial 
conference the court “shall examine [the pretrial conference report]” and “inquire if the 
defendant waives the right to jury trial” (emphasis added).  Id.  Rule 5 provides that, in the event 
discovery is not completed at the pretrial hearing, a subsequent “compliance” hearing “shall be 
scheduled at the request of the party seeking discovery” and “shall be limited to the following 
court actions: . . . obtaining defendant’s decision on waiver of the right to jury and scheduling 
the trial date or trial assignment date” (emphasis added).  Dist./Mun. Cts. R. Crim. P. 5.  In 
addition, G. L. c. 263, § 6 provides that “consent to . . . waiver shall not be denied [in the District 
Court and BMC] if the waiver is filed before the case is transferred for jury trial to the 
appropriate jury session” (emphasis added). 
These rules do not explicitly require waiver prior to the trial date or trial assignment date, but 
G. L. c. 263, § 6 at least appears to allow rejection of a waiver if it is filed after the case is 
transferred to a session for jury trial.  Thus, where defendants have not waived a jury trial after 
the pre-trial hearing, it would appear that a court could impose a policy of assigning cases 
thereafter for trial in a jury session, and declining to accept waivers thereafter, assuming such 
declinations fit within the Rule’s requirement of “good and sufficient reason” for rejection.  
Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 (a).  Although there are cases affirming rejection of a defendant’s request 
for jury waiver in specific situations,  such as where the judge previously heard evidence about 
the case or there are multiple defendants, case law does not appear to provide more general 
guidance about what constitutes good cause for rejecting a jury waiver.  See Collado, 426 Mass. 
at 676-77 (a judge should reject a defendant’s jury waiver request when a co-defendant did not 
also waive his right to a jury trial); Commonwealth v. Kope, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 944, 946 (1991) 
(within the judge’s authority to decline to accept a jury waiver when he had previously heard the 
result of a plea negotiation); Commonwealth v. Collins, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 126, 141 (1981) (trial 
                                                                                                                                                             
waive the right to a jury trial within the first 15 days after arraignment.  La. C.Cr.P. Art. 521, 780(A)-(B).  
Thereafter,  the permission of the court is required, and the waiver may not occur later than 45 days prior to the trial 
date.  La. Const. Art. I, § 17.  This 45 day time limit was the result of a 2010 Louisiana constitutional amendment.  
State v. Chinn, 92 So. 3d 324 (La. 2012) (citing H.B. 940, Reg. Sess., 2010).  As originally introduced, a 
defendant’s ability to waive a jury trial depended on the prosecutor’s consent and approval of the court.  Id.  
However, during legislative debate an amendment was proposed to delete this provision and substitute the language 
that is now found in Article I, § 17 of the Louisiana constitution.  Id. at 14-15.  The intention of this amendment was 
“to prevent last minute waivers by criminal defendants.”  Id. at 15. 
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judge properly rejected a waiver where he had heard certain evidence in pretrial proceedings that 
would prejudice his views during trial).   
The rules also, quite properly, require that a waiver need not occur until the defendant has 
received all of the required discovery.  However, strict enforcement of Dist./Mun. Cts. R. Crim. 
P. 4 and 5, together with a requirement or clarification that a waiver may not be accepted after 
the later of a pretrial hearing or compliance hearing (perhaps with an exception for good cause, 
aimed at circumstances such as late production of discovery or changes in applicable law), would 
serve to avoid judge shopping on the day of trial, without the necessity of a more broadly 
applicable rule requiring prosecutorial consent.71 
We do not offer these suggestions lightly and recognize, based on our conversations with court 
personnel and other participants, that they would require extensive evaluation before being 
adopted, since they would apply to all offenses in the District Court and the BMC.   
In addition, some participants suggested that judges should be rotated among courts more 
frequently, at least in those courts where high waiver and bench trial acquittal rates are found.  
Others caution that continuity of presence in community courts, at least by the presiding justice, 
is an important factor not to be overlooked.  Whether increased rotation is feasible should be 
studied, in conjunction with consideration of changes in procedures for jury trial waivers, to 
make the bench trial assignment process as neutral as possible with regard to the identity of the 
trial judge. 
3. Judicial Training Focusing On Judges’ Gatekeeper Role With Respect To 
Scientific Evidence. 
Both the District Court and the BMC engage in ongoing training of judges on OUI-related issues.  
We reviewed all of the OUI training sessions that the District Court and BMC have held since 
2003.  Most of them were organized by the Administrative Office of the Trial Court’s Judicial 
Institute (“Institute”).72  Based on information received from the Institute, the District Court and 
the BMC, since 2003 the following sessions have been held. 
District Court Annual Judicial Conferences73 
• 2003: An elective training session at which two judges presented on handling 
scientific evidence in OUI cases.   
• 2004 and 2005: Elective training sessions concerning scientific evidence in OUI 
trials. 
                                                 
71
 Given the language in c. 263, § 6 stating that a defendant may waive his right to jury trial “before a jury has been 
impanelled,” there is a question whether a legislative change would be necessary in order to enforce a rule generally 
requiring waiver before transfer to a jury session.  See G. L. c. 263, § 6. 
72
 We reviewed training materials compiled by Ellen O’Connor and Victoria Lewis, Director of Judicial Education 
and Lead Program Manager of the Judicial Institute, respectively. 
73
 District Court judges are required to attend these conferences. 
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• 2007: An elective OUI trial workshop focusing on the “nuts and bolts” of OUI cases.   
• 2008: District Court judges received materials entitled “The Year-In-Review: 
Understanding How Recent Appellate Decisions Impact District Court Criminal 
Practice and Procedure,” which included case citations to new OUI decisions.   
• 2010: District Court judges heard presentations regarding how to consider the 
admission of an expert proffered in the field of field sobriety testing. 
• 2011: An elective training session on OUI evidentiary matters.  The judges were 
provided with a table of case citations covering the three elements of an OUI 
violation, the admissibility of certain types of OUI evidence (breath test results, 
testimony concerning field sobriety tests, etc.), and the OUI jury instructions.  
Additional District Court Mandatory Training 
• In September 2011, Chief Justice Connolly organized mandatory regional meetings of 
District Court judges to provide training on OUI case issues.  A portion of these 
meetings was spent using hypothetical examples to review OUI jury instructions.  
Other areas examined included pre-trial issues, admissibility of chemical tests, and 
how to handle subsequent offenses and pleas.   
BMC 
• 2006: Mandatory training at the BMC Spring Educational Conference entitled “OUI 
Update: Melanie’s Law and the Interlock Device”.  
In addition, the following training sessions have been conducted which were available to both 
BMC and District Court judges. 
• 2003: Training entitled “Handling Impaired Driving Cases,” attended by 65 District 
Court and BMC judges regarding alcohol absorption, the effect of alcohol on a 
defendant’s nervous system, and alcohol testing. 
• 2006: Day-long training sessions, on various dates, entitled “OUI Update for Judges.” 
These sessions addressed various legal updates and updates regarding breathalyzer 
technology.  They also included a panel discussion on trial issues including a defense 
attorney and the Massachusetts Traffic Safety Resource Prosecutor.   
• 2007: Supplemental “OUI Update for Judges” following the Colturi decision, 
attended by  46 District Court and BMC judges.  
• 2012: A training session organized in conjunction with the National Judicial College 
entitled “Detecting the Impaired Driver: Science and Methodology.”  32 District 
Court and BMC judges attended this session, which examined scientific aspects of 
field sobriety tests and common challenges to their admissibility. 
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While there have been training sessions regarding scientific issues, as discussed below, it may be 
helpful to focus future training efforts on the limited, gatekeeper role judges are required to play 
in connection with scientific evidence in OUI cases.   
Judges presiding over OUI trials routinely make factual findings dependent on scientific 
principles regarding the operation of breathalyzer devices; the evaluation of delay in the 
administration of breathalyzer tests, and the related scientific principle of retrograde 
extrapolation; and, more generally, the effect that alcohol has on a defendant’s ability to operate 
a motor vehicle safely.   
Regarding the administration of breathalyzer tests, judges are to apply explicit regulatory 
requirements as a condition of admissibility.  General Laws c. 90, § 24K provides that the results 
of a chemical test are not considered valid unless “such analysis has been performed by a 
certified operator, using infrared breath-testing devices according to methods approved by the 
secretary of public safety.”  The regulations implementing this requirement are found at 501 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2.00, the purpose of which is “to establish rules and regulations regarding 
satisfactory methods, techniques and criteria for breath tests[.]”  501 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01.74  
Thus, there is palpable guidance on the issue of admissibility: judges can determine whether the 
regulations have been followed, and defense lawyers may challenge admissibility by attacking 
police officers’ familiarity and compliance with the regulations.  See Schutte, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 801 (allowing defendant to refer to State Police Manual to impeach officer’s credibility “by 
showing deviations between the understanding and practices of the officer and the recommended 
procedures in the manual”). 
However, evaluating the effect of delay on the weight to be given to a breathalyzer test result is a 
different issue.  As we have said, there is little available guidance, none in the regulations 
governing the admissibility of the test results themselves, and little in the case law beyond 
Colturi’s holding that three hours is presumptively a “reasonable time.”  Colturi, 448 Mass. at 
816-817.  We have seen the issue addressed in bench trials without expert testimony, through 
cross-examination of police or simply through argument.  Defense lawyers may cross-examine 
police officers based on their training on scientific principles, injecting those concepts into the 
record in support of an attack on the issue of delay.  For example, they may use information 
about the physiologic processes associated with alcohol consumption contained in training 
materials such as the DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing Student Manual.  
Massachusetts State Police, DWI Detection & Standardized Field Sobriety Testing, Student 
Manual, at http://www.mass.gov/eopss/images/msp/crimelab/oat/sfst-train-manuals/oat-2006-
sfst-manual.pdf (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012). 
It is proper to impeach an officer’s qualifications and training, but police officers need not be 
qualified as experts in order to give a lay opinion regarding sobriety.  Lay opinion is permissible 
                                                 
74
 The breath test device must be certified. 501 Code Mass. Regs.§ 2.13(2).  The test must “consist of a multipart 
sequence consisting of: (a) one adequate breath sample analysis; (b) one calibration standard analysis; and (c) a 
second adequate breath sample analysis,” and the two adequate breath samples must be within ±0.02% blood 
alcohol units of one another.  Id. at §§ 2.14(3)-(4). The regulations further require that the breath test operator 
observe the arrestee “for no less than 15 minutes immediately prior to the administration of the breath test.”  Id. at § 
2.13(3).   
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on this subject.  See Holton v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 303 Mass. 242, 246 (1939) (“While it 
might not be easy accurately to describe each and every minute detail indicative of intoxication, 
yet the principal objective symptoms are so well known that witnesses have always been 
permitted to express their opinion as to the inebriety of a person.”); Commonwealth v. DeLeon, 
Mass. App. Ct., No. 09-P-285, at 1-2 (Dec. 28, 2009) (Rule 1:28 Decision) (rejecting defendant’s 
assertion that police officer must be qualified as an expert to testify as to defendant’s sobriety); 
Sudderth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 321 (“The opinion testimony of police who observed the 
defendant may also be taken into account” when determining defendant’s intoxication).  Where 
the Commonwealth does not seek to qualify a police officer as an expert for the purpose of 
offering scientific opinion regarding the effects of alcohol consumption or retrograde 
extrapolation, information used to impeach the officer is not itself admissible to establish 
scientific principles that are the subject of police training.  See Schutte, 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 801 
(although defendant was allowed to refer to State Police Manual to impeach officer’s credibility 
by showing deviations between the understanding and practices of the officer and the 
recommended procedures in the manual, the defendant was not allowed to introduce the manual 
itself as evidence of the proper procedures). 
We have seen that judges do discount breathalyzer readings above .08% at bench trials on the per 
se portion of the statute, sometimes in connection with such cross-examination of police officers 
or in light of other evidence indicating sobriety, such as booking videos.  Judges may be  
importing their scientific knowledge, gained either from other trials in which experts did testify, 
or perhaps more commonly from the type of cross-examination discussed above, into their 
evaluation of a test result in a given case.   
In the course of ongoing training, it may be helpful for judges to focus on the limits of their role 
as “gatekeepers” for scientific evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 
(1994) (noting that the judge has a gatekeeper role in determining admissibility of a scientific 
expert’s opinion).  A large part of a judge’s responsibility as a gatekeeper is determining whether 
a witness is qualified to give expert testimony.  Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 31 
(2012).75  Once these foundational requirements are established, a judge also must determine if 
the expert’s testimony is relevant to the case, and, if so, whether it will be unfairly prejudicial.  
Id. at 32.  It is also a judge’s role as gatekeeper to determine when lay witnesses have exceeded 
the bounds of common knowledge or observation and are attempting to testify as an expert.  See 
Commonwealth v. Antunes, Mass. App. Ct., No. 11-P-406, at 1 (Mar. 12, 2012) (Rule 1:28 
Decision) (affirming trial judge’s decision to strike officer’s testimony from record because it 
was “starting to sound like expert testimony[.]”). 
Based on our discussions with judges, the limits of Colturi are well understood, but it does not 
appear that there is frequent discussion regarding the distinction between impeachment and 
expert opinion noted above, or the importation of expert knowledge outside the record into a 
                                                 
75
 When determining whether a witness may testify as an expert, a judge must consider the following five 
“foundational requirements for admissibility: (1) that the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact because the 
information is beyond the common knowledge of jurors, (2) that the witness is qualified as an expert in the relevant 
area of inquiry, (3) that the expert’s opinion is based on facts or data of a type reasonably relied on by experts to 
form opinions in the relevant field, (4) that the theory underlying the opinion is reliable, and (5) that the theory is 
applied to the particular facts of the case in a reliable manner.”  Polk, 462 Mass. at 31. 
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given bench trial.  A judge must function only as a gatekeeper with regard to scientific evidence, 
limited to considering evidence properly entered into the record.  See O’Brien, 423 Mass. at 848 
(“A judge’s reliance on information that is not part of the record implicates fundamental fairness 
concerns . . . Thus, a judge may not rely on his private knowledge of particular facts that are not 
matters of which he can take judicial notice.” [citation omitted]).76  In the design of future 
training sessions, it may be helpful to focus on these issues.77 
4. Revisiting The Treatment Of Refusal Evidence. 
The Spotlight Series made much of the fact that a defendant’s refusal of a breathalyzer or field 
sobriety test is not admissible in Massachusetts, and that the penalty for refusal, a 180-day or 
more license suspension, may be undone by a judge if a defendant is acquitted of the OUI 
charge.   
Massachusetts is indeed one of very few states in which evidence of defendant’s refusal to take a 
breathalyzer test is inadmissible.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e) (“Evidence that the defendant 
failed or refused to consent to such test or analysis shall not be admissible against him in a civil 
or criminal proceeding”); Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1211 (1992) (answering 
question put to Court by Senate regarding proposed legislation, and concluding that admission of 
refusal evidence in criminal case would violate privilege against self-incrimination contained in 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights).78  Evidence of a defendant’s refusal to take field sobriety 
                                                 
76
 For example, in one national judicial training program we found, there was emphasis on the distinction between 
judges acting as gatekeepers and judges evolving into experts themselves.  The Advanced Science & Technology 
Adjudication Resource Center (“ASTAR”) operates the National Science and Technology Resource Judge Program.  
See ASTAR, http://www.astarcourts.net (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012).  Forty-seven state and territorial and two 
federal jurisdictions receive federally-sponsored training scholarships.  190 judges have participated in the 2011-
2012 programs.  Id.  The aim of the program is not to create experts, but rather, to help judges master “the terms of 
reference that can enable motions for admissibility or exclusion of evidence and for qualification or exclusion of 
experts in important cases.”  See “ASTAR’S Concept,” http://www.astarcourts.net/services.html (last viewed Aug. 
28, 2012).  These training programs “always avoid recommendations about judicial decisions; and focus on the 
spectrum of science and technology considerations that forms the background bulwark of many complex cases.”  Id.  
One participant explained that the goal is to “help ensure that something that’s not truly science doesn’t get in front 
of the jury . . . .  Our job here is to understand the science better so we can perform that duty.”  See Flynn, Science 
school for judges, at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2011/science-for-judges-0920.html (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012). 
77
 Less formal scientific training programs also exist in other states.  The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration supplies funds for each state to have a Traffic Safety Resource Prosecutor (“TSRP”).  A TSRP 
“provides training, education and technical support to traffic crimes prosecutors and law enforcement agencies 
throughout their state.”  TSRP Manual, http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/enforce/ProsecutorsManual/pages/ 
WhatDoesItMean.html (last viewed Aug. 28, 2012).  In some states, TSRPs also work with the judicial branch to 
train judges about issues that are likely to emerge during OUI trials.  See, e.g., “Judicial Outreach Liaison Program,” 
http://www.centurycouncil.org/judicial-outreach-liaison-program (Florida); “Traffic Safety Resource Prosecutor,” 
http://www.ago.state.ms.us/index.php/sections/divisions/traffic_safety_resource_prosecutor/ (Mississippi).  As 
noted above, we have learned that the Massachusetts’s TSRP did participate in OUI-specific scientific training for 
judges through the Judicial Institute in 2007--jointly with prosecutors and defense lawyers--but this program has not 
been repeated. 
78
 Breath test refusal evidence is inadmissible in Rhode Island unless the defendant testifies at trial.  See R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 31-27-2(c).  In Michigan, breath test results are admissible to show that a test was given, “but not as 
evidence in determining the defendant’s innocence or guilt.”  Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625a(9).  In Virginia, refusal 
of a breath test is admissible if the refusal is found to be unreasonable, and then only to explain the absence of the 
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tests is also inadmissible in Massachusetts.  See McGrail, 419 Mass. at 780 (noting allowing 
“refusal evidence to be admissible at trial would compel defendants to choose between two 
equally unattractive alternatives: take the test and perhaps produce potentially incriminating real 
evidence; refuse and have adverse testimonial evidence used against him at trial.” [citation 
omitted]).  Finally, in Commonwealth v. Zevitas, 418 Mass. 677, 683-84 (1994), the Court struck 
down a statutory provision requiring that the trial judge instruct the jury in an OUI case generally 
about blood alcohol tests and to not speculate as to the reasons why none was offered at trial, 
holding that such an instruction “tended to have the same effect” as the admission of refusal 
evidence.  Zevitas, 418 Mass. at 683; see also Commonwealth v. Downs, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 195, 
199-200 (2001) (affirming that under Zevitas, judge may not inform jury of possible reasons for 
absence of breathalyzer, but may instruct jury “not to think about or otherwise consider” absence 
of the test in evidence).  
We discussed this issue with judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers.  There was general 
consensus that the impact of these holdings is felt in jury trials more than in bench trials.  We 
heard anecdotal reports that jurors often ask why no breathalyzer evidence was offered at trial, 
and that they sometimes speculate that the reading must have been low or that the defendant 
refused the test.  Most participants agreed that judges, sitting as fact finders, would not be 
influenced if the fact of a refusal were admissible.  Judges are familiar with these cases and know 
that the absence of breathalyzer evidence indicates that there likely was a refusal, and they have 
the docket available to indicate whether, instead, breathalyzer evidence previously was  
suppressed by another judge.  This information also may be mentioned in sidebar conferences 
prior to trials.   
Even if refusal evidence were admissible, judges presumably would be entitled to give it only the 
weight they see fit.  Many participants were mindful that the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights has been interpreted as more protective of defendants than the federal Constitution.  It is 
difficult to see how a change in the law would influence judges steeped in this principle. 
However, it should be noted that a current, collateral benefit connected to the refusal of 
breathalyzer tests is not dependent on constitutional principles and, presumably, could be 
changed.  It is the opportunity of a defendant acquitted of OUI to obtain the return of a license 
which was suspended because of a breath test refusal. 
In Massachusetts, an adult arrested for OUI will have his license automatically suspended for at 
least 180 days upon refusal to take a breathalyzer test.  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).79  General 
Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1) provides that such a defendant, upon the entry of a not guilty finding 
or dismissal of charges, may immediately apply for and be granted a hearing before the court 
which “took final action on the charges for the purpose of requesting the restoration of [said 
                                                                                                                                                             
test at trial, not as evidence of guilt.  Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-268.10(C). In all other states, breath test refusal evidence 
is admissible.  A chart comparing the law in all fifty states is attached hereto as Attachment 8.  
79
 For persons under the age of 21 and second-time offenders, the suspension period is three years.  G. L. c. 90, § 24 
(1) (f) (1).  The suspension period is five years for those previously convicted of two OUI violations, and for those 
previously convicted of three or more violations, a lifetime suspension is imposed.  If a person refuses to submit to a 
breathalyzer test and has been convicted of motor vehicle homicide under G. L. c. 90, § 24G or vehicular 
manslaughter under G. L. c. 265, § 131/2, his license is revoked for life. 
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defendant’s] license.”  (There must be no other alcohol-related charges pending against the 
defendant at the time).  There is a rebuttable presumption in favor of reinstatement, unless the 
Commonwealth establishes by a “fair preponderance of the evidence, that [the reinstatement] 
would likely endanger the public safety.”  Id.  In such a case, the court is required to issue 
written findings of fact with its decision.  Id. 
Thus, a defendant who refuses to take the test, although suffering an immediate license 
suspension, may obtain a double benefit thereafter: acquittal in the criminal case, made weaker 
without scientific evidence of alcohol consumption, and immediate license reinstatement.  We 
looked at other states to see whether a defendant whose license was suspended for refusing to 
submit to chemical testing may have his license reinstated upon acquittal or dismissal of the 
underlying OUI charge.  Like Massachusetts, Louisiana and Texas both allow for immediate or 
quick reinstatement of a license--suspended based on test refusal--upon proof of acquittal and/or 
dismissal of the underlying DUI charges.  See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:667(H)(1) (allowing for 
“immediate” reinstatement upon acquittal or dismissal of charges); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 
§ 524.015(b) (prohibiting suspensions under the Transportation Code after acquittals (only) and 
requiring rescission and removal of reference from driving record of existing suspensions upon 
acquittal); 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 17.13 (prohibiting suspensions upon acquittal and requiring 
rescission of suspensions already in place, but noting defendant must send certified copy of 
judgment of acquittal to department of motor vehicles, which the department has the right to 
verify). 
However, California and Florida specifically provide that an acquittal for the underlying offense 
does not affect the validity of an administrative suspension for refusal to submit to chemical 
testing.  Cal. Veh. Code §13353 (governing suspension for refusal to submit to a blood alcohol 
test); Cal. Veh. Code § 13353.2(f) (stating disposition of suspension for driving with blood 
alcohol level over .08 does not affect suspension under § 13353); Cal. Veh. Code § 13353.4 
(governing restoration of driving privileges); see also Burnstine v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 60 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that, unlike suspensions for driving with a 
blood alcohol level of .08 or more, there is “no statutory right to reinstatement” when a license is 
suspended for refusal to submit to a chemical test);80 Fla. Stat. § 322.2615(14)(b) (“the 
disposition of any related criminal proceedings does not affect suspension for refusal to submit to 
a blood, breath, or urine test imposed under this section”); Solomon v. State, 538 So. 2d 931, 933 
(Fla. 1989) (holding that despite acquittal of underlying DUI charge, administrative refusal to 
reinstate defendant’s license was proper). 
                                                 
80
 The court in Burnstine distinguished between license suspension for driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 or 
greater and suspension for refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test.  60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90.  The former situation is 
governed by Cal. Veh. Code § 13353.2, which contains a specific provision allowing for license reinstatement upon 
acquittal of that charge.  Id.  The latter is governed by § 13353, which does not contain a similar provision allowing 
for reinstatement.  Id.  Also worth noting, upon conviction for OUI in California, a court may impose enhanced 
penalties for “willful” refusal or “willful” failure to complete a chemical test at the time of arrest for OUI.  Cal. Veh. 
Code § 23577 (setting forth additional penalties where willful refusal or failure to complete a chemical test is “pled 
and proven”); Cal. Veh. Code § 23578 (requiring courts to consider refusal as a “special factor that may justify 
enhancing the penalties in sentencing, in determining whether to grant probation, and . . . determining additional or 
enhanced terms and conditions of probation”).  “Willful refusal” appears to be “intentional (or even purposeful) 
refusal,” as opposed to when a driver simply “does not take one of the chemical tests” for other reasons, such as 
where his level of intoxication renders him incapable of refusing the test.  Burnstine, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90. 
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Note that the 1992 holding in Opinion of the Justices, supra, is confined to the admissibility of 
refusal evidence in criminal proceedings, and none of the Massachusetts cases cited above imply 
that a defendant has a constitutional right to license reinstatement upon refusal.  As the Appeals 
Court recently stated: 
The right to operate a motor vehicle in Massachusetts is a privilege that is 
conditioned upon obedience to the comprehensive regulatory scheme designed to 
keep the motorways safe. General Laws c. 90, §§ 23 & 24, were enacted for the 
purpose of removing drivers under the influence of alcohol from the roads. 
License revocation for refusal to submit to testing pursuant to G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24(1)(f )(1), is a remedial, nonpunitive public safety measure.  
Kasper v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 902 (2012) (citations omitted); 
see Wasserman v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 18 Mass. L. Rep. 259 (2004) (noting that 
individuals arrested for operating under the influence have no constitutional right to refuse a 
breath test, and rejecting defendant’s substantive and procedural due process challenges to 
breathalyzer test consent procedures and administrative license suspension hearings).  If the 
requirement that a defendant submit to a test on pain of license suspension raises no 
constitutional implications, then the opportunity for reinstatement after suspension, based on 
acquittal in a criminal case, may not be constitutionally required.  See Commonwealth v. Bauer, 
455 Mass. 497, 501 (2009) (finding “nothing unconstitutional about the legislative allocation of 
authority [to judges] over [license] restoration decisions described in Mass. Gen. Laws c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1)” and holding license reinstatement not required despite acquittal because 
suspension was for refusal rather than underlying OUI charge).   
We also note that many participants told us that license reinstatement hearings before judges are 
often not actively contested by prosecutors, who seem to leave the matter to the discretion of the 
judges after acquittal of the criminal charges, at least where the defendant is not a second-or-
subsequent offender.  If there is a concern about the impact of constitutional principles related to 
refusal evidence, perhaps attention for reform should be directed to these suspension-related 
provisions of the statute. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Bench trials alone do not have a substantial impact on the enforcement of OUI statutes in 
Massachusetts.  Almost four out of five OUI defendants in Massachusetts admit their guilt or are 
found guilty after trial.  Less than one defendant in ten is acquitted by a judge in a bench trial.   
Many OUI cases are indeed factually weak for the Commonwealth.  However, almost none are 
dismissed by prosecutors on that basis alone.  Prosecutors may be constrained to apply limited 
resources to more serious crimes, and defense attorneys vigorously contest evidence which is 
often presented in a rote and repetitive manner.  Thus, bench trial acquittals are to be expected at 
high rates. 
Nevertheless, the record of near-100% acquittals and high waiver rates in certain courts, and 
before certain judges, creates an appearance of leniency.  In other courts, the dearth of waivers 
and bench trials raises concerns about the equal administration of the law.  While the cases 
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which “go jury-waived” may be weaker than others, it is difficult to accept that all of them 
should fail after trial in some courts, just as it is difficult to explain why so few should “go jury-
waived” in other courts.   
Where extremely high waiver and acquittal rates are found, this suggests that the bar to 
conviction presented by the reasonable doubt standard may be raised ever higher by judges 
presented with a high volume of cases involving similar evidence, offered by the same 
prosecutors and police, in the same manner, in support of the same charge, but against different 
defendants.  While judges earnestly seek to apply the law and fairly hold the Commonwealth to 
its burden of proof--and we fully accept that this is so--they may tend to look with an 
increasingly skeptical eye on the repetitive evidence in these cases, as they hear more and more 
of them over time.  
No one we interviewed contended that these statistics are the product of corrupt relationships 
between lawyers and judges.  However, the appearance created by such patterns of acquittal 
should be addressed. 
Concerns about “judge shopping” may be addressed by rule changes regarding jury waiver, and 
by rotation of the judges who hear OUI cases.  Judges can and should re-examine the challenges 
presented when fact finding is dependent on scientific principles in the abbreviated context of 
these trials, where experts seldom are called in support of the prosecutor’s case.  The use of 
breathalyzer tests as evidence of impairment, or even as a surrogate for impairment under the per 
se portion of the statute, is essentially a scientific short cut.  While regulations provide tangible 
rules for the admission of breath tests, no concrete guidance is offered in law or regulation to 
evaluate delay between a defendant’s operation and the test.  On this issue, the trial of the 
offense could be simplified by revising the per se portion of the statute.   
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, refusal evidence is not admissible in criminal OUI 
trials in Massachusetts.  However, the privilege of obtaining a driver’s license can be conditioned 
on more strict requirements to deter refusal of breathalyzer tests, including elimination of the 
opportunity for return of a license, suspended for refusal, after acquittal.  Yet criminalizing 
driving under the influence of alcohol, which is entirely appropriate, brings with it all the 
constitutional protections available to any criminal defendant, and properly so.  The systemic 
concerns raised by press reports and this inquiry should indeed lead to serious reflection by 
judges on the manner in which these cases are administered and tried, but should in no way deter 
them in the exercise of their constitutional responsibility to hold the Commonwealth to its burden 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the essential guarantee of our rights in the criminal 
justice system.   
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ATTACHMENT 4 
 
COLLECTION OF STATISTICAL DATA – METHODS AND AUDIT 
 
This section of our report describes the methods we used to derive useful data from the 
MassCourts and CourtView case management systems. 
In 2006, the Commonwealth began the implementation of MassCourts in most departments and 
divisions of the Trial Court.  MassCourts is currently used in 60 out of 62 courts of the District 
Court and seven of the eight courts in the BMC.  MassCourts is a web-based case management 
system that stores electronic data concerning the scheduling and disposition of cases.
1
   
In each court, court staff enters basic case information, such as the defendant’s name and the 
charges, into MassCourts using the application for criminal complaint and statement of facts or 
police report.  They then enter into MassCourts information about each event up to the final 
disposition using a paper case docket sheet, which is considered the “official” record in a 
criminal proceeding.  Once a case is opened, case information is first recorded on the paper 
docket sheet, usually inside a courtroom, and that data is entered into MassCourts at some later 
time.  When a case is concluded, court staff enters the following information from the paper 
docket sheet into MassCourts: the “Disposition Date,” “Disposition Method,”2 “Disposition 
Code,”3 and “Disposition Judge.”  For the “Disposition Method,” “Disposition Code,” and 
                                                 
1
 The Trial Court staff provided us with a demonstration of MassCourts on or about November 10, 2011. 
2
 The available “Disposition Methods” are: 
Admission to Sufficient Facts Nolo Plea 
Disposed as Civil Infraction Nolle Prosequi 
Dismissed Probable Cause Hearing 
Filed Without a Finding Pretrial Probation Without a Finding 
Guilty Plea Probation Violation Hearing 
Hearing Bench Trial 
Jury Trial Transferred to Another Court 
Lesser Charge – Admission to Sufficient Facts Transferred Out – For Guilty Plea 
Lesser Charge – Guilty Plea Transferred Out – For Trial 
 
3
 The available “Disposition Codes” are: 
Not Responsible After Appellate Division Review Filed Without a Finding 
Responsible After Appellate Division Review Guilty 
Continued Without a Finding Guilty – 24D Program 
Continued Without a Finding – 24D Program Guilty; Placed on File 
Dismissed – Accord & Satisfaction Guilty of Lesser Included Offense 
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“Disposition Judge” entries, court staff must select the available options from a drop down menu.  
A screen shot reflecting those data fields appears below:   
 
 
 
There are many options available in MassCourts for the Disposition Method (18 options) and 
Disposition Code (39 options)--too many for us to use in our analysis.  One challenge we faced, 
explained in the following pages, was how to reduce the entries using these options to a useable 
format for our inquiry. 
The BMC Central Division (in downtown Boston) uses a different case management system, 
CourtView, to store similar electronic data.  With the assistance of Trial Court staff, we were 
able to derive useful data from this system as well and include it in our analyses.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Responsible Under G.L. c. 277, § 70C Inactivated For Lack Of Service 
Not Responsible Under G.L. c. 277, § 70C Not Delinquent 
Dismissed – After Continuance Without a Finding Not Guilty 
Dismissed – Defendant Deceased Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 
Dismissed – Defendant Indicted Nolle Prosequi 
Dismissed No Probable Cause Found 
Delinquent Not Responsible 
Dismissed – Lack of Prosecution Probable Cause Found 
Dismissed – Lack of Speedy Trial Pretrial Probation as Disposition 
Dismissed – Pretrial Diversion Responsible 
Dismissed – After Pretrial Probation Transferred to Another Court 
Dismissed – Request of Commonwealth To Be Dismissed Upon Payment 
Dismissed – Request of Victim Transferred Out for Guilty Plea (MRCrP 37 {a}) 
Dismissed – Substitute Complaint Issued Transferred Out for Trial (MRCrP 37 {b}) 
Dismissed – Without Prejudice  
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The Barnstable and Brockton District Courts use an older docket management program, the 
“Judicial Management System.”  Because of the limitations of that system, Trial Court staff was 
unable to extract the data necessary for our analyses of OUI cases.  We are not aware of any 
feasible means to do so.  These courts are not included in any of our analyses. 
A. Extraction of Data From MassCourts 
In November 2011, we contacted Craig Burlingame, Chief Information Officer of the Trial 
Court, to determine whether data contained in MassCourts could be extracted for our use in 
examining acquittal rates in OUI cases.  We learned, as the Spotlight Series had reported, that the 
Trial Court does not routinely compile such data, nor is it readily available from MassCourts.  
However, with the extensive assistance of Trial Court and Sentencing Commission staff, we 
were able to devise a means for collecting information sufficient for our purposes.  
We met with Mark Prior, Team Lead of the MassCourts Data Management Team, and asked him 
to devise a means for extracting data for each OUI case disposed of in the Commonwealth from 
January 1, 2008 to September 30, 2011 (the “Time Period”).  We selected the Time Period for 
several reasons.  Generally, we wanted to collect a sufficient number of OUI dispositions to 
identify meaningful trends.  We selected January 1, 2008 as the start date because most of the 
courts in the District Court and BMC Departments were using MassCourts by then.  We selected 
September 30, 2011 as our end date because it was the latest date, prior to the start of our work, 
when we could be confident that complete disposition data had been entered into MassCourts. 
In addition, in order to evaluate whether the Spotlight Series did have an impact on the 
disposition of OUI cases, we later asked Mr. Prior to extract an additional set of data from 
October 1, 2011 to March 31, 2012.     
1. Relevant Data Fields in MassCourts  
Over a period of several weeks, Mr. Prior devised specific “queries,” written in software code 
(“SQL”), to extract data from the database.  He used the following data fields found in 
MassCourts:
4
 
(a)  Charge.  For our purposes, “Charges” alleging a violation of G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24(1)(a)(1), Operating Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs or .08%, were 
collected.  We use the term “OUI Charge” to refer to such violations. 
                                                 
4
 In addition, we asked Mr. Prior to extract the following data for each OUI case disposed of during the Time Period: 
Defendant Name Date of Offense 
Defendant Date of Birth Police Department 
Court Attorney BBO Number 
Docket Number  
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(b)  Disposition Method.  The “Disposition Method” is the manner of disposition of an 
OUI Charge.  For example, a bench trial, jury trial, guilty plea, and admission to 
sufficient facts are Disposition Methods. 
(c)  Disposition Code.  The “Disposition Code” is the outcome of an OUI Charge.  For 
example, an OUI Charge may result in a guilty or not guilty finding, a “continuance 
without a finding” (“CWOF”),5 or a dismissal.  
(d)  Disposition Judge.  The “Disposition Judge” is the judge who presided over the 
disposition of an OUI Charge.  For example, a judge who presided over a bench trial or 
jury trial is the Disposition Judge.   
(e)  Disposition Date.  The “Disposition Date” is the date of disposition of an OUI 
Charge.  
(f)  Attorney.  The “Attorney” is the defense attorney who represented the defendant at 
the time of the disposition of an OUI Charge. 
(g)  Event.  An “Event” is the proceeding that was scheduled to occur on a given date.   
(h)  Event Result.  The “Event Result” establishes the outcome of the Event. 
2. Conversion of This Data for Our Analysis  
Beginning in December 2011, Mr. Prior, at our request, provided the data extract to Ms. Linda 
Holt, Research Director of the Massachusetts Sentencing Commission, for quantitative analysis.  
The extract contained several hundred thousand data points for approximately 63,000 cases.  Ms. 
Holt used SPSS, a computer program widely used for statistical analysis, to analyze the data.
6,7
 
As noted above, MassCourts offers 18 Disposition Methods for court staff to enter in connection 
with an OUI Charge, and 39 Disposition Codes.  In light of our objectives, we worked with 
Linda Holt to construct a methodology for converting and simplifying this data for our analysis.  
What follows is an explanation of how we worked with this data in light of these concerns.   
(a)  Charge 
Where an OUI Charge was amended, we used the amended OUI Charge in our analysis.  We 
excluded cases where the Commonwealth amended an OUI Charge to a non-OUI Charge.  
Where multiple OUI offenses were charged in a single case, we included only the OUI Charge 
                                                 
5
 A CWOF requires the defendant to admit sufficient facts for an OUI conviction.  The case is continued for a 
specified period during which the defendant is on probation.  If the defendant complies with the probation 
conditions, the case is dismissed.  If the defendant violates the conditions, the CWOF disposition may be modified 
to a guilty finding.  We considered a CWOF to be a disposition adverse to the defendant regardless of whether the 
CWOF was ultimately dismissed. 
6
 We requested that Ms. Holt display the cases in an Excel spreadsheet format reflecting certain data for each case.     
7
 Ms. Holt was assisted by Lee Kavanagh, Research Analyst at the Massachusetts Sentencing Commission. 
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that resulted in a conviction, if there was one.  Otherwise, we used the disposition of the “lead” 
OUI Charge--the one listed first in MassCourts--in our analysis.  For purposes of our analysis, 
we treated an OUI case as consisting of one OUI Charge.  Thus, we use the terms “case” and 
“charge” interchangeably throughout the remainder of this report. 
(b)  Disposition Methods 
There are 18 Disposition Methods available for selection in MassCourts.  Of these 18 
Disposition Methods, only 13 were selected by court staff in connection with the OUI cases in 
our data extract.  We grouped these 13 Disposition Methods into four Disposition Method 
Categories:  Plea, Bench Trial, Jury Trial, and “Other.”  The chart below shows that grouping: 
Disposition Method Category 
(For Our Analysis) 
Disposition Methods 
(From MassCourts) 
Plea Admission to Sufficient Facts 
Guilty Plea 
Nolo Plea 
Lesser Charge – Admission to   
  Sufficient Facts 
Lesser Charge – Guilty Plea 
Bench Trial Bench Trial 
Jury Trial Jury Trial 
Other Hearing 
Dismissed 
Nolle Prosequi
8
 
Disposed as Civil Infraction 
Filed Without a Finding 
Pretrial Probation Without a Finding
9
 
 
Our methodology for classifying Disposition Methods into one of four categories is as follows: 
Pleas: Where court staff selected any of the following Disposition Methods, we classified 
the proceeding as a Plea: Admission to Sufficient Facts; Guilty Plea; Nolo Plea; Lesser 
Charge–Admission to Sufficient Facts; and Lesser Charge–Guilty Plea.  Where court 
staff did not select a Disposition Method for a case, we classified the Disposition Method 
as a Plea where: (1) the “Event” in MassCourts was a Pre-Trial Hearing, Arraignment, 
Status Review, Probable Disposition, or Default Removal Hearing; and (2) the 
Disposition Code that was entered was either Guilty or Guilty–Section 24D Program.  
                                                 
8
 A nolle prosequi is a declaration by the prosecutor in a criminal case that he is declining to prosecute the case. 
9
 Pretrial Probation is an agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant, approved by the court, that occurs 
before a trial or other final disposition.  If the defendant successfully completes a probationary period, the case is 
dismissed.  If the defendant violates any of the terms and conditions of the pretrial probation, the case proceeds to a 
final disposition. 
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We also classified a Disposition Method as a Plea where court staff did not select a 
Disposition Method, but selected CWOF as the Disposition, regardless of the “Event.”   
Bench Trials: Where court staff selected Bench Trial as the Disposition Method, we 
classified the proceeding as a Bench Trial.
10
  Where court staff did not select a 
Disposition Method, we used other data to infer one.  We classified the proceeding as a 
Bench Trial where the “Event” code was Bench Trial In Progress, Bench Trial Criminal, 
or Judge Hearing, and the Disposition was Guilty, Guilty Finding, Guilty–Section 24D 
Program,
11
 or Not Guilty.   
Jury Trials: Where court staff selected Jury Trial as the Disposition Method, we 
classified the proceeding as a “Jury Trial.”  Where court staff did not select a Disposition 
Method, we classified the proceeding as a Jury Trial where the “Event” code was Jury 
Trial In Progress or Jury Trial Criminal, and the Disposition was Guilty, Guilty Finding, 
Guilty–Section 24D Program, or Not Guilty.  
“Other” Disposition Methods: We used this category to group Disposition Methods 
other than Bench Trial, Jury Trial, or Plea.  Where court staff selected any of the 
following Disposition Methods, we classified them in our “Other” category:  Hearing, 
Dismissed, Nolle Prosequi, Disposed as Civil Infraction, Filed Without a Finding, and 
Pretrial Probation Without a Finding.  We also used this category where court staff did 
not identify a Disposition Method but selected one of the following Dispositions: 
Dismissed, Dismissed–Accord Satisfaction, Dismissed–Defendant Deceased, Dismissed–
Lack of Prosecution, Dismissed–After Pretrial Probation, Dismissed–Request of 
Commonwealth, Dismissed–Without Prejudice, Nolle Prosequi, and To Be Dismissed 
Upon Payment.  Where court staff did not select a Disposition Method and the “Event” 
was First Assignment in Trial Session, and the Disposition was Guilty, Guilty Finding, 
Guilty–Section 24D Program, or Not Guilty, we assigned the proceeding to the “Other” 
category as well.   
In 34 cases for which court staff selected Bench Trial or Jury Trial as the Disposition 
Method, the Disposition Code indicates that the case resulted in a dismissal or pretrial 
probation.  In those cases, we inferred that no trial actually occurred, and therefore 
assigned those cases to the “Other” Disposition Method Category. 
In addition, the MassCourts data reflects that there were 77 Pleas that resulted in Not 
Guilty findings and 130 Pleas that resulted in a dismissal or pretrial probation.  We did 
not review the docket sheet or other information to understand these classifications, and 
therefore we cannot say whether these dispositions reflect errors.  Since the Pleas did not 
appear to result in findings adverse to the defendant, we assigned those cases to the 
“Other” Disposition Method Category.   
                                                 
10
 In a limited number of cases, the Event data indicated that a case was scheduled for trial, but the trial was “Not 
Held But Resolved.”  In those cases, we assigned the Charge to the Plea Disposition Method category. 
11
 The 24D Program is an alcohol education program for eligible first- and second-time OUI offenders in 
Massachusetts pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24D. 
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(c)  Disposition Codes 
There are 39 Disposition Codes available for selection in MassCourts.  Of these 39 Disposition 
Codes, only 22 were selected by court staff in connection with the OUI cases in our data extract.  
We grouped these 22 Disposition Codes into four categories: Guilty, Not Guilty, CWOF, and 
“Other.”  The chart below shows that grouping:   
 
Disposition Category 
(For Our Analysis) 
Disposition Codes 
(From MassCourts) 
Continued Without a 
Finding (“CWOF”) 
Continued Without a Finding 
Continued Without a Finding–24D Program 
Guilty Guilty 
Guilty–24D Program 
Guilty of Lesser Included Offense 
Guilty; Placed on File 
Not Guilty Not Guilty 
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 
Other Dismissed 
Dismissed – Accord & Satisfaction 
Dismissed – After Pretrial Probation 
Dismissed – Defendant Deceased 
Dismissed – Lack of Prosecution 
Dismissed – Lack of Speedy Trial 
Dismissed – Request of Commonwealth 
Dismissed – Request of Victim 
Dismissed – Without Prejudice 
Filed Without a Finding 
Inactivated for Lack of Service 
Nolle Prosequi 
Pretrial Probation as Disposition 
To Be Dismissed Upon Payment 
 
Our methodology for grouping Disposition Codes had two parts.  First, we assigned a 
Disposition Method to a Charge as described above.  See supra at 6-7.  Second, we reviewed the 
MassCourts Disposition Code selected by court staff (e.g., Guilty) for that Charge and then 
assigned it to one of our Disposition Categories.   
With regard to the CWOFs associated with Bench Trials and Jury Trials, we cannot determine 
from the docket sheets whether judges entered CWOFs before or after the trial occurred.
 12
 
                                                 
12
 Courts are not permitted to enter CWOFs over the Commonwealth’s objection after a trial has occurred.  
Commonwealth v. Norrell, 423 Mass. 725 (1996).  We do note, however, that in 63 instances, courts may have 
entered CWOFs following bench trials and, in two instances, following jury trials.  We cannot determine from the 
docket sheets when the court entered the CWOF.   
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We assigned 5,854 cases to the Other disposition category during the Time Period, representing 
roughly 10% of the sample. 
Finally, we observed cases where court staff entered multiple Dispositions for the same Charge.  
When those Dispositions were entered on the same date, we selected the Disposition that 
occurred later in time.  We assumed that the later disposition was a correction of an earlier one.  
When those Dispositions were entered on a different date, we selected the initial Disposition.  
For example, if an OUI Charge initially resulted in a CWOF, but that CWOF was subsequently 
dismissed or modified to a guilty finding, we included the CWOF in our analysis.
13
   
(d)  Disposition Judge 
The data reflected a Disposition Judge for 9,472 of 9,487 Bench and Jury Trials.  For eleven  
trials where no Disposition Judge was entered, we assigned as Disposition Judge the judge 
recorded in MassCourts as the “Result Judge.”  We did not have sufficient information to assign 
a Disposition Judge in the remaining four cases. 
(e)  Disposition Date 
We accepted the date entries which appeared in MassCourts without change.  
(f)  Attorney 
The data we extracted identified the defense lawyer for 4,916 of 5,883 Bench Trials, 3,125 of 
3,604 Jury Trials, and 30,376 of 41,625 Pleas. 
3. Refinements to the Data 
As a result of our review of OUI cases from MassCourts, we made several refinements to the 
data to, among other things, eliminate double counting of cases. 
Probation Hearings: We excluded cases where “Probation Violation Hearing” was the 
Disposition Method, and where the OUI Charge was associated with the following 
Events: “Probation Violation–First Appearance” or “Probation Violation Hearing.”  
These Disposition Methods and Events do not reflect an initial Disposition of an OUI 
Charge.  
Transferred Cases: The data extract included cases that were transferred from one 
District Court to another for disposition of an OUI Charge.  The Disposition Codes 
and/or Disposition Methods for these cases were: Transferred Out For Guilty Plea, 
Transferred Out For Trial, or Transferred to Another Court.  We excluded these cases 
from our analysis on the assumption that if any of these cases proceeded to a final 
disposition in another court during the Time Period, those cases would be captured in our 
                                                 
13
 Only initial Dispositions that occurred during the Time Period were included in our analysis.  For example, if a 
case was disposed of by CWOF before the Time Period, and defendant violated probation during the Time Period, 
we excluded that case.  If a case was disposed of by CWOF during the Time Period, and the defendant violated 
probation during or after the Time Period, the case appears once in our analysis as a CWOF. 
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data extract.  The total number of cases excluded from our analysis for these reasons was 
207. 
Duplicative cases: Our data included 313 cases that appeared to be duplicative of another 
case with a different docket number.  The duplicative cases share the same defendant and 
police incident report number.  Of the two cases, we included in our analysis only the one 
with the more recent docket number. 
Second and Subsequent OUI Charges: Where a defendant is charged with a second or 
subsequent OUI offense, the trial of the case is bifurcated.  The court first disposes of the 
case arising from the new arrest.  Assuming that disposition is adverse to the defendant, 
the court then resolves whether the defendant committed an earlier OUI offense which is 
the basis for the second or subsequent element.
14
  The dispositions of the new offense and 
the second or subsequent element may result from different Disposition Methods.  For 
example, the new offense may be tried to a judge or jury, while the second or subsequent 
element is then the subject of either a plea or separate trial.  However, MassCourts allows 
court staff to enter only one Disposition Method.  Therefore, instead of reflecting two 
Disposition Methods, one for the new offense and one for the second or subsequent 
element, MassCourts captures only one or the other.  In light of our assignment, we 
concluded that the more relevant Disposition Method was the one applied to a plea or 
trial on the new arrest, and not the second or subsequent element.
15
  We reviewed a 
sample of the docket sheets for these cases and identified cases where the second or 
subsequent element was tried to a jury or resolved by plea and the predicate offense was 
tried to the bench.  We reclassified the Disposition Method from Bench Trial to Plea or 
Jury Trial, as appropriate.  Since we reviewed docket sheets for only a sample of the 294 
cases, there may be additional cases that should be reclassified.  However, the result of 
any further reclassifications would be to decrease the number of cases resulting in guilty 
findings at Bench Trial, which would, in turn, increase the Bench Trial acquittal rate. 
4. Audit of MassCourts Data  
With the approval of the Supreme Judicial Court, we worked with William Marchant, Chief 
Financial Officer of the Trial Court, who supervised an audit of the MassCourts data extract.  We 
focused on the data relied upon to determine the Bench Trial acquittal rate.  Our audit plan was 
intended to evaluate the extent to which the MassCourts data accurately reflects the Disposition 
Method, Disposition, and Disposition Judge for an OUI Charge.   
The audit did have a significant limitation.  The docket sheet, not MassCourts, is the official case 
record in a criminal case.  Any errors in a docket sheet would be transferred to MassCourts.  The 
only certain method to assess the accuracy of the Disposition Method and Disposition is to listen 
to the tape recording of a proceeding.  We did not do so, except for the relatively small number 
                                                 
14
 In the event a defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, the new OUI Charge, the Commonwealth still bears 
the burden to prove a conviction on the earlier OUI Charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt.   
15
 Note we have not focused in this report on the manner in which the second or subsequent element in these cases 
was resolved.  There are 294 cases in our data extract where MassCourts reported that a defendant was convicted of 
a second or subsequent offense after a Bench Trial.  
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of bench trials which we reviewed for the purpose of identifying substantive trial issues.  Our 
audit, therefore, primarily assessed the accuracy of the transfer of information from the docket 
sheet to MassCourts.  The audit had the following four components. 
First, with respect to Bench Trials, Linda Holt provided the auditors with an Excel spreadsheet 
listing one-third of the  OUI bench trials in our data extract as of January 24, 2012.
16
  She 
selected the one-third sample at random.  The auditors visited each of the District Courts (except 
the Barnstable and Brockton District Courts) and copied the docket sheet and police report for 
each case reviewed.
17
  The auditors determined whether MassCourts correctly reflected the 
Disposition Method and Disposition for the OUI Charge.  They memorialized the results of their 
analysis on an Excel spreadsheet.   
Second, the auditors interviewed clerks at each of the District Courts to learn whether, over the 
Time Period, court staff identified the judge that presided over the Bench Trial as the Disposition 
Judge, or some other judge.
18
  For example, in the event that court staff identified the Assigning 
Judge (who assigns trials to other judges for disposition) or Presiding Judge (the presiding judge 
of the court) as the Disposition Judge, we would ascribe trials to judges who did not preside over 
them.   
Third, with respect to all Disposition Methods, we asked Ms. Holt to provide the auditors with an 
Excel spreadsheet composed of a 10% sample of all  OUI cases in our data extract as of January 
24, 2012.  Ms. Holt selected the sample at random.  On their visits to the District Courts, the 
auditors reviewed the docket sheet for each case in the sample that they were able to locate.  For 
each case they located, they evaluated whether MassCourts correctly reflected the Disposition 
Method for the OUI Charge.  The auditors were instructed to memorialize the results of their 
analysis on an Excel spreadsheet. 
Fourth, because we noted several categories of anomalous Disposition Methods and 
Dispositions, we asked the auditors to check certain cases.  For example, court staff assigned 
Hearing as the Disposition Method for 458 OUI charges.  The Dispositions for these Hearings 
included CWOF, Not Guilty, and Guilty.  We could not determine whether the Hearings were 
Bench Trials, Jury Trials, Pleas or some other proceeding.  We also observed the following 
additional anomalies: 
                                                 
16
 In light of the refinements to the data identified above, there are 5,883 bench trials in the Database referred to in 
our report.  
17
 The auditors were unable to locate or access some of the case files in the sample. 
18
 The auditors were instructed to ask the following questions:   
(a)  For the time period 1/1/08 - 9/30/11, what was the court's practice when recording on docket sheets the 
judge who presided over a bench trial?  
(b)  For the time period 1/1/08 - 9/30/11, what was the court's practice when entering the “Disposition 
Judge” into MassCourts? 
(c)  For the time period 1/1/08 - 9/30/11, would the presiding judge or assigning judge be designated 
“Disposition Judge” for bench trials? 
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 50 cases where Disposition was Responsible/Not Responsible or Delinquent/Not 
Delinquent; 
 
 81 cases disposed of by trial where the Disposition was recorded as CWOF; and 
 
 109 cases where the Disposition was recorded as Guilty or Not Guilty, but no 
Disposition Method was recorded. 
 
We directed the auditors to review the docket sheet for these anomalies to determine, among 
other things, whether the Disposition Method and Disposition was correct.  In sum, we directed 
the auditors to review docket sheets for an additional 681 cases.
19
 
The auditors completed their field work on or about April 25, 2012.  They provided us with 
copies of the docket sheets and police reports for the one-third sample of Bench Trials they 
reviewed and for many of the anomalies they reviewed.  They additionally provided us with the 
Excel spreadsheets reflecting their field work.  We reviewed the docket sheets the auditors 
provided to us and the auditors’ field work and identified additional errors in the data.  The 
results of this combined effort are as follows:  
Bench Trials – One-Third Sample:  We and the auditors reviewed 1,835 docket sheets 
out of the cases that we classified as Bench Trials.  We collectively found 106 errors in 
Disposition Method, an error rate of 5.8%, and fourteen errors in Disposition, an error 
rate of 0.8%.  We also found 96 instances where MassCourts incorrectly identified the 
Disposition Judge, an error rate of 5.2%.  We corrected these errors in our data extract.   
Interview of Clerks:  The auditors also interviewed clerks at each of the District Courts 
they visited regarding whether court staff correctly entered the Disposition Judge--the 
judge who presided over the Bench Trial--into MassCourts.  See supra at 11.  With the 
exception of the Haverhill District Court, clerks reported to the auditors that they did so.  
With respect to the Haverhill District Court, for some period, court staff incorrectly 
entered into MassCourts the Assigning Judge as the Disposition Judge.  The Assigning 
Judge did not necessarily try the case.  Therefore, over the Time Period, MassCourts 
identified judge #1, the Presiding Judge in Haverhill, as the Disposition Judge for a large 
number of cases disposed of in the Haverhill District Court.  We did not have enough 
information to assign these Trials to the actual Disposition Judge. 
Review of One-Tenth of the Cases for Disposition Method:  The auditors reviewed 
5,457 docket sheets.  They found 111 errors in Disposition Method, an error rate of 2.0%.  
We did not review the docket sheets for any of these cases, and we did not correct these 
errors in our data extract. 
Review of Anomalies:  As noted above, we directed the auditors to review docket sheets 
for 681 anomalous cases.  We reviewed a significant number of these docket sheets as 
well.  Upon our collective review of these docket sheets, we determined that 47 cases 
                                                 
19
 The number of cases reviewed is less than the sum of the anomalous cases identified because some cases fell into 
more than one of the categories enumerated above. 
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should be reclassified.  For instance, of the 458 Charges with “Hearing” as the 
Disposition Method, we determined that 75 should have been classified as Bench Trials, 
24 as Jury Trials, and 202 as Pleas.  We reclassified these cases in our data extract.  We 
also determined from our review that the initial disposition in 15 cases occurred outside 
of the Time Period and four cases were duplicative of other cases in the data extract.  We 
excluded those cases from our analysis.  For the remaining 208 anomalies, there was 
insufficient information on the docket sheet to permit us to reclassify the cases.   
B. The CourtView Database 
The Central Division of the BMC, or “BMC Central,” uses CourtView, a legacy Windows-based 
client-server application.  CourtView is maintained separately and differs from MassCourts.  We 
were required to collect and analyze BMC Central data separately from data extracted from 
MassCourts. 
When a criminal charge in BMC Central is resolved, court staff enters the Disposition in 
CourtView: 
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They do so by choosing a Disposition from a Disposition Code Selection menu: 
 
 
 
Unlike MassCourts, there is no Disposition Method, Disposition Judge, or Event data in 
CourtView. 
We asked Mark Prior to extract from CourtView data analogous to that extracted from 
MassCourts.  The extract consisted of numerous data points for 416 cases.  Mr. Prior provided 
this extract to Linda Holt for quantitative analysis.  
We inferred a Disposition Method for these cases, and grouped the CourtView Disposition 
Codes, as follows:
20
   
 
                                                 
20
 The Disposition Codes in CourtView associated with the OUI cases in our data extract are: 
Admission Disposed – Admission 
Disposed – CFFS – CWOF Disposed – Amended 
Direct Indictment Disposed – Court Finds Facts Sufficient 
Dismissed for Want of Prosecution Disposed – CFFS – Found Guilty 
Dismissed Guilty by Finding 
Dismissed Upon Payment Guilty by Plea 
Dismissed at Request of Commonwealth Guilty by Verdict 
Not Guilty by Finding Pretrial Probation Ch 276 Sec 87 
Not Guilty by Verdict Case Sealed 
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Inferred 
Disposition Method 
(For Our Analysis) 
Disposition 
Category 
(For Our Analysis)  
Disposition Codes 
(From CourtView) 
Plea 
Guilty 
Guilty by Plea 
Disposed – CFFS – Found Guilty 
CWOF Disposed – CFFS – CWOF 
Other 
Admission 
Disposed – Admission 
Disposed – Court Finds Facts Sufficient 
Jury Trial 
Guilty Guilty by Verdict 
Not Guilty Not Guilty by Verdict 
Bench Trial 
Guilty Guilty by Finding 
Not Guilty Not Guilty by Finding 
Other Other 
Case Sealed 
Direct Indictment 
Dismissed 
Dismissed for Want of Prosecution 
Dismissed at Request of 
Commonwealth 
Dismissed Upon Payment 
Disposed – Amended 
Pretrial Probation Ch 276 Sec 87 
 
As a result, we were able to integrate the BMC Central data with the MassCourts data. 
We also made certain corrections and refinements.  We had assigned 65 cases in BMC Central to 
the Jury and Bench Trial Disposition Method Categories.  The auditors reviewed and copied all 
of the docket sheets for these cases.  The auditors determined that the Disposition or Disposition 
Method Category was incorrect in four cases.  We also reviewed the docket sheets and identified 
eight additional misclassified cases.  We corrected these entries in our data extract for the 12 
cases. 
In addition, we asked the auditors specifically to determine the judge who presided over the 
disposition of the 65 Bench and Jury Trials cases by reviewing the docket sheets.  We included 
that data in our analysis. 
Since our primary objective was to determine the acquittal rates at trial, we did not ask the audit 
team to review cases designated as having been resolved by some method other than Bench Trial 
or Jury Trial. 
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TABLE A1 County Data and Statewide Totals
TABLE A2 Court Data
TABLE A3 Judge Data
TABLE A4 Pre- and Post-Spotlight Series Data
* Denotes a judge who was assigned, at least one day, to either the Barnstable or Brockton District Court.
** Denotes a judge who was assigned, at least one day, to the BMC Central Division.
*** This judge sat in Haverhill, which was the only court to report to the auditors that there was a practice, for some period of time,
which may have resulted in the inaccurate designation of the Disposition Judge and may have specifically affected this judge. See
Attachment 4, at 11.  Therefore, this judge has been excluded from the statistical analyses applied by Analysis Group.
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BARNSTABLE 844 407 1,251 0 69 251 320 19% 78% 0 38 45 83 54% 233 1,887 72%
BERKSHIRE 623 533 1,156 0 12 19 31 2% 61% 0 38 65 103 63% 77 1,367 88%
BRISTOL 2,810 1,470 4,280 10 62 366 438 9% 84% 0 111 178 289 62% 613 5,620 79%
DUKES 283 116 399 0 4 20 24 6% 83% 0 2 0 2 0% 159 584 69%
ESSEX 4,389 2,423 6,812 2 66 283 351 5% 81% 0 244 314 558 56% 548 8,269 86%
FRANKLIN 695 364 1,059 4 33 115 152 12% 76% 0 29 50 79 63% 177 1,467 77%
HAMPDEN 2,520 943 3,463 0 47 261 308 8% 85% 0 67 88 155 57% 462 4,388 82%
HAMPSHIRE 1,412 402 1,814 0 34 225 259 12% 87% 0 44 45 89 51% 160 2,322 81%
MIDDLESEX 5,027 2,085 7,112 2 165 681 848 10% 80% 0 373 432 805 54% 1,003 9,768 78%
NANTUCKET 127 28 155 0 1 2 3 2% 67% 0 4 10 14 71% 81 253 63%
NORFOLK 2,655 981 3,636 22 90 451 563 13% 80% 0 116 153 269 57% 538 5,006 77%
PLYMOUTH 1,654 681 2,335 15 118 539 672 22% 80% 1 63 47 111 42% 381 3,499 72%
SUFFOLK 1,924 737 2,661 1 29 217 247 8% 88% 0 81 147 228 64% 653 3,789 73%
WORCESTER 3,831 1,661 5,492 7 41 1,619 1,667 21% 97% 1 301 517 819 63% 769 8,747 67%
Total 28,794 12,831 41,625 63 771 5,049 5,883 12% 86% 2 1,511 2,091 3,604 58% 5,854 56,966 77%
OVERALLPLEAS BENCH TRIALS JURY TRIALS
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ATTLEBORO 854 404 1,258 0 13 70 83 6% 84% 0 31 53 84 63% 121 1,546 84%
AYER 427 156 583 1 13 50 64 8% 78% 0 71 72 143 50% 81 871 77%
BMC BRIGHTON 459 92 551 0 6 90 96 14% 94% 0 9 24 33 73% 58 738 77%
BMC CENTRAL 128 98 226 0 4 38 42 15% 90% 0 4 9 13 69% 135 416 56%
BMC CHARLESTOWN 85 17 102 1 1 1 3 3% 33% 0 0 0 0 -- 17 122 85%
BMC DORCHESTER 424 175 599 0 8 29 37 5% 78% 0 23 39 62 63% 94 792 80%
BMC EAST BOSTON 107 38 145 0 0 8 8 5% 100% 0 2 6 8 75% 26 187 79%
BMC ROXBURY 201 70 271 0 3 10 13 4% 77% 0 1 17 18 94% 87 389 71%
BMC SOUTH BOSTON 87 17 104 0 1 2 3 3% 67% 0 2 4 6 67% 20 133 80%
BMC WEST ROXBURY 159 81 240 0 0 17 17 6% 100% 0 24 25 49 51% 34 340 78%
BROOKLINE 117 19 136 0 3 6 9 6% 67% 0 0 0 0 -- 17 162 86%
CAMBRIDGE 336 177 513 0 8 59 67 10% 88% 0 30 32 62 52% 99 741 74%
CHELSEA 274 149 423 0 6 22 28 6% 79% 0 16 23 39 59% 182 672 66%
CHICOPEE 388 118 506 0 0 27 27 5% 100% 0 6 5 11 45% 63 607 84%
CLINTON 337 78 415 0 0 26 26 6% 100% 0 0 0 0 -- 20 461 90%
CONCORD 582 198 780 0 9 43 52 6% 83% 0 35 50 85 59% 56 973 85%
DEDHAM 522 220 742 0 32 104 136 14% 76% 0 45 65 110 59% 106 1,094 75%
DUDLEY 478 164 642 1 5 187 193 23% 97% 0 0 0 0 -- 150 985 66%
EAST BROOKFIELD 310 226 536 3 4 338 345 34% 98% 0 45 86 131 66% 100 1,112 53%
EASTERN HAMPSHIRE 890 216 1,106 0 12 155 167 13% 93% 0 23 21 44 48% 112 1,429 80%
EDGARTOWN 283 116 399 0 4 20 24 6% 83% 0 2 0 2 0% 159 584 69%
FALL RIVER 677 363 1,040 4 15 101 120 10% 84% 0 23 53 76 70% 171 1,407 77%
FALMOUTH 400 178 578 0 36 111 147 20% 76% 0 12 10 22 45% 123 870 72%
FITCHBURG 360 227 587 0 12 394 406 35% 97% 0 80 83 163 51% 88 1,244 55%
FRAMINGHAM 515 232 747 0 39 193 232 22% 83% 0 38 49 87 56% 87 1,153 71%
GARDNER 145 42 187 0 1 16 17 8% 94% 0 1 0 1 0% 24 229 83%
GLOUCESTER 154 107 261 0 1 5 6 2% 83% 0 0 2 2 100% 21 290 90%
GREENFIELD 519 271 790 4 32 108 144 15% 75% 0 14 20 34 59% 135 1,103 76%
HAVERHILL 507 268 775 0 0 35 35 4% 100% 0 8 16 24 67% 53 887 88%
HINGHAM 507 189 696 4 17 171 192 21% 89% 1 16 11 28 39% 90 1,006 73%
HOLYOKE 176 112 288 0 12 43 55 14% 78% 0 18 24 42 57% 68 453 70%
IPSWICH 262 132 394 0 1 10 11 3% 91% 0 16 19 35 54% 17 457 90%
LAWRENCE 1,019 432 1,451 0 34 74 108 6% 69% 0 58 63 121 52% 163 1,843 84%
LEOMINSTER 213 74 287 1 0 78 79 22% 99% 0 0 1 1 100% 40 407 71%
LOWELL 727 326 1,053 0 19 118 137 11% 86% 0 40 56 96 58% 266 1,552 72%
LYNN 548 362 910 0 11 47 58 6% 81% 0 28 53 81 65% 114 1,163 82%
MALDEN 411 174 585 1 15 37 53 8% 70% 0 23 31 54 57% 82 774 81%
OVERALLPLEAS BENCH TRIALS JURY TRIALS
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MARLBORO 313 201 514 0 17 45 62 10% 73% 0 22 24 46 52% 26 648 85%
MILFORD 240 111 351 1 0 16 17 4% 94% 1 6 13 20 65% 52 440 82%
NANTUCKET 127 28 155 0 1 2 3 2% 67% 0 4 10 14 71% 81 253 63%
NATICK 143 34 177 0 3 2 5 3% 40% 0 0 0 0 -- 12 194 93%
NEW BEDFORD 712 412 1,124 3 13 109 125 9% 87% 0 38 55 93 59% 170 1,512 78%
NEWBURYPORT 852 520 1,372 1 0 3 4 0% 75% 0 56 81 137 59% 57 1,570 91%
NEWTON 155 39 194 0 1 9 10 5% 90% 0 4 11 15 73% 26 245 81%
NORTHAMPTON 522 186 708 0 22 70 92 11% 76% 0 21 24 45 53% 48 893 84%
NORTHERN BERKSHIRE 128 176 304 0 3 3 6 2% 50% 0 10 18 28 64% 21 359 88%
ORANGE 176 93 269 0 1 7 8 2% 88% 0 15 30 45 67% 42 364 78%
ORLEANS 444 229 673 0 33 140 173 19% 81% 0 26 35 61 57% 110 1,017 72%
PALMER 477 163 640 0 6 24 30 4% 80% 0 9 10 19 53% 106 795 82%
PEABODY 566 387 953 1 11 73 85 7% 86% 0 64 68 132 52% 68 1,238 83%
PITTSFIELD 307 266 573 0 7 12 19 3% 63% 0 28 46 74 62% 36 702 87%
PLYMOUTH 717 264 981 6 79 240 325 24% 74% 0 28 23 51 45% 196 1,553 70%
QUINCY 1,034 371 1,405 19 39 200 258 15% 78% 0 45 42 87 48% 217 1,967 77%
SALEM 481 215 696 0 8 36 44 6% 82% 0 14 12 26 46% 55 821 87%
SOMERVILLE 282 120 402 0 11 37 48 10% 77% 0 9 10 19 53% 62 531 79%
SOUTHERN BERKSHIRE 188 91 279 0 2 4 6 2% 67% 0 0 1 1 100% 20 306 92%
SPRINGFIELD 1,021 392 1,413 0 24 153 177 11% 86% 0 27 33 60 55% 156 1,806 81%
STOUGHTON 326 87 413 1 6 46 53 11% 87% 0 0 0 0 -- 76 542 77%
TAUNTON 567 291 858 3 21 86 110 11% 78% 0 19 17 36 47% 151 1,155 78%
UXBRIDGE 295 149 444 1 2 83 86 15% 97% 0 10 18 28 64% 35 593 77%
WALTHAM 444 155 599 0 9 24 33 5% 73% 0 13 20 33 61% 58 723 86%
WAREHAM 430 228 658 5 22 128 155 18% 83% 0 19 13 32 41% 95 940 75%
WESTBOROUGH 551 211 762 0 4 199 203 20% 98% 0 21 51 72 71% 92 1,129 70%
WESTFIELD 458 158 616 0 5 14 19 3% 74% 0 7 16 23 70% 69 727 86%
WINCHENDON 90 30 120 0 0 12 12 9% 100% 0 0 0 0 -- 17 149 81%
WOBURN 692 273 965 0 21 64 85 7% 75% 0 88 77 165 47% 148 1,363 79%
WORCESTER 812 349 1,161 0 13 270 283 15% 95% 0 138 265 403 66% 151 1,998 66%
WRENTHAM 656 284 940 2 10 95 107 10% 89% 0 26 46 72 64% 122 1,241 79%
Total 28,794 12,831 41,625 63 771 5,049 5,883 12% 86% 2 1,511 2,091 3,604 58% 5,854 56,966 77%
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1*** Abany, Stephen S*** 480 245 725 0 0 24 24 3% 100% 0 7 15 22 68% 52 823
2 Abdella, Charles A 57 56 113 0 0 41 41 26% 100% 0 1 3 4 75% 22 180
3 Allard - Madaus, Michael G 61 29 90 1 1 71 73 43% 97% 0 2 3 5 60% 15 183
4* Amrhein, Mary L* 125 37 162 0 0 11 11 6% 100% 0 2 4 6 67% 9 188
5* Baler, Gregory R* 166 51 217 0 8 12 20 8% 60% 0 2 0 2 0% 51 290
6 Barnes, Benjamin C 86 20 106 0 0 9 9 7% 100% 0 9 10 19 53% 7 141
7* Barrett, Thomas S* 105 103 208 7 18 119 144 38% 83% 0 11 12 23 52% 58 433
8 Barretto, James D 79 25 104 0 2 9 11 9% 82% 0 3 2 5 40% 9 129
9* Baylor, Robert E** 69 34 103 0 1 0 1 0% 0 7 7 14 50% 9 127
10 Beattie, Phillip A 276 99 375 0 2 39 41 10% 95% 0 1 1 2 50% 35 453
11* Bernard, Julie J* 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 -- 0 3
12** Bernstein, Patricia E** 36 8 44 0 0 1 1 100% 0 2 7 9 78% 3 57
13 Bibaud, Timothy M 63 46 109 2 2 72 76 40% 95% 0 5 2 7 29% 14 206
14* Bolden, Michael C** 81 20 101 0 2 0 2 0% 0 0 0 0 -- 15 118
15 Boyle, William J 220 30 250 0 0 3 3 1% 100% 0 1 0 1 0% 36 290
16* Bradley, Heather M.S.* 31 11 42 0 0 5 5 10% 100% 0 0 4 4 100% 3 54
17 Brant, Jonathan 134 103 237 0 8 14 22 8% 64% 0 11 7 18 39% 12 289
18 Brennan, Dennis J 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 -- 0 2
19 Brennan, Martha A 309 69 378 0 0 40 40 9% 100% 0 3 3 6 50% 15 439
20 Brennan, Robert A 269 159 428 0 4 21 25 5% 84% 0 17 16 33 48% 34 520
21 Brennan, Thomas M 225 114 339 0 17 35 52 11% 67% 0 31 33 64 52% 74 529
22 Broker, Phyllis J 146 58 204 0 5 12 17 6% 71% 0 36 34 70 49% 42 333
23 Brooks, Michael J 285 73 358 0 1 2 3 1% 67% 0 0 0 0 -- 21 382
24 Brownell, Thomas F 60 22 82 0 0 1 1 1% 100% 0 0 0 0 -- 13 96
25 Calagione, Robert B 282 131 413 1 0 38 39 8% 97% 0 15 15 30 50% 55 537
26* Canavan, John A* 168 92 260 2 2 38 42 13% 90% 0 6 8 14 57% 27 343
27 Cannone, Beverly J 50 39 89 1 4 37 42 30% 88% 0 4 5 9 56% 17 157
28 Carey, Richard J 285 76 361 0 1 13 14 4% 93% 0 7 6 13 46% 31 419
29* Carpenter, Don L* 202 98 300 0 13 34 47 13% 72% 0 9 14 23 61% 57 427
30 Carroll, Martine 67 15 82 0 2 7 9 8% 78% 0 6 10 16 63% 5 112
31** Coffey, James W** 103 39 142 0 0 2 2 100% 0 6 6 12 50% 18 174
32** Coffey, Kathleen E** 57 23 80 0 0 3 3 100% 0 15 15 30 50% 12 125
33 Concannon, John P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 -- 1 1
34 Conlon, Albert S 119 82 201 0 1 6 7 3% 86% 0 3 4 7 57% 23 238
35 Connly, Jacklyn M 60 35 95 0 0 19 19 17% 100% 0 1 0 1 0% 11 126
36 Connolly, Lynda M 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 -- 0 1
37 Contant, Philip A 406 120 526 0 2 4 6 1% 67% 0 2 10 12 83% 52 596
38 Cornetta, Robert A 81 33 114 0 0 7 7 6% 100% 0 2 3 5 60% 8 134
39 Cote, Kenneth J 21 21 42 0 0 1 1 2% 100% 0 4 6 10 60% 3 56
JURY TRIALSPLEAS BENCH TRIALS
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40 Coven, Mark S 135 55 190 0 0 19 19 8% 100% 0 9 14 23 61% 22 254
41** Coyne, Michael J** 67 23 90 0 1 37 38 97% 0 1 6 7 86% 12 147
42* Creedon, Michael C* 275 113 388 0 27 103 130 25% 79% 0 5 4 9 44% 82 609
43 Cremens, J.Elizabeth 27 15 42 0 2 8 10 18% 80% 0 3 0 3 0% 7 62
44 Crimmins, Francis T 116 26 142 0 4 16 20 12% 80% 0 0 0 0 -- 25 187
45 Cunis, David W 297 107 404 1 5 35 41 8% 85% 0 20 23 43 53% 57 545
46 Cunningham, Kevan J 115 57 172 0 2 11 13 7% 85% 0 3 2 5 40% 33 223
47 Curran, Dennis J 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 -- 0 3
48 Curran, John J 72 22 94 0 0 8 8 7% 100% 0 2 3 5 60% 6 113
49 Curtin, Patricia G 107 28 135 0 3 3 6 4% 50% 0 1 1 2 50% 14 157
50* D'Angelo, Andrew M* 164 93 257 0 11 76 87 22% 87% 0 16 33 49 67% 39 432
51** Dashiell, Pamela M** 9 3 12 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 2 2 100% 3 17
52* Dawley, Paul C* 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 -- 1 4
53** Desmond, Kenneth** 69 27 96 0 2 5 7 71% 0 2 2 4 50% 20 127
54* Despotopulos, David P* 93 62 155 0 1 26 27 11% 96% 0 35 22 57 39% 43 282
55** Donnelly, David T** 347 71 418 0 2 69 71 97% 0 1 3 4 75% 43 536
56** Dougan, Raymond G** 12 3 15 0 0 10 10 100% 0 0 2 2 100% 10 37
57 Dowling, Patricia A 48 34 82 0 0 9 9 10% 100% 0 2 1 3 33% 2 96
58 Doyle, Peter F 700 442 1,142 0 0 7 7 1% 100% 0 30 34 64 53% 43 1,256
59** Driscoll, Mary Ann** 43 32 75 0 0 5 5 100% 0 9 6 15 40% 16 111
60 Dunn, Deborah A 155 58 213 1 3 9 13 5% 69% 0 3 12 15 80% 20 261
61 Dusek-Gomez, Nancy 83 58 141 0 7 21 28 15% 75% 0 13 9 22 41% 22 213
62** Fiandaca, Kenneth J** 37 12 49 0 0 2 2 100% 0 0 3 3 100% 4 58
63 Finnerty, Kevin J. 35 17 52 0 0 5 5 8% 100% 0 3 1 4 25% 3 64
64 Flatley, Ellen 79 67 146 0 4 21 25 12% 84% 0 11 21 32 66% 31 234
65 Flynn, Gregory C 223 88 311 0 7 14 21 6% 67% 0 12 17 29 59% 44 405
66 Flynn, Maurice R 164 80 244 0 2 15 17 6% 88% 0 1 3 4 75% 45 310
67** Forde, Annette** 17 1 18 0 0 1 1 100% 0 1 1 2 50% 6 27
68* Fortes-White, Stacey J* 69 50 119 0 1 3 4 3% 75% 0 7 14 21 67% 13 157
69 Fox, Patrick A 102 39 141 0 1 20 21 13% 95% 0 3 3 6 50% 16 184
70** Frison, Shannon** 18 1 19 0 1 1 2 50% 0 0 1 1 100% 4 26
71 Gaffney, Kevin J 266 92 358 0 5 10 15 4% 67% 0 15 8 23 35% 38 434
72 Gailey, Timothy H 211 105 316 0 6 35 41 10% 85% 0 20 17 37 46% 99 493
73 Gardner, Robert W 105 32 137 0 0 34 34 15% 100% 0 22 38 60 63% 9 240
74* Garth, Lance J* 230 94 324 0 11 42 53 14% 79% 0 7 4 11 36% 66 454
75 Gilligan, Brian F 264 97 361 0 11 53 64 15% 83% 0 5 0 5 0% 51 481
76* ** Gobourne, Franco J* ** 22 7 29 0 1 0 1 0% 0 0 1 1 100% 4 35
77 Goggins, W. Michael 350 139 489 0 26 128 154 22% 83% 0 20 25 45 56% 42 730
78 Gordon, Robert A 201 81 282 0 5 29 34 11% 85% 0 2 5 7 71% 23 346
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79 Greco, Robert V 202 111 313 0 17 34 51 12% 67% 0 25 33 58 57% 44 466
80 Guzman, Margaret R 87 30 117 0 0 149 149 51% 100% 0 4 21 25 84% 39 330
81 Hadley, William P 68 25 93 0 4 6 10 8% 60% 0 11 13 24 54% 11 138
82 Haley, Arthur F 266 84 350 0 0 39 39 10% 100% 0 4 3 7 43% 54 450
83* Hand, Kathryn E* 157 79 236 0 22 52 74 22% 70% 0 10 13 23 57% 31 364
84* ** Hanlon, Sydney* ** 24 12 36 0 2 1 3 33% 0 0 2 2 100% 16 57
85 Harbour, Robert G* 206 99 305 0 1 51 52 14% 98% 1 3 10 14 71% 32 403
86 Harvey, Tobin 236 72 308 0 2 6 8 3% 75% 0 1 2 3 67% 17 336
87 Healy, Paul F 107 67 174 0 13 103 116 39% 89% 0 3 6 9 67% 30 329
88 Herlihy, Kevin M 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 -- 0 1
89 Hinkle, Marianne C 265 104 369 0 3 17 20 5% 85% 0 18 19 37 51% 56 482
90 Hodos, Herbert H 18 11 29 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 -- 3 32
91 Hogan, Michele B 88 86 174 0 4 48 52 19% 92% 0 28 27 55 49% 56 337
92** Horgan, Thomas C** 18 4 22 0 0 10 10 100% 0 0 4 4 100% 3 39
93 Howarth, Robert L 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 50% 100% 0 0 0 0 -- 2 4
94 Hurley, Mary E 228 67 295 0 0 14 14 4% 100% 0 2 3 5 60% 36 350
95 Hurley, Patrick J 397 90 487 1 1 5 7 1% 71% 0 0 0 0 -- 41 535
96 Jennings, Joseph W 170 123 293 0 1 7 8 3% 88% 0 7 6 13 46% 24 338
97* Johnson Smith, Emogene* 277 105 382 1 2 5 8 2% 63% 0 11 16 27 59% 40 457
98 Johnson, Lee G 113 40 153 0 1 5 6 4% 83% 0 2 2 4 50% 22 185
99* Julian, John M* 250 144 394 2 8 65 75 16% 87% 0 8 5 13 38% 82 564
100* Kelley Brown, Angel* 67 31 98 0 3 8 11 9% 73% 0 7 9 16 56% 14 139
101* ** Kelly, Sally A* ** 8 5 13 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 -- 2 15
102 Kilmartin, Peter J 191 98 289 0 6 27 33 7% 82% 0 52 81 133 61% 55 510
103* Kirkman, J. Thomas* 56 51 107 0 4 12 16 11% 75% 0 8 19 27 70% 37 187
104 Klein, Dyanne J 126 38 164 0 2 8 10 5% 80% 0 4 11 15 73% 25 214
105 Koenigs, Rita 74 72 146 0 3 0 3 2% 0% 0 16 12 28 43% 15 192
106 Kumor, Robert F 47 13 60 0 1 2 3 5% 67% 0 1 2 3 67% 7 73
107* LaMothe, James L* 139 64 203 0 6 6 12 5% 50% 0 5 8 13 62% 19 247
108 Lauranzano, Michael C 261 148 409 0 2 13 15 3% 87% 0 3 8 11 73% 39 474
109** Leary, Paul K** 6 4 10 0 0 0 0 -- 0 3 1 4 25% 2 16
110 Leoney, Antoinette E. McLean 25 8 33 0 0 1 1 3% 100% 0 2 2 4 50% 0 38
111 Leroy, Jacques C 149 97 246 0 5 55 60 20% 92% 0 0 1 1 100% 42 349
112 Livingston, Dunbar D 112 64 176 0 7 18 25 11% 72% 0 18 19 37 51% 17 255
113 Locke, David B 178 50 228 0 0 50 50 17% 100% 0 7 6 13 46% 19 310
114 LoConto, Paul F 32 12 44 0 0 4 4 5% 100% 0 11 15 26 58% 8 82
115 Losapio, Paul A 264 130 394 0 2 27 29 7% 93% 0 5 17 22 77% 45 490
116* Lynch, Joan E* 20 7 27 0 1 6 7 18% 86% 0 3 3 6 50% 4 44
117** Lyons, Tracy Lee** 39 6 45 0 1 5 6 83% 0 5 5 10 50% 10 71
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118 MacLeod, Laurie 179 75 254 1 16 50 67 20% 75% 0 10 8 18 44% 47 386
119* Macy, Joseph I* 197 95 292 0 3 18 21 6% 86% 0 11 17 28 61% 121 462
120** Mahoney, Paul F** 16 7 23 0 0 1 1 100% 0 0 0 0 -- 5 29
121 Maldonado, Diana L 39 32 71 0 1 7 8 9% 88% 0 3 8 11 73% 93 183
122 Mandell, Andrew L 178 126 304 0 2 156 158 30% 99% 0 22 41 63 65% 35 560
123 Marini, Francis L 100 77 177 1 10 55 66 26% 83% 0 7 4 11 36% 40 294
124 Mason, Mark D 97 38 135 0 5 16 21 12% 76% 0 5 14 19 74% 24 199
125 May, Thomas J 17 3 20 0 1 0 1 5% 0% 0 0 0 0 -- 4 25
126 Mazanec, William F 219 109 328 3 7 46 56 14% 82% 0 3 2 5 40% 64 453
127 McCallum, Paul J 56 28 84 0 1 9 10 10% 90% 0 1 5 6 83% 7 107
128** McCormick, Lawrence E** 64 16 80 0 0 2 2 100% 0 2 5 7 71% 9 98
129 McDonough, William B 118 53 171 0 10 9 19 9% 47% 0 12 8 20 40% 17 227
130 McElroy, James B 135 88 223 0 2 10 12 5% 83% 0 6 7 13 54% 18 266
131 McGill, Paul L 73 23 96 0 3 42 45 29% 93% 0 9 7 16 44% 11 168
132* McGovern, James J* 241 92 333 0 9 90 99 23% 91% 0 1 4 5 80% 63 500
133 McGuiggan, Janet J 36 19 55 0 2 3 5 6% 60% 0 10 10 20 50% 4 84
134 McGuinness, James H 36 19 55 0 5 92 97 61% 95% 0 4 4 8 50% 23 183
135** McKenna, Robert J** 25 8 33 0 1 11 12 92% 0 0 12 12 100% 6 63
136 Melahn, William E 5 3 8 0 1 1 2 11% 50% 0 2 7 9 78% 2 21
137* Merrick, Brian R* 231 114 345 0 22 68 90 20% 76% 0 5 13 18 72% 47 500
138** Miller, Rosalind H** 61 38 99 0 2 5 7 71% 0 3 3 6 50% 17 129
139 Minehan, Rosemary B 171 42 213 1 3 8 12 5% 67% 0 2 2 4 50% 33 262
140* Mooney, Toby S* 152 117 269 2 7 133 142 34% 94% 0 2 7 9 78% 48 468
141 Mori, Richard A 211 143 354 1 6 35 42 10% 83% 0 6 8 14 57% 24 434
142 Moriarty, Diane E 136 75 211 6 15 63 84 28% 75% 0 4 2 6 33% 90 391
143* Moynahan, Ronald F* 119 43 162 0 18 64 82 31% 78% 0 10 12 22 55% 35 301
144 Mulcahy, Michael E 49 20 69 0 2 31 33 30% 94% 0 5 3 8 38% 13 123
145 Nadeau, Gilbert J 130 82 212 0 4 9 13 5% 69% 0 4 9 13 69% 59 297
146 Nestor, Matthew J 252 127 379 1 2 23 26 6% 88% 0 9 14 23 61% 46 474
147 Noonan, Mark E 195 102 297 1 4 207 212 40% 98% 0 6 12 18 67% 62 589
148* O'Dea, Kevin J* 175 56 231 11 11 42 64 21% 66% 0 5 7 12 58% 24 331
149 O'Leary, James J 92 73 165 0 3 7 10 5% 70% 0 18 24 42 57% 6 223
150* O'Neill, W. James* 20 12 32 0 3 6 9 20% 67% 0 2 1 3 33% 14 58
151* Orfanello, Mary A* 231 66 297 0 4 14 18 5% 78% 0 14 8 22 36% 30 367
152* O'Shea, Daniel J* 259 127 386 1 11 17 29 7% 59% 0 10 11 21 52% 45 481
153* Ostrach, Stephen S* 232 80 312 0 6 44 50 13% 88% 0 19 19 38 50% 29 429
154 Packard, Geoffery C 62 32 94 0 2 6 8 8% 75% 0 1 0 1 0% 32 135
155 Paratore, Dominic J 147 63 210 0 6 19 25 10% 76% 0 12 8 20 40% 25 280
156 Payne, John M 429 112 541 0 3 18 21 4% 86% 0 8 5 13 38% 48 623
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157 Pearson, Barbara S 264 123 387 0 5 22 27 6% 81% 0 10 19 29 66% 21 464
158 Philbin, Austin T 47 25 72 1 1 66 68 31% 97% 0 9 71 80 89% 9 229
159* Phillips, Gregory L* 173 86 259 0 1 1 2 1% 50% 0 8 18 26 69% 43 330
160 Pierce, Laurence D 117 47 164 0 8 9 17 8% 53% 0 14 15 29 52% 14 224
161 Poehler, Patricia T 379 100 479 0 1 3 4 1% 75% 0 2 2 4 50% 70 557
162* Pomarole, Michael J* 130 51 181 0 9 2 11 5% 18% 0 19 30 49 61% 17 258
163** Poole, David B** 34 12 46 0 2 2 4 50% 0 0 1 1 100% 16 67
164 Powers, Warren A 181 75 256 1 1 18 20 7% 90% 0 0 0 0 -- 34 310
165** Redd, Edward R** 20 10 30 0 0 1 1 100% 0 0 0 0 -- 7 38
166 Ricciardone, David 130 88 218 1 0 82 83 23% 99% 0 16 43 59 73% 41 401
167* Riley, William J* 24 14 38 1 2 12 15 28% 80% 0 1 0 1 0% 6 60
168 Ripps, Michael J 124 141 265 0 1 2 3 1% 67% 0 5 11 16 69% 18 302
169** Ronquillo, Roberto** 65 22 87 0 0 4 4 100% 0 0 0 0 -- 16 107
170 Rooney, Lynn C 179 97 276 0 10 6 16 5% 38% 0 19 21 40 53% 70 402
171 Ross, David S 221 81 302 0 2 6 8 2% 75% 0 17 39 56 70% 45 411
172 Rowe, Brian 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 -- 0 1
173 Ruma, Santo J 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 -- 0 1
174 Rutberg, Fredric D 212 145 357 0 4 2 6 2% 33% 0 10 18 28 64% 23 414
175 Ryan, Michael W 39 19 58 0 4 18 22 27% 82% 0 1 2 3 67% 3 86
176 Sabra, Bernadette L 162 79 241 2 0 7 9 4% 78% 0 1 1 2 50% 23 275
177** Sarason, Ernest L** 49 20 69 0 0 2 2 100% 0 2 4 6 67% 5 82
178* Savignano, Richard D* 232 89 321 0 1 3 4 1% 75% 0 4 14 18 78% 22 365
179 Schubert, John M 63 33 96 0 4 29 33 26% 88% 0 0 0 0 -- 14 143
180 Shopteese, Deborah 33 20 53 0 2 5 7 11% 71% 0 4 1 5 20% 5 70
181 Singer, Sarah B 171 62 233 0 5 1 6 2% 17% 0 3 5 8 63% 12 259
182 Singh, Sabita 85 21 106 0 4 1 5 4% 20% 0 7 7 14 50% 6 131
183 Singleton, Severlin B 69 26 95 0 2 7 9 9% 78% 0 0 0 0 -- 19 123
184** Sinnott, Eleanor** 25 2 27 1 0 1 2 50% 0 1 2 3 67% 7 39
185 Snider, Neil G 311 82 393 0 2 42 44 10% 95% 0 0 1 1 100% 79 517
186 Sragow, Roanne 150 69 219 0 0 1 1 0% 100% 0 1 3 4 75% 14 238
187 Stoddart, Douglas W 255 70 325 0 9 57 66 16% 86% 0 13 14 27 52% 19 437
188 Sullivan, Anthony P 80 33 113 0 1 3 4 3% 75% 0 10 4 14 29% 11 142
189* Sullivan, James M* 154 57 211 0 1 17 18 7% 94% 0 9 13 22 59% 30 281
190 Sullivan, Mark A 153 60 213 0 5 4 9 4% 44% 0 8 12 20 60% 23 265
191 Sullivan, Mary Hogan 164 71 235 0 19 54 73 23% 74% 0 9 4 13 31% 38 359
192 Sullivan, Thomas F 57 27 84 0 1 6 7 5% 86% 0 16 27 43 63% 23 157
193** Summerville, Mark H** 4 2 6 0 1 5 6 83% 0 2 0 2 0% 2 16
194 Swan, Allen G 308 153 461 1 0 1 2 50% 0 23 31 54 57% 20 537
195 Teahan, William W 6 7 13 0 0 1 1 7% 100% 0 0 0 0 -- 2 16
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TABLE A3
Judge Data
OTHER OVERALL
JUDGE # JUDGE CWOF GUILTY TOTAL CWOF GUILTY
NOT
GUILTY
TOTAL
WAIVER
RATE
ACQUITTAL
RATE
CWOF GUILTY
NOT
GUILTY
TOTAL
ACQUITAL 
RATE
TOTAL TOTAL
JURY TRIALSPLEAS BENCH TRIALS
196 Thomas, Steven E 35 17 52 0 6 6 12 12% 50% 0 15 24 39 62% 7 110
197** Tochka, Robert N** 41 18 59 0 1 1 2 50% 0 5 9 14 64% 20 95
198* Turcotte, David T* 279 109 388 0 4 7 11 3% 64% 0 0 1 1 100% 43 443
199 Uhlarik, Michael A 191 73 264 0 1 8 9 3% 89% 0 25 43 68 63% 21 362
200 Vega, Bethzaida 33 17 50 0 0 6 6 10% 100% 0 3 2 5 40% 16 77
201 Virzi, Vito A 210 92 302 0 4 86 90 20% 96% 0 13 45 58 78% 32 482
202 Vrabel, Paul S 168 139 307 0 2 2 4 1% 50% 0 6 24 30 80% 20 361
203 Waickowski, Paul S 297 110 407 0 1 89 90 17% 99% 0 9 19 28 68% 48 573
204 Walker, Neil J 255 108 363 0 7 21 28 7% 75% 0 1 0 1 0% 104 496
205 Walsh, Maureen E 164 69 233 0 7 46 53 17% 87% 0 7 14 21 67% 44 351
206** Weingarten, David** 56 18 74 0 3 8 11 73% 0 1 10 11 91% 7 103
207* Welch, Christopher D* 133 61 194 1 8 28 37 14% 76% 1 8 19 28 68% 28 287
208 Welsh, Robert A 155 100 255 3 1 45 49 15% 92% 0 15 12 27 44% 47 378
209 Wexler, James H 109 47 156 0 1 4 5 3% 80% 0 5 5 10 50% 23 194
210* White, Mary Dacey E* 141 41 182 2 2 55 59 24% 93% 0 2 3 5 60% 23 269
211* Williams, Gregory H* 172 82 254 0 4 35 39 13% 90% 0 5 3 8 38% 73 374
212** Wright, Milton L** 24 7 31 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 -- 3 34
213* Wright, Therese M* 155 84 239 0 8 24 32 10% 75% 0 17 18 35 51% 38 344
214 Yee, Paul M 92 39 131 0 4 5 9 6% 56% 0 8 8 16 50% 17 173
215 Zaleski, Margaret 76 24 100 0 1 7 8 7% 88% 0 2 2 4 50% 8 120
216 Zide, Elliott L 115 66 181 0 6 107 113 32% 95% 0 38 24 62 39% 25 381
217* ** Ziemian, Robert P* ** 137 62 199 0 7 18 25 72% 0 26 31 57 54% 39 320
Unassigned Unassigned 128 91 219 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 2 135 358
Total 28,794 12,831 41,625 63 771 5,049 5,883 12% 86% 2 1,511 2,091 3,604 58% 5,854 56,966
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TABLE A4
Pre- and Post-Spotlight Series Data
OTHER
CWOF GUILTY TOTAL CWOF GUILTY
NOT
GUILTY
TOTAL
WAIVER
RATE
ACQUITTAL
RATE
CWOF GUILTY
NOT
GUILTY
TOTAL
ACQUITAL 
RATE
TOTAL TOTAL
CONVICTION
RATE
OCT. 1, 2010 - MAR. 31, 2011* 3,407 1,496 4,903 9 102 706 817 13% 86% 0 169 232 401 58% 737 6,858 76%
OCT. 1, 2011 - MAR. 31, 2012* 3,291 1,497 4,788 8 79 367 454 8% 81% 3 224 341 568 60% 664 6,474 79%
* Note: These numbers do not include data from the Central Division of the BMC.
JURY TRIALSBENCH TRIALS OVERALLPLEAS
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ATTACHMENT 6 
REPORT TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
This statistical appendix describes the methodologies used to identify judges who are out of the 
ordinary from a statistical standpoint in terms of three different quantitative measures: 
 Acquittal Rate: the proportion of a judge’s bench trials that results in acquittal.  Formally, 
the acquittal rate for a given judge is: 
 
Number of Bench Trials with Not-Guilty Verdict
Acquittal Rate
Number of Bench Trials
j
j
j
  
where j refers to the particular judge. 
 
 Waiver Rate: the proportion of OUI cases overseen by a judge that ends up in a bench 
trial.  Formally, the waiver rate for a given judge is: 
 
Number of Bench Trials
Waiver Rate
Number of Cases Heard
j
j
j
  
where the Number of Cases Heard is equal to: 
 
 
 Number of Bench Trials: the Number of Bench Trials presided over by a given judge. 
Given the definition of the waiver rate, the number of bench trials presided over by a 
judge is equal to the total number of cases heard by that judge multiplied by his/her 
waiver rate.  Formally, this can be described as follows: 
 
Number of Bench Trials Number of Cases Heard  x Waiver Ratej j j  
This implies that the Acquittal Rate defined above is based, in part, on both the Waiver 
Rate and the Number of Bench Trials for that judge.   
Standard Statistical Techniques 
To identify judges on any of these three metrics, we used two different statistical techniques: (1) 
bootstrapping; and (2) binomial proportion tests. 
Number of Bench Trials + Number of Jury  Trials + Number of Pleas (CWOFs and Guilty 
Pleas) 
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(1) Bootstrapping 
Statistical bootstrapping involves applying resampling methods to create confidence intervals
1
 
around the mean Acquittal Rate, the Waiver Rate, and the Number of Bench Trials observed in 
the data.  The methodological steps are as follows: 
 The overall Acquittal Rate is 85.8% (5,049 not guilty verdicts for 5,883 trials), and the 
overall Waiver Rate is 11.5% (5,883 bench trials out of 51,112 non-dismissed cases).  
These reported overall percentages are equivalent to weighted averages across all judges 
statewide.  
 Because judges can have very different assignments and therefore different OUI 
caseloads, statistical analysis of the distribution of judges on various performance metrics 
can be used to evaluate differences in the raw data.  For example, a judge who heard 
more OUI cases should be more heavily weighted than one who presided over very few 
when trying to characterize overall tendencies across judges. 
 We therefore create an alternative sample of Massachusetts District Court judges and 
Boston Municipal Court judges by drawing with replacement 216 times out of the pool of 
217 judges.
2
 In performing this exercise, each judge has a probability to be drawn that is 
proportional to the total number of non-dismissed OUI cases heard over the sampling 
period.  The weighting scheme allows the alternative sample created to be more 
representative of the distribution of judges’ experiences than would be the case if all 
judges counted equally regardless of their cumulative OUI caseload over time.  
 Once the sample is created, we compute the overall Acquittal Rate and Waiver Rate for 
the alternative sample. 
 We repeat this operation 1,000 times, creating 1,000 different computations of the overall 
Acquittal Rate and Waiver Rate for the different samples. 
 We rank the 1,000 overall Acquittal Rates from smallest to largest. The 25th value 
corresponds to the lower limit of the 95% confidence interval, while the 975
th
 
corresponds to the upper limit of this confidence interval.  Thus, 2.5% of the sample can 
be found below and 2.5% above the limits of the confidence interval. 
 We then repeat the same sequence of steps in calculating the distribution of overall 
Waiver Rates.  
 Finally, we follow an identical process to measure the 95% confidence interval around 
the average Number of Bench Trials heard by a judge.  
                                                          
1 A confidence interval measures a range around a statistic that defines the level of precision with which that statistic 
is measured.  For example, if an individual has an acquittal rate that falls outside the 95% confidence interval, there 
is a 95% likelihood that this individual’s acquittal rate is truly different from the average. 
 
2
 The original dataset includes 217 judges.  However, judge #33 had zero non-dismissed cases and is therefore 
excluded from the analyses. 
  Privileged & Confidential 
Prepared at the Request of Counsel 
October 2012 
 
 
ANALYSIS GROUP  3  
 
The idea behind the bootstrapping technique is that the 217 judges who handled the 56,966 cases 
in the database are drawn from an unobserved larger distribution of judges and cases. By 
resampling amongst the judges using statistical bootstrapping, one can assess the stability of the 
observed metrics of interest, and calculate the extent to which small changes in the composition 
in the sample of judges could lead to large changes in these metrics.  Once the 95% confidence 
intervals for each of these overall measures is known, it becomes easy to flag judges who fall 
outside these intervals for any one--or for combinations--of metrics. 
(2) Binomial Proportion Tests 
The second statistical technique is used to evaluate whether an individual judge’s Acquittal Rate 
and Waiver Rate is significantly different from the mean value.  The idea behind this test is fairly 
simple.  If one throws a coin three times and gets three heads, this is probably not sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the coin is not fair.  On the other hand, if one throws that coin 100 
times and gets 100 heads, chances are very high that the coin is actually not fair. 
For instance, one proportion test looks at each judge’s Acquittal Rate, and computes whether it is 
statistically significantly higher or lower than the observed average of 85.8%.  A similar 
proportion test is implemented with respect to each judge’s Waiver Rate in comparison with the 
overall average of 11.5%.  This type of test does not allow a disentangling, as neatly as with the 
bootstrap approach, of the respective influence of the Acquittal Rate, the Waiver Rate, and the 
overall Number of Cases Heard by the judge.  Instead, it implicitly blends the three metrics 
together.  
The result of the test is summarized in a “Z-score,” which measures the likelihood that the 
observed gap between a judge’s Acquittal Rate, for example, and the overall average is due to 
chance alone.  To illustrate this point, if a particular judge has a 91% Acquittal Rate with a Z-
score of 1%, this would imply that there is only a 1% chance that the judge’s Acquittal Rate is 
actually higher than the 85.8% average by mere chance.  Note that the generally accepted cutoff 
for significance is 2.5% on either side of the mean (i.e., consistent with a 95% level of 
confidence).  More generally, any judge whose Acquittal Rate is above the overall 85.8% 
average, with an accompanying proportion test that returns a Z-score below 2.5%, would be 
considered an outlier on this particular metric.  
Results 
Using the bootstrapping technique, the derived 95% confidence intervals are as follows: 
 Acquittal Rate – between 85.0% and 87.2% (weighted mean = 85.8%) 
 Waiver Rate – between 10.7% and 12.4% (weighted mean = 11.5%) 
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 Number of Bench Trials – between 33 and 39 (weighted mean = 363) 
Table 1 presents the list of 28 judges who are above the 95% confidence interval threshold on all 
three of these metrics (i.e., Acquittal Rate > 87.2%, Waiver Rate > 12.4% and Number of Bench 
Trials > 39). 
Table 1: Judges above the Upper Limit of the 95% Confidence Interval for Acquittal Rate 
(87.2%), Bench Trial Waiver Rate (12.4%), and Number of Bench Trials (39) 
Judge # Total OUI Cases Waiver Rate Bench Trials Bench Trial 
Acquittal Rate 
2 180 26% 41 100% 
3 183 43% 73 97% 
13 206 40% 76 95% 
26 343 13% 42 90% 
27 157 30% 42 88% 
50 432 22% 87 87% 
55
4
 536  71 97% 
80 330 51% 149 100% 
85 403 14% 52 98% 
87 329 39% 116 89% 
91 337 19% 52 92% 
111 347 20% 60 92% 
113 310 17% 50 100% 
122 560 30% 158 99% 
131 168 29% 45 93% 
132 500 23% 99 91% 
134 183 61% 97 95% 
140 468 34% 142 94% 
147 589 40% 212 98% 
153 429 13% 50 88% 
158 229 31% 68 97% 
166 401 23% 83 99% 
                                                          
3
 Note that the weighted mean number of bench trials per judge is 36, while the unweighted mean is 27. 
4
 Since this judge sat in the BMC Central Division (and other courts as well), we do not have data for his pleas and 
other dispositions for the Central Division.  Therefore, a waiver rate was not computed, as that rate is dependent 
upon a comparison of bench trials to the total of trials and pleas. 
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Judge # Total OUI Cases Waiver Rate Bench Trials Bench Trial 
Acquittal Rate 
201 482 20% 90 96% 
203 573 17% 90 99% 
208 378 15% 49 92% 
210 254 23% 54 93% 
211 374 13% 39 90% 
216 381 32% 113 95% 
 
As noted above, the Acquittal Rate incorporates attention to the Number of Bench Trials (the 
denominator of this ratio), which is itself a function of the Waiver Rate.  Therefore, using the 
proportion test of the Acquittal Rate captures, either directly or indirectly, attention to all three of 
these influences.  Table 2 lists the 21 judges whose Acquittal Rates are statistically above 
average, based on the criterion of a Z-score below 2.5%. 
Table 2: Judges with Significantly Higher than Average Acquittal Rate (85.8%) based on a 
Proportion Test
 
Judge # Bench Trials Bench Trial 
Acquittal Rate 
Z-Score 
2 41 100% 0.002 
3 73 97% 0.001 
13 76 95% 0.012 
19 40 100% 0.002 
25 39 97% 0.019 
41 38 97% 0.022 
55 71 97% 0.002 
73 34 100% 0.005 
80 149 100% 0.000 
82 39 100% 0.003 
85 52 98% 0.003 
113 50 100% 0.000 
122 158 99% 0.000 
134 97 95% 0.004 
140 142 94% 0.003 
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Judge # Bench Trials Bench Trial 
Acquittal Rate 
Z-Score 
147 212 98% 0.000 
158 68 97% 0.002 
166 83 99% 0.000 
201 90 96% 0.003 
203 90 99% 0.000 
216 113 95% 0.002 
 
There is considerable overlap between the two tables:  
 Five judges appear in Table 2, but were excluded from Table 1.  They are: 19, 25 and 82 
(their waiver rates are too low to qualify them for Table 1) and 41 and 73 (who had less 
than 39 bench trials); 
 Twelve judges appear in Table 1, but not in Table 2.  These judges have acquittal rates 
that are above average, but not by much, and have presided over enough trials for the 
difference to be statistically significant. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the proportional binomial tests on Waiver Rates.  The test is 
restricted to judges who presided over a larger than average number of trials (44 trials, bench or 
jury). As for the test on acquittal rate, the Table identifies judges whose Waiver Rates are 
statistically below average, based on the criterion of a Z-score below 2.5%. 
 
Table 3:  Judges with Significantly Lower than Average Waiver Rates and at least 44 
Trials (Bench or Jury) 
Judge # 
Total Pleas 
Plus Trials 
Waiver  
Rate 
Bench 
Trials Jury Trials 
Bench Trial 
Acquittal 
Rate 
20 486 5% 25 33 84% 
22 291 6% 17 70 71% 
25 482 8% 39 30 97% 
45 488 8% 41 43 85% 
58 1213 1% 7 64 100% 
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Judge # 
Total Pleas 
Plus Trials 
Waiver  
Rate 
Bench 
Trials Jury Trials 
Bench Trial 
Acquittal 
Rate 
65 361 6% 21 29 67% 
89 426 5% 20 37 85% 
102 455 7% 33 133 82% 
115 445 7% 29 22 93% 
119 341 6% 21 28 86% 
146 428 6% 26 23 88% 
149 217 5% 10 42 70% 
152 436 7% 29 21 59% 
157 443 6% 27 29 81% 
162 241 5% 11 49 18% 
170 332 5% 16 40 38% 
171 366 2% 8 56 75% 
192 134 5% 7 43 86% 
194 517 0% 2 54 50% 
199 341 3% 9 68 89% 
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ATTACHMENT 7 
 
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 
 
A.  Judges We Interviewed 
 
We met with the Administrative Committee of the District Court, which includes Lynda M. 
Connolly, Chief Justice of the District Court, Ellen Shapiro, Director of District Court 
Operations, Peter J. Kilmartin, Presiding Judge of the Ayer and Concord District Courts, and six 
Regional Administrative Judges (“RAJs”).  We then met individually with each of the six RAJs.  
Thereafter we had additional conversations with some of them.  The RAJs and the Regions that 
they oversee are identified below: 
 
 REGION 1 REGION 2 REGION 3 
RAJ: Rosemary Minehan Paul Dawley Robert Brennan 
Courts: Barnstable 
Edgartown 
Fall River 
Falmouth 
Hingham 
Nantucket 
New Bedford 
Orleans 
Plymouth 
Wareham 
Attleboro 
Brockton 
Brookline 
Dedham 
Quincy 
Stoughton 
Taunton 
Wrentham 
Cambridge 
Chelsea 
Gloucester 
Haverhill 
Ipswich 
Lynn 
Malden 
Newburyport 
Peabody 
Salem 
Somerville 
 
 REGION 4 REGION 5 REGION 6 
RAJ: Michael Brooks Paul LoConto Maureen Walsh 
Courts: Ayer 
Concord 
Framingham 
Lawrence 
Lowell 
Marlborough 
Natick 
Newton 
Waltham 
Woburn 
Clinton 
Dudley 
East Brookfield 
Fitchburg 
Gardner 
Leominster 
Milford 
Uxbridge 
Westborough 
Winchendon 
Worcester 
Chicopee 
Eastern Hampshire 
Greenfield 
Holyoke 
Northampton 
Northern Berkshire 
Orange 
Palmer 
Pittsfield 
Southern Berkshire 
Springfield 
Westfield 
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We met with the following justices of the Boston Municipal Court: 
 
JUDGE TITLE 
Charles Johnson Chief Justice of the BMC 
Raymond Dougan First Justice, BMC Central 
Robert Ronquillo First Justice, East Boston Division 
David Weingarten First Justice, Roxbury Division 
Michael Coyne Justice, BMC Central 
Thomas Horgan Justice, BMC Central 
James Coffee Associate Justice, Dorchester Division 
Kenneth Desmond Associate Justice, East Boston Division 
Kenneth Fiandaca Associate Justice, Roxbury Division 
Annette Ford Associate Justice 
Tracy-Lee Lyons Associate Justice 
 
In addition, the following administrators participated in our meetings with the BMC justices:  
Michael O’Laughlin, Administrative Attorney; Lisa Yee, Administrative Attorney; Christopher 
Connolly, Chief, BMC’s Administrative Office. 
 
We also requested interviews with four judges who sat regularly in courts in Worcester County:  
We interviewed Justices Timothy Bibaud, Margaret Guzman, and Andrew Mandell.  Justice 
Mark Noonan declined our request for an interview. 
 
B.  Prosecutors We Interviewed 
 
In addition to obtaining the data provided to the Globe by the District Attorneys, we interviewed 
each of Massachusetts’s 11 District Attorneys and other members of their offices.  Specifically, 
we interviewed the following individuals from each office: 
 
District Attorney’s Office Individual(s) Interviewed 
Berkshire County David Capeless, District Attorney 
Kelly Kemp, Assistant District Attorney 
Bristol County Samuel Sutter, District Attorney 
Derrick Coyne, District Court Supervisor 
Paul Machado, Assistant District Attorney 
Cape & Islands Michael O’Keefe, District Attorney 
Tara Meltmore, Assistant District Attorney 
Essex County Jonathan Blodgett, District Attorney 
Mary Doyle, District Court Supervisor 
William Melkonian, Assistant District Attorney 
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District Attorney’s Office Individual(s) Interviewed 
Hampden County Mark Mastroianni, District Attorney 
Middlesex County Gerard Leone, Jr., District Attorney 
Sarah Ellis, District Court Supervisor 
Norfolk County Michael Morrissey, District Attorney 
Michael Connolly, District Court Chief 
Northwestern District David Sullivan, District Attorney 
Plymouth County Timothy Cruz, District Attorney 
Bridget Middleton, Assistant District Attorney 
Timothy Shyne, Assistant District Attorney 
Suffolk County Daniel Conley, District Attorney 
Christina Miller, District Court Chief 
Worcester County Joseph Early, Jr., District Attorney 
Daniel Bennett, First Assistant 
Marc Dupuis, Assistant District Attorney 
John Hartmayer, Assistant District Attorney 
 
 
C.  Defense Lawyers We Interviewed 
 
Based on the MassCourts data we collected, we identified defense lawyers who appeared most 
often in the database.  (Note that the name of the defense attorney is included in MassCourts for 
each case only about 75% of the time.)  Ultimately we interviewed the following defense 
attorneys: 
 
ATTORNEY 
Steven Panagiotes 
Jack Diamond 
James Milligan 
James Geraghty 
Anthony Salerno 
Stephen Jones 
Daniel O’Malley 
Terrence Kennedy 
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D.  Other Individuals We Interviewed 
 
To gain additional information concerning judicial training we spoke with the following 
individuals: 
 
INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED 
Andrea Nardone, Esq., Massachusetts Traffic Safety Resource Prosecutor 
Ellen O’Connor, Esq., Director of Judicial Education at the Judicial Institute 
Victoria Lewis, Esq., Lead Program Manager at the Judicial Institute 
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ATTACHMENT 8 
 
TABLE OF OUI LAWS IN OTHER STATES 
 
* References to statutes, rules, and cases are summaries, and are not verbatim quotations of these respective sources. 
 
 
STATE STATUTE JURY WAIVER BT REFUSAL 
Alabama Code of Ala. § 32-5A-191 Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Ala. R. Crim. P. 18.1(b) 
 In all cases, the defendant may 
waive his right to trial by jury, 
with the consent of the 
prosecutor and the court. 
Admissible. 
 
Code of Ala. § 32-5A-194(c) 
 If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test under 
the provisions of Section 32-5-192, evidence of refusal shall be 
admissible in any civil, criminal or quasi-criminal action or 
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed 
while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or controlled 
substance. 
 
Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318 (Ala. 1979) 
 Admission of refusal to submit to breathalyzer test not violation 
of defendant’s 5A right against self-incrimination.  Evidence 
admissible to show consciousness of guilt. 
 
Alaska Alaska Stat. § 28.35.030  
 
 
Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Alaska R. Crim. Proc. 23(a) 
 Cases required to be tried by 
jury shall be so tried unless the 
defendant waives a jury trial in 
writing with the approval of the 
court and the consent of the 
state. 
 
Admissible. 
 
Alaska Stat. § 28.35.032(e) 
 The refusal of a person to submit to a chemical test authorized 
under AS 28.33.031(a) or AS 28.35.031(a) or (g) is admissible 
evidence in a civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of 
an act alleged to have been committed by the person while 
operating or driving a motor vehicle or operating an aircraft or 
watercraft while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, 
inhalant, or controlled substance. 
 
 
 
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1381, Consent of court required. Admissible. 
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1382, 1383  
 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
 
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(b) 
 The defendant may waive the 
right to trial by jury with 
consent of the prosecution and 
the court. 
 
 
 
State v. Lee, 908 P.2d 44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)  
 Refusal to take chemical breath test is physical evidence only, not 
testimonial, and thus admissible at a criminal trial for DUI. 
 
 
 
Arkansas Ark. Code Ann  § 5-65-103   
 
 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-108(a) 
 In all criminal cases, except 
where a sentence of death may 
be imposed, trial by a jury may 
be waived by the defendant, 
provided the prosecuting 
attorney gives his or her assent 
to the waiver. 
 
Admissible. 
 
Medlock v. State, 964 S.W.2d 196 (Ark. 1998)          
 Refusal bears on consciousness of guilt and is probative on the 
issue of intoxication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
California Cal. Veh. Code § 23152  
 
 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Cal. Const., Art. I § 16 
 A jury may be waived in a 
criminal cause by the consent of 
both parties expressed in open 
court by the defendant and the 
defendant's counsel. 
 
People v. Whitmore, 251 Cal. App. 
2d 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) 
 While a defendant has a 
constitutional right to a jury 
trial, he does not have the 
correlative right to a trial 
without a jury.  Consent by the 
prosecuting attorney is 
Admissible. 
 
People v. Municipal Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)  
 Admission into evidence of refusal to submit to testing does not 
violate defendant’s 5th Amendment privileges because refusal is 
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt rather than 
testimonial evidence.  
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necessary notwithstanding that 
defendant insists on a trial by 
judge alone. 
 
People v. Terry, 466 P.2d 961 (Cal. 
1970) 
 The judge does not have to 
consent to a nonjury trial nor 
can he overrule the consent of 
defendant and the prosecutor. 
Under the Constitution, this 
determination is left to the 
consent of both parties, the 
defendant and the prosecutor, 
and the concurrence of the court 
is not required. 
 
 
Colorado  
Colo. Rev. Stat.  §42-4-1301  
 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Colo. Crim. P. 23(a)(5) 
 The person accused of a felony 
or misdemeanor may, with the 
consent of the prosecution, 
waive a trial by jury in writing 
or orally in court. Trial shall 
then be to the court. 
 
Admissible. 
 
Colo. Rev. Stat.  §42-4-1301(6)(d) 
 If a person refuses to take or to complete, or to cooperate with the 
completing of, any test or tests as provided in section 42-4-
1301.1 and such person subsequently stands trial for DUI or 
DWAI, the refusal to take or to complete, or to cooperate with the 
completing of, any test or tests shall be admissible into evidence 
at the trial, and a person may not claim the privilege against self-
incrimination with regard to admission of refusal to take or to 
complete, or to cooperate with the completing of, any test or 
tests.  
 
Cox v. People, 735 P.2d 153 (Colo. 1987) 
 Defendants' refusals to take a blood or breath test after lawful 
requests did not constitute compelled testimony entitled to 
protection under Colo. Const. art. II, § 18. 
 
 
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-227a 
 
At the sole option of defendant. 
 
Admissible. 
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 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-82(a) 
 In any criminal case, 
prosecution or proceeding, the 
party accused may, if he so 
elects when called upon to 
plead, be tried by the court 
instead of by the jury; and, in 
such case, the court shall have 
jurisdiction to hear and try such 
case and render judgment and 
sentence thereon. 
 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-227a(e) 
 In any criminal prosecution for a violation of subsection (a) of 
this section, evidence that the defendant refused to submit to a 
blood, breath or urine test shall be admissible. If a case involving 
a violation of subsection (a) of this section is tried to a jury, the 
court shall instruct the jury as to any inference that may or may 
not be drawn from the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood, 
breath or urine test. 
 
State v. Seekins, 1 A.3d 1089 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010)  
 Four inferences must be drawn regarding consciousness of guilt: 
(1) an inference from the conduct of the defendant to his denial to 
the prosecution of Breathalyzer evidence of his blood alcohol 
level, (2) from that denial to an inference of consciousness of 
guilt, (3) from that consciousness of guilt to an inference of 
consciousness of guilt as to having operated a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol and (4) therefrom to an 
inference of guilt of that offense.  
 
Delaware 21 Del. C. § 4177  Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 23 
 Cases required to be tried by 
jury shall be so tried unless the 
defendant waives a jury trial in 
writing with the approval of the 
court and the consent of the 
state. 
Admissible. 
 
21 Del. Code § 2749 
 Upon the trial of any action or proceeding arising out of the acts 
alleged to have been committed by any person while in violation 
of § 4177 or § 4177L of this title or local ordinance substantially 
conforming thereto, the court may admit evidence of the refusal 
of such person to submit to a chemical test of breath, blood or 
urine under this subchapter. 
 
State v. Lynch, 274 A.2d 443 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971)  
 Supporting admissibility of refusal because (1) the statute was 
obviously intended to broaden the police arsenal in the fight 
against persons who drive while under the influence and so no 
inference of statutory restrictions on evidence should be drawn; 
(2) even without the statute, the court has held refusal may be 
considered by the jury; (3) the defendant’s conduct and demeanor 
are vital evidence and refusal is an integral part of the 
circumstances surrounding the arrest; and (4) the statute is 
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confirmatory of common law principles.  
 
 
D.C. D.C. Code § 50-2201.05  
 
 
 
Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
D.C. Code § 16-705 
 The defendant is entitled to a 
jury trial, the trial shall be by 
jury, unless the defendant in 
open court expressly waives trial 
by jury and requests trial by the 
court, and the court and the 
prosecuting officer consent 
thereto.  
 
Admissible. 
 
Stevenson v. District of Columbia, 562 A.2d 622 (D.C. 1989) 
 Appellant's refusal to take a blood alcohol test could properly be 
considered against him as evincing consciousness of guilt.  
 
 
Florida Fla. Stat. § 316.193  
  
 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.260 
 A defendant may in writing 
waive a jury trial with the 
consent of the state. 
 
State v. Thorup, 659 So. 2d 1116, 
1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 
1995) 
 Rules relating to waiver of a 
jury trial are procedural rather 
than substantive in nature, and 
the supreme court has 
established the procedural rule 
governing this waiver without 
abrogating or modifying the 
substantive right to a trial by 
jury. 
 
 
Admissible. 
 
State v. Pagach, 442 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1983) 
 The legislature acted clearly within its prerogative when it added 
the section providing that refusal to submit to a chemical test is 
admissible evidence in any criminal proceeding.  
 Admission of the refusal evidence at trial without previously 
advising the driver that his refusal could be introduced against 
him is not violative of either federal or state constitutional rights. 
 
Georgia O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Admissible. 
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Zigan v. State, 638 S.E.2d 322 (Ga. 
2006).  
 Although appellants’ waiver of 
the right to trial by jury appears 
adequate, the refusal of the 
prosecution to consent left the 
trial court with no choice but to 
deny the demand. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(d)  
 In any criminal trial, the refusal of the defendant to permit a 
chemical analysis to be made of his blood, breath, urine, or other 
bodily substance at the time of his arrest shall be admissible in 
evidence against him. 
 
Keenan v. State, 436 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. 1993) 
 Although the legislature has granted a driver the right to refuse to 
take a State-administered test, it has nevertheless mandated that 
evidence of the exercise of that right shall be admissible in the 
driver's criminal trial. 
 
 
Hawaii HRS § 291E-61 Consent of court required. 
 
HRS § 806-61 
 The defendant in any criminal 
case may, with the consent of 
the court, waive the right to a 
trial by jury either by written 
consent filed in court or by oral 
consent in open court entered on 
the minutes.  
 
 
Admissible. 
 
State v. Ferm, 7 P.3d 193 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000)  
 Because defendant's refusal to take the field sobriety test was 
neither testimonial nor compelled, the fifth amendment and 
article I, section 10 were not offended. 
Idaho Idaho Code § 18-8004  
 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
I.C.R. Rule 23(a)  
 In felony cases issues of fact 
must be tried by a jury, unless a 
trial by jury is waived by a 
written waiver executed by the 
defendant in open court with the 
consent of the prosecutor 
expressed in open court and 
entered in the minutes. 
 
I.C.R. Rule 23(b) 
 In criminal cases not amounting 
Admissible. 
 
State v. Bock, 328 P.2d 1065 (Idaho 1958)  
 Evidence of appellant’s refusal to submit to a blood test was 
competent and admissible.  Like any other act or statement 
voluntarily made by him, it was competent for the jury to 
consider and weigh, with the other evidence, and to draw from it 
whatever inference as to guilt or innocence may be justified 
thereby.  
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to a felony, issues of fact must 
be tried by a jury, unless a trial 
by jury is waived by the consent 
of both parties expressed in open 
court and entered in the minutes. 
    
 
 
Illinois 625 ILCS 5/11-501 At the sole option of defendant. 
 
725 ILCS 5/103-6 
 Every person accused of an 
offense shall have the right to a 
trial by jury unless (i) 
understandingly waived by 
defendant in open court or (ii) 
the offense is an ordinance 
violation punishable by fine 
only and the defendant either 
fails to file a demand for a trial 
by jury at the time of entering 
his or her plea of not guilty or 
fails to pay to the clerk of the 
circuit court at the time of 
entering his or her plea of not 
guilty any jury fee required to be 
paid to the clerk. 
 
State v. Reed, 319 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1974)  
 It was reversible error for the 
trial court not to accept 
defendant’s waiver of a jury trial 
even though the state objected to 
that waiver. 
 
 
Admissible. 
 
625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(c)(1) 
 Evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any civil or criminal 
action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been 
committed while the person under the influence of alcohol, other 
drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds, or any 
combination thereof was driving or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle. 
 
Indiana Indiana Code § 9-30-5-1  
 
Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
Admissible. 
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Indiana Code § 35-37-1-2  
 The defendant and prosecuting 
attorney, with the assent of the 
court, may submit the trial to the 
court.  
 
Arnold v. State, 460 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. 
1984) 
 Statute clearly states that a 
defendant may not waive a jury 
trial without the assent of the 
prosecutor and the trial court. 
 
Indiana Code § 9-30-6-3(b).  
 At any proceeding under this chapter, a person's refusal to submit 
to a chemical test is admissible into evidence. 
 
Iowa Iowa Code § 321J.2 At the sole option of defendant only 
during a specified period of time.   
 
Otherwise, consent of prosecution 
required. 
 
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.17 
 Cases required to be tried by 
jury shall be so tried unless the 
defendant voluntarily and 
intelligently waives a jury trial 
in writing and on the record 
within 30 days after 
arraignment, or if no waiver is 
made within 30 days after 
arraignment the defendant may 
waive within ten days after the 
completion of discovery, but not 
later than ten days prior to the 
date set for trial, as provided in 
these rules for good cause 
shown, and after such times only 
with the consent of the 
prosecuting attorney. The 
Admissible. 
 
Iowa Code § 321J.16 
 If a person refuses to submit to a chemical test, proof of refusal is 
admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising 
out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was 
operating a motor vehicle. 
 REPORT TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 
OCTOBER 2012 
 
 
9 
 
STATE STATUTE JURY WAIVER BT REFUSAL 
defendant may not withdraw a 
voluntary and knowing waiver 
of trial by jury as a matter of 
right, but the court, in its 
discretion, may permit 
withdrawal of the waiver prior 
to the commencement of the 
trial. 
Kansas K.S.A. § 8-1567 Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
K.S.A. 22-3403(1) 
 The defendant and prosecuting 
attorney, with the consent of the 
court, may submit the trial of 
any felony to the court. 
 
State v. Irving, 533 P.2d 1225 (Kan. 
1975)    
 It is provided by statute in this 
state that a jury trial may be 
waived in any criminal trial 
where the defendant, the state, 
and the trial court assent to such 
waiver. 
 
Admissible. 
 
K.S.A. § 8-1001(n)  
 The person's refusal to submit to a chemical test shall be 
admissible in evidence against the person at any trial on a charge 
arising out of the alleged operation or attempted operation of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both. 
Kentucky KRS § 189A.010 
 
Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Ky. RCr Rule 9.26(1)  
 Cases required to be tried by 
jury shall be so tried unless the 
defendant waives a jury trial in 
writing with the approval of the 
court and the consent of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
Admissible. 
 
KRS § 189A.105(2)(a)(1)  
 If the person refuses to submit to such tests, the fact of this 
refusal may be used against him in court. 
 
Hoppenjans v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 290 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009)  
 The jury heard testimony that Hoppenjans refused to submit to a 
breath test.  Such a refusal is admissible pursuant to KRS 
189A.105(2)(a)(1).  
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Louisiana La. R.S. 14:98 At the sole option of defendant only 
during a specified period of time.   
 
Otherwise, consent of the court is 
required. 
 
In any event, waiver can occur no 
later than 45 days prior to trial. 
 
La. Const. Art. I, § 17   
 Except in capital cases, a 
defendant may knowingly and 
intelligently waive his right to a 
trial by jury but no later than 
forty-five days prior to the trial 
date and the waiver shall be 
irrevocable. 
 
Admissible. 
 
La. R.S. 32:666  
 Evidence of an offender’s refusal shall be admissible in any 
criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have 
been committed while the person was driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of 
this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or any 
abused substance or controlled dangerous substance. 
 
State v. Shoupe, 71 So. 3d 508 (La. Ct. App. 2011)  
 A defendant’s refusal to take the breath test is admissible at a 
DWI prosecution; the weight of the evidence is left to the trier of 
fact. 
 
 
Maine 29 M.R.S. § 2401 
29 M.R.S. § 2411  
Consent of court required. 
 
Me. R. Crim. P. 23(a) 
 The defendant with the approval 
of the court may waive a jury 
trial. 
 
Admissible (if proper warnings of consequences are given). 
 
29-A M.R.S. § 2521  
 Neither a refusal to submit to a test nor a failure to complete a 
test may be admissible in court unless the person has first been 
told that the refusal or failure will: result in suspension of that 
person's driver's license for a period up to 6 years; be admissible 
in evidence at a trial for operating under the influence of 
intoxicants; and be considered an aggravating factor at sentencing 
if the person is convicted of operating under the influence of 
intoxicants that, in addition to other penalties, will subject the 
person to a mandatory minimum period of incarceration. 
 
Maryland Md. TRANSPORTATION 
Code Ann. § 21-902 
 
At the sole option of defendant unless 
the court determines the defendant 
lacks the knowledge necessary to 
make that selection. 
 
Md. Rule 4-246  
Admissible. 
 
Md. COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS Code Ann. § 10-
309(a)(2) 
 The fact of refusal to submit is admissible in evidence at the trial. 
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 In the circuit court, a defendant 
having a right to trial by jury 
shall be tried by a jury unless the 
right is waived.  The State does 
not have the right to elect a trial 
by jury. 
 
Thomas v. State, 598 A.2d 789 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1991) 
 When a defendant or his counsel 
informs the court that the 
defendant desires to be tried by 
the court, a court may not deny 
the defendant his right to select 
a court trial unless, after a 
sufficient inquiry of the 
defendant, the trial court finds 
that because of his inability to 
understand, he lacks the 
knowledge necessary to make 
that selection. 
 
Wyatt v. State, 817 A.2d 901 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) 
 Legislature amended the drunk driving statute to explicitly 
provide that an accused's refusal to take a breathalyzer test could 
be admitted in evidence. The appellate court found the amended 
statute did not violate defendant's guarantee against self-
incrimination.  
 
Massachusetts G. L. c. 90, § 24 Consent of court required. 
 
G. L. c. 218 § 26A 
 Trial of criminal offenses in the 
Boston municipal court 
department and in the district 
court department shall be by a 
jury of six persons, unless the 
defendant files a written waiver 
and consent to be tried by the 
court without a jury. 
 
Mass. R. Crim. P. Rule 19(a) 
 A case in which the defendant 
has the right to be tried by a jury 
shall be so tried unless the 
Inadmissible. 
 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e) 
 Evidence that the defendant failed or refused to consent to such 
test or analysis shall not be admissible against him in a civil or 
criminal proceeding. 
 
Opinion of Justices to Senate, 412 Mass. 1201 (1992) 
 Holding that a proposed statute, which would have permitted a 
defendant's failure or refusal to submit to a chemical test or 
analysis of his breath to be admissible as evidence in a criminal 
proceeding, would have violated the self-incrimination clause, 
Mass. Const. Declaration of Rights art. 12, in that the defendant 
would have been compelled to furnish evidence against himself. 
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defendant waives a jury trial in 
writing with the approval of the 
court and files the waiver with 
the clerk, in which instance he 
shall be tried by the court 
instead of by a jury. 
 
 
Michigan MCL § 257.625 
 
Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
MCL § 763.3  
 In all criminal cases arising in 
the courts of this state the 
defendant may, with the consent 
of the prosecutor and approval 
by the court, waive a 
determination of the facts by a 
jury and elect to be tried before 
the court without a jury. 
 
Michigan Court Rule 6.401 
 The defendant has the right to be 
tried by a jury, or may, with the 
consent of the prosecutor and 
approval by the court, elect to 
waive that right and be tried 
before the court without a jury. 
 
People v. Kirby, 487 N.W.2d 404 
(Mich. 1992) 
 While defendants' right to trial 
by jury was guaranteed by the 
Michigan and federal 
constitutions, there was no 
corresponding constitutional 
right to waive a jury, and any 
rights a defendant might have to 
Admissible (only to show that a test was administered, not to show 
guilt). 
 
MCL § 257.625a(9) 
 A person's refusal to submit to a chemical test is admissible in a 
criminal prosecution only to show that a test was offered to the 
defendant, but not as evidence in determining the defendant's 
innocence or guilt. The jury shall be instructed accordingly. 
 
People v. Keskinen, 441 N.W.2d 79 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) 
 Generally, evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a 
Breathalyzer test should not be admitted in the prosecutor's case 
in chief because it constitutes neither evidence of guilt or 
innocence nor evidence regarding an essential element of the 
crime.  However, refusal to take a Breathalyzer test may be 
admitted at trial in situations where the defendant opens the 
controversy by a showing of lack of credibility or competence of 
the police officer and it is necessary to rebut defendant's 
evidence. 
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waive a jury were solely those 
granted by the legislature. 
Therefore, the trial court could 
not hold unconstitutional the 
requirement of prosecutorial 
consent to a waiver of jury trial 
where the right to waive a jury 
trial was not a constitutionally 
protected right. 
 
 
Minnesota Minn. Stat. 169A.20 
 
Consent of court required. 
 
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01(2)(a) 
 The defendant, with the 
approval of the court, may 
waive a jury trial on the issue of 
guilt provided the defendant 
does so personally, in writing or 
on the record in open court, after 
being advised by the court of the 
right to trial by jury, and after 
having had an opportunity to 
consult with counsel. 
 
State v. Lessley, 779 N.W.2d 825 
(Minn. 2010) 
 The State argued that Minn. 
Const. art. I, § 4 should be read 
to require the State's consent 
before a criminal defendant 
could waive a jury trial and be 
tried by a judge of the district 
court. The supreme court 
disagreed. Minn. Const. art. I, § 
4 did not require the State's 
consent before a defendant 
sought to waive a jury trial.  
Admissible. 
 
Minn. Stat. § 169A.45(3) 
 Evidence of the refusal to take a test is admissible into evidence 
in a prosecution under section 169A.20 (driving while impaired). 
 
State v. Berge, 464 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) 
 Evidence of the refusal to take the test was admissible; statute 
passed constitutional muster under the federal constitution; and 
since the federal and state constitutions protecting compelled 
self-incrimination were coextensive, statute was not 
unconstitutional under the state constitution. 
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State v. Kilburn, 231 N.W.2d 61 
(Minn. 1975) 
 Restrictions on waiver of a jury 
trial does not violate the United 
States Constitution or the 
Minnesota Constitution. Minn. 
Stat. § 631.01 does not create an 
absolute right to waive a jury 
trial. The right is subject to the 
approval of the trial court.  
 
 
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30 
 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Robinson v. State, 345 So. 2d 1044 
(Miss. 1977) 
 It has been settled in Mississippi 
that trial by jury in criminal 
cases may be waived by the 
agreement of the defendant and 
the prosecution. (citing Prueitt v. 
State, 261 So.2d 119, 121-22 
(Miss. 1972)). 
 
Admissible. 
 
Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-41 
 If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test under 
the provisions of this chapter, evidence of refusal shall be 
admissible in any criminal action under this chapter. 
 
Ricks v. State, 611 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1992) 
 Evidence of defendant's refusal to take a blood alcohol test could 
be admitted into evidence against him without violating the Fifth 
Amendment. Defendant's refusal was physical instead of 
testimonial; thus, its introduction into evidence violated neither 
the Fifth Amendment or Mississippi Constitution. 
 
 
 
Missouri R.S.Mo. §§ 577.010, 577.012 
 
Consent of court required. 
 
Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 27.01(b) 
 The defendant may, with the 
assent of the court, waive a trial 
by jury and submit the trial of 
any criminal case to the court, 
whose findings shall have the 
force and effect of the verdict of 
Admissible. 
 
R.S.Mo. § 577.041 
 If a person refuses upon the request of the officer to submit to any 
test allowed pursuant to section 577.020, then evidence of the 
refusal shall be admissible in a proceeding pursuant to section 
565.024, 565.060, or 565.082, or section 577.010 or 577.012.  
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a jury. In felony cases such 
waiver by the defendant shall be 
made in open court and entered 
of record. 
 
State v. Taylor, 391 S.W.2d 835 
(Mo. 1965) 
 Missouri requires that a waiver 
of the right to trial by jury has to 
be agreed to by the trial court. 
Defendant had no absolute right, 
either by constitution, statute, or 
court rule, to elect that he would 
be tried by the court without a 
jury.  
 
State v. Goree, 762 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 
1988)   
 Defendant had no absolute right 
to waive jury trial, and, in view 
of unambiguous language of 
state constitution conditioning 
waiver right on assent of court, 
trial court's failure to sustain 
defendant's waiver motion was 
not abuse of discretion.  
 
Montana Mont. Code Anno. § 61-8-
401 
 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Mont. Code Anno. § 46-16-110(3)  
 Upon written consent of the 
parties, a trial by jury may be 
waived. 
 
State ex rel. Long v. Justice Court, 
156 P.3d 5 (Mont. 2007) 
 Art. II, sec. 26, Mont. Const., 
provides a right of a jury trial to 
Admissible. 
 
Mont. Code Anno., § 61-8-404(2)   
 If the person under arrest refused to submit to one or more tests, 
proof of refusal is admissible in any criminal action or 
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed 
while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a 
vehicle upon the ways of this state open to the public, while 
under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of alcohol 
and drugs. The trier of fact may infer from the refusal that the 
person was under the influence. The inference is rebuttable. 
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the state and both parties in a 
criminal trial must consent to 
waiver. 
 
 
State v. Slade, 194 P.3d 677 (Mont. 2008) 
 If a person under arrest for the offense of operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs refuses 
to submit to a test which detects the presence of alcohol, drugs or 
a combination of alcohol and drugs, proof of that refusal is 
admissible in a trial of that offense; jury may infer from the 
refusal that the person was under the influence, and that inference 
is rebuttable. MCA 61-8-404(2).  
 
Nebraska R.R.S. Neb. § 60-6,196 
 
Consent of court required. 
 
State v. Godfrey, 155 N.W.2d 438 
(Neb. 1968) 
 The right to a jury trial is 
personal to the defendant, and 
the state is without power to 
require one if the defendant 
wishes to waive it.  
 We hold that the court may 
reasonably require that a motion 
to waive a jury trial be made or 
filed within a reasonable time 
prior to trial as a condition to the 
consent of the court.  
 
Admissible. 
 
R.R.S. Neb. § 60-6,197(6) 
 Refusal to submit to a chemical blood, breath, or urine test or 
tests pursuant to this section shall be admissible evidence in any 
action for a violation of section 60-6,196 or a city or village 
ordinance enacted in conformance with such section. 
 
State v. Meints, 202 N.W.2d 202 (Neb. 1972) 
 The refusal to give the chemical test should be admissible in 
evidence against the defendant.  
 
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
484C.110 
Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 175.011.  
 In a district court, cases required 
to be tried by jury must be so 
tried unless the defendant 
waives a jury trial in writing 
with the approval of the court 
and the consent of the state.  
 
Rains v. State, 422 P.2d 541(Nev. 
Admissible. 
 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 484C.240 
 If a person refuses to submit to a required chemical test, evidence 
of that refusal is admissible in any criminal or administrative 
action arising out of acts alleged to have been committed. 
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1967) 
 Requiring the consent of the 
prosecutor or court, or both, 
before a waiver of a jury trial 
becomes effective is a 
reasonable protective condition.  
 
New 
Hampshire 
RSA 265-A:2 
 
At the sole option of defendant. 
 
RSA 606:7   
 Any defendant in the superior 
court in a criminal case other 
than a capital case may, if he 
shall so elect, when called upon 
to plead, or later and before a 
jury has been impanelled to try 
him, waive his right to trial by 
jury by signing a written waiver 
thereof and filing the same with 
the clerk of the court, 
whereupon he shall be tried by 
the court instead of by a jury. 
 
Admissible. 
 
RSA 265-A:10  
 If a person refuses to submit to a test, such refusal may be 
admissible into evidence in a civil or criminal action or 
proceeding. 
 
State v. Denney, 536 A.2d 1242 (N.H. 1987) 
 Refusal cannot be accomplished with impunity. The legislature 
has attached two strings to a refusal.  First, refusal to submit to a 
blood alcohol test results in a possible maximum one-year 
administrative revocation of the arrestee's driver's license, and, 
second, the statute provides for the admission of a refusal as 
evidence in court. 
 
New Jersey N.J. Stat. §39:4-50 Consent of court required. 
 
N.J. Court Rules, Rule 1:8-1(a)  
 Criminal actions required to be 
tried by a jury shall be so tried 
unless the defendant, in writing 
and with the approval of the 
court, after notice to the 
prosecuting attorney and an 
opportunity to be heard, waives 
a jury trial.  
 
State v. Belton, 286 A.2d 78 (N.J. 
1972) 
 The restriction against a 
Admissible.  
 
State v. Stever, 527 A.2d 408 (N.J. 1987) 
 Admission into evidence of defendant's refusal to submit to a 
breathalyzer test did not violate his common-law privilege 
against self-incrimination, nor did it infringe on his due process 
rights under the New Jersey Constitution. 
 
State v. Tabisz, 322 A.2d 453 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) 
 Defendant argued that the county court committed reversible 
error to admit evidence of his refusal to take the breathalyzer test. 
The court reviewed applicable law and noted that New Jersey had 
eliminated any requirement that an accused give his express 
consent to submit to a breathalyzer test, so an accused no longer 
had a right to refuse to take the test. The failure of an accused to 
 REPORT TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 
OCTOBER 2012 
 
 
18 
 
STATE STATUTE JURY WAIVER BT REFUSAL 
unilateral waiver of jury trial by 
the accused presents no 
constitutional infirmity. 
 
State v. Fiorilla, 543 A.2d 958 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) 
 New Jersey has already 
determined to delete the 
requirement for consent of the 
prosecutor. 
 
submit to the test was therefore properly admitted into evidence. 
As defendant had no right to refuse to submit to breathalyzer test, 
his refusal to do so was admissible in evidence and could be the 
basis of an inference of guilt.  
 
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-102 et 
seq  
Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
N.M. Dist. Ct. R.Cr.P. 5-605  
 Defendant may waive a jury, but 
waiver requires the approval of 
the court and the consent of the 
State. 
 
 
Admissible. 
 
McKay v. Davis, 653 P.2d 860 (N.M. 1982) 
 Driver's refusal to take the breath test is admissible under the 
Implied Consent Act, under U.S. Const. Amend. V, and under 
N.M. R. Evid. 401.  There is no constitutional right to refuse and 
any testimony about the refusal to submit does not burden the 
Fifth Amendment. The introduction of and comment on the 
driver's refusal to take a breath test does not violate the U.S. 
Const. Amend. V.  Driver's refusal to take a chemical test was 
relevant to show his consciousness of guilt and fear of the test 
results. 
New York NY CLS Veh & Tr § 1192 
 
Consent of court required. 
 
NY CLS CPL § 320.10 
 Except where the indictment 
charges the crime of murder in 
the first degree, the defendant, 
subject to the provisions of 
subdivision two, may at any 
time before trial waive a jury 
trial and consent to a trial 
without a jury in the superior 
court in which the indictment is 
pending. 
 Such waiver must be in writing 
and must be signed by the 
Admissible. 
 
NY CLS Veh & Tr § 1194(2)(f) 
 Evidence of a refusal to submit to such chemical test or any 
portion thereof shall be admissible in any trial, proceeding or 
hearing based upon a violation of the provisions of section eleven 
hundred ninety-two of this article but only upon a showing that 
the person was given sufficient warning, in clear and unequivocal 
language, of the effect of such refusal and that the person 
persisted in the refusal. 
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defendant in person in open 
court in the presence of the 
court, and with the approval of 
the court.  
 
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1 Jury waiver NOT permitted. 
 
State v. Newkirk, 2010 N.C. App. 
LEXIS 2333 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 
2010) 
 In North Carolina, the Sixth 
Amendment right to plead not 
guilty is buttressed by a state 
constitutional right to a jury trial 
which further provides that any 
criminal defendant who pleads 
not guilty cannot waive a jury 
trial (citing N.C. Const. art. I, § 
24). 
 
Admissible. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-139.1(f) 
 If any person charged with an implied-consent offense refuses to 
submit to a chemical analysis or to perform field sobriety tests at 
the request of an officer, evidence of that refusal is admissible in 
any criminal, civil, or administrative action against the person. 
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code, § 39-08-01 
et seq.  
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
N.D. Cent. Code, § 29-16-02  
 A trial jury may be waived by 
the consent of the defendant and 
the state's attorney expressed in 
open court and entered on the 
minutes of the court. Otherwise, 
the issues of fact must be tried 
by the jury. 
 
Admissible. 
 
N.D. Cent. Code, § 39-20-08 
 If the person under arrest refuses to submit to the test or tests, 
proof of refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal action or 
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed 
while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a 
vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, drugs, or a combination thereof. 
 
Ohio ORC Ann. 4511.19 At the sole option of defendant. 
 
Consent of prosecution required if 
waiver during trial. 
 
  
Ohio Crim. R 23 
 In serious offense cases the 
Admissible. 
 
City of Maumee v. Anistik, 632 N.E.2d 497 (Ohio 1994) 
 Under certain circumstances, evidence of a refusal to submit to a 
chemical test can be used against a defendant at trial.  
 
State v. Frangella, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1654 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) 
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defendant before 
commencement of the trial may 
knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily waive in writing his 
right to trial by jury. Such 
waiver may also be made during 
trial with the approval of the 
court and the consent of the 
prosecuting attorney. 
 Evidence regarding a refusal to submit to a breath or blood test is 
admissible at trial. 
 
Oklahoma 47 Okl. St. § 11-902 Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Morrison v. State, 236 P. 901 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1925) 
 The state is entitled to a jury, 
although the defendant may 
expressly waive a jury. The 
Constitution (section 20, art. 7) 
contemplates that in order for a 
waiver to be effective both 
parties should waive the right to 
have the issues of fact 
determined by a jury. 
Admissible. 
 
47 Okl. St. § 756  
 Evidence that the person has refused to submit to either of said 
analyses is also admissible. 
 
 
State v. Neasbitt, 735 P.2d 337 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) 
 Oklahoma's constitutional provision does not grant any broader 
protections than the Fifth Amendment does, and we hold it is not 
offended by allowing use of evidence that a driver refused to take 
a sobriety test.  
 
 
Oregon ORS § 813.010  Consent of court required. 
 
ORS § 136.001  
 (1) The defendant and the state 
in all criminal prosecutions have 
the right to public trial by an 
impartial jury. 
 (2) Both the defendant and the 
state may elect to waive trial by 
jury and consent to a trial by the 
judge of the court alone, 
provided that the election of the 
defendant is in writing and with 
the consent of the trial judge. 
 
 
 
Admissible. 
 
ORS § 813.310 
 If a person refuses to submit to a chemical test under ORS 
813.100 or refuses to consent to chemical tests under ORS 
813.140, evidence of the person's refusal is admissible in any 
civil or criminal action, suit or proceeding arising out of acts 
alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a 
motor vehicle on premises open to the public or the highways 
while under the influence of intoxicants. 
 
 
State v. Cabanilla, 273 P.3d 125 (Or. 2012) 
 Evidence of a DUII defendant's refusal to take a breath test is 
admissible against that defendant even if the state does not 
establish that the defendant understood the information given 
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State v. Baker, 976 P.2d 1132 (Ore. 
1999) 
 The constitution grants to only 
one person, the trial judge, the 
discretionary choice to deny a 
criminal defendant in a 
noncapital criminal case the 
right to waive trial by jury. The 
legislature's choice to provide 
such a right to the district 
attorney in ORS 136.001(1) 
infringes on the right granted by 
Article I, section 11, of the 
Oregon Constitution. 
 
about the rights and consequences of refusing to take the breath 
test. 
 
Pennsylvania 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802 et seq. Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Pa. R. Crim. P. 620 
 In all cases, the defendant and 
the attorney for the 
Commonwealth may waive a 
jury trial with approval by a 
judge of the court in which the 
case is pending, and elect to 
have the judge try the case 
without a jury. 
 
Commonwealth v. Hargraves, 883 
A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) 
 Aside from the right to a jury 
trial guaranteed by Article 1, § 
6, Pa.R.Crim.P. 620, "Waiver of 
Jury Trial", also ensures the 
right by requiring that the 
Commonwealth join a 
defendant's waiver of a jury 
trial. 
Admissible. 
 
75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(e) 
 In any summary proceeding or criminal proceeding in which the 
defendant is charged with a violation of section 3802 or any other 
violation of this title arising out of the same action, the fact that 
the defendant refused to submit to chemical testing may be 
introduced in evidence along with other testimony concerning the 
circumstances of the refusal. 
 
Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 393 A.2d 730 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) 
 The oral refusal to take the breathalyzer was non testimonial in 
nature and therefore not a violation of appellant's privilege 
against self incrimination. 
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Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2  Consent of court required. 
 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-17-3 
 In all criminal cases the accused 
may, if he or she shall so elect 
and with the leave of the court, 
waive a trial by jury, and in 
those cases the court shall have 
jurisdiction to hear and try the 
cause without a jury and render 
judgment and pass sentence. 
 
 
 
Inadmissible (unless defendant elects to testify). 
 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2(c)(1) 
 Evidence that the defendant had refused to submit to the test shall 
not be admissible unless the defendant elects to testify. 
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2930 
et seq. 
 
Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Rule 14(b), SCRCrimP 
 A defendant may waive his right 
to a jury trial only with the 
approval of the solicitor and the 
trial judge. 
 
Admissible. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950(B)(1) 
 A person must be informed that he does not have to take the test 
or give the samples, but that his privilege to drive must be 
suspended or denied for at least six months if he refuses to submit 
to the test and that his refusal may be used against him in court. 
 
State v. Jansen, 408 S.E.2d 235 (S.C. 1991) 
 It is well established in this State that one who is arrested for DUI 
impliedly consents to a breathalyzer test, and that the revocation 
of that consent is constitutionally admissible as prosecutorial 
evidence at the trial pursuant to that arrest. 
 
 
 
 
South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws  
§ 32-23-1 
 
Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-18-1 
 Cases required to be tried by a 
jury shall be so tried unless the 
defendant waives a jury trial in 
writing or orally on the record 
Admissible. 
 
S.D. Codified Laws § 32-23-10.1 
 If a person refuses to submit to chemical analysis of the person's 
blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance, or allow the 
withdrawal of blood or other bodily substance for chemical 
analysis as provided in § 32-23-10, and that person subsequently 
stands trial for violation of § 32-23-1 or § 32-23-21, such refusal 
 REPORT TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 
OCTOBER 2012 
 
 
23 
 
STATE STATUTE JURY WAIVER BT REFUSAL 
with the approval of the court 
and the consent of the 
prosecuting attorney. 
 
State v. Van Roekel, 472 N.W.2d 
919 (S.D. 1991). 
 Absent an inability to obtain a 
fair and impartial jury, the trial 
court properly accepted the 
prosecutor's refusal to consent, 
and accordingly was required to 
deny defendant’s waiver of his 
right to a jury trial. 
 
may be admissible into evidence at the trial. 
 
 
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann.  
§ 55-10-401 
 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5(c)(2)(C) 
 If the defendant offers to waive 
in writing the right to a grand 
jury investigation and a trial by 
jury, and to submit the case to 
the general sessions court-and 
the district attorney general or 
the district attorney general's 
representative does not object-
the magistrate may accept the 
defendant's written waiver and 
hear the misdemeanor case on 
the not guilty plea. 
 
State v. Brackett, 869 S.W.2d 936 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) 
 There is no guarantee that the 
accused may elect whether to 
waive the right to indictment or 
presentment and trial by jury. 
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5 has the 
effect of granting the State a 
Admissible. 
 
State v. Frasier, 914 S.W.2d 467 (Tenn. 1996) 
 The admission into evidence of defendant's refusal to submit to 
the breath test did not violate defendant's rights under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
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right to a trial by jury. That, in 
the court's view, is an equally 
meritorious basis for the rule. 
Rule 5 must be given its 
ordinary and natural 
construction. For many of the 
reasons the defendant is 
guaranteed the right to trial by 
jury in the criminal case, there 
exists a basis for the State, on 
behalf of its people, to exercise 
the same entitlement. 
Texas Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 
49.01; § 49.04 
Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.13(a)  
 The waiver must be made in 
person by the defendant in 
writing in open court with the 
consent and approval of the 
court, and the attorney 
representing the state.  
 
In re State ex rel. O'Connell, 976 
S.W.2d 902 (Tex. App. 1998) 
 The right to waive a jury is not a 
constitutional right. It is a 
statutory right, and it is not 
absolute; instead, it is subject to 
the procedural conditions 
provided in article 1.13(a).  
 
Admissible. 
 
Tex. Transp. Code § 724.061 
 A person's refusal of a request by an officer to submit to the 
taking of a specimen of breath or blood, whether the refusal was 
express or the result of an intentional failure to give the 
specimen, may be introduced into evidence at the person's trial. 
 
Griffith v. State, 55 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) 
 Also relevant as evidence of intoxication is a refusal to take a 
blood-alcohol test. 
Utah Utah Code Ann.  
§ 41-6a-502 
If felony: 
 
Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 17(c) 
Admissible.  
 
Sandy City v. Larson, 733 P.2d 137 (Utah 1985) 
 Evidence of the refusal to take the test was admissible in 
evidence and did not offend the art. I, § 12 privilege against self-
incrimination or the right to due process. 
 REPORT TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 
OCTOBER 2012 
 
 
25 
 
STATE STATUTE JURY WAIVER BT REFUSAL 
 All felony cases shall be tried by 
jury unless the defendant waives 
a jury in open court with the 
approval of the court and the 
consent of the prosecution. 
 
If non-felony: 
 
Defendant must demand a jury trial.  
 
Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 17(d) 
 All other cases shall be tried 
without a jury unless the 
defendant makes written 
demand at least ten days prior to 
trial, or the court orders 
otherwise. No jury shall be 
allowed in the trial of an 
infraction. 
 
Vermont 23 V.S.A. § 1201 Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
V.R.Cr.P. Rule 23(a) 
 The defendant may in a signed 
writing or in open court, with 
the consent of the prosecuting 
attorney and the court entered of 
record, waive a jury trial in 
offenses not punishable by 
death. 
 
 
Admissible.  
 
23 V.S.A. § 1202(b) 
 If the person refuses to submit to an evidentiary test it shall not 
be given, except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, but 
the refusal may be introduced as evidence in a criminal 
proceeding. 
 
Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266 Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:13(b) 
 If an accused who has pleaded 
not guilty in a circuit court 
Admissible (if refusal found to be unreasonable under § 18.2-268.3, 
and then only  to explain the absence of test at trial).  
 
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-268.10(B) 
 The failure of an accused to permit a blood or breath sample to be 
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consents to trial without a jury, 
the court may, with the 
concurrence of the 
Commonwealth's attorney, try 
the case without a jury. 
 
taken to determine the alcohol or drug content of his blood is not 
evidence and shall not be subject to comment by the 
Commonwealth at the trial of the case, except in rebuttal; nor 
shall the fact that a blood or breath test had been offered the 
accused be evidence or the subject of comment by the 
Commonwealth, except in rebuttal. 
 
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-268.10(C) 
 Evidence of a finding against the defendant under § 18.2-268.3 
for his unreasonable refusal to permit a blood or breath sample to 
be taken to determine the alcohol or drug content of his blood 
shall be admissible into evidence, upon the motion of the 
Commonwealth or the defendant, for the sole purpose of 
explaining the absence at trial of a chemical test of such sample. 
When admitted pursuant to this subsection such evidence shall 
not be considered evidence of the accused's guilt. 
 
 
Washington Rev. Code Wash.  
§ 46.61.502; 
§ 46.61.504 
Consent of court required.  
 
Wash. CRR 6.1(a) 
 Cases required to be tried by 
jury shall be so tried unless the 
defendant files a written waiver 
of a jury trial, and has consent of 
the court. 
  
State v. Newsome, 515 P.2d 741 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974) 
 Waiver of a jury trial in a 
criminal case is not a matter of 
right. Rather, it is discretionary 
with the trial court. 
 
Admissible. 
 
Rev. Code Wash. § 46.61.517 
 The refusal of a person to submit to a test of the alcohol or drug 
concentration in the person's blood or breath is admissible into 
evidence at a subsequent criminal trial. 
 
West Virginia W. Va. Code Ann. § 17C-5-2 If required to be tried by a jury: 
 
Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
Admissible. 
 
State v. Cozart, 352 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1986) 
 The admission into evidence at a criminal trial of the fact that a 
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W. Va. R.Cr.P., Rule 23 
 Cases required to be tried by 
jury shall be so tried unless the 
defendant waives a jury trial in 
writing with the approval of the 
court and the consent of the 
state. 
 
 
If misdemeanor: 
 
Defendant must demand jury trial. 
 
W. Va. Code Ann. § 50-5-8 
 A defendant in any criminal trial 
for a misdemeanor offense 
triable before a magistrate has 
the right to demand that the 
matter be tried with a jury, and 
the defendant shall be advised of 
the right to trial by jury in 
writing.   
 Failure to demand within such 
time constitutes a waiver of the 
right to trial by jury. 
 
 
defendant arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol 
refused to take a breathalyzer test offered to him does not violate 
the defendant's right against self-incrimination guaranteed under 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution. 
 
 
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. § 346.63 Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 972.02(1) 
 Except as otherwise provided in 
this chapter, criminal cases shall 
be tried by a jury, unless the 
defendant waives a jury in 
writing or by statement in open 
court, on the record, with the 
approval of the court and the 
Admissible. 
 
State v. Albright, 298 N.W.2d 196 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) 
 Testimony of a police officer that the defendant refused to take 
any chemical tests for intoxication was admissible evidence. 
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consent of the state. 
 
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 Consent of court required. 
Consent of prosecution required. 
 
W.R.Cr.P. Rule 23 
 Cases required to be tried by 
jury shall be so tried unless the 
defendant waives a jury trial 
with the approval of the court 
and the consent of the state. 
 
Admissible. 
 
City of Laramie v. Mengel, 671 P.2d 340 (Wyo. 1983) 
 Admission, in prosecution for driving under the influence, of 
evidence that a person who had been arrested for driving under 
influence of intoxicant had refused to submit to a chemical blood 
alcohol test was not unconstitutional.  
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ATTACHMENT 9 
 
TRIAL COURT DATA ON OTHER OFFENSES 
We were asked to examine whether the rate of acquittal in jury-waived OUI trials differs 
from the rate of acquittal in other criminal cases in the District Court and BMC.  However, the 
Trial Court does not track statewide acquittal or conviction rates by offense category, and we did 
not ask the Trial Court staff to perform the extensive work that would be required to compute 
such statistics for non-OUI offenses. 
The Trial Court recently extracted data from MassCourts regarding all criminal charges 
that were resolved at a trial event in all courts within the District Court and BMC (except the 
Barnstable and Brockton District Courts and BMC Central) during the period January 2010 
through June 2011.  Note that the data unit in this analysis is a charge, not a case.  One case may 
have many charges, and in our Database we controlled for that fact by selecting only the OUI 
offense as the lead charge.  In addition, in the Trial Court statistics, the endpoint is simply 
resolution of the charges on the date of a trial event, regardless of whether the charges actually 
were resolved by plea or trial, and regardless of whether the disposition occurred on a non-trial 
event.  
With respect to OUI offenses, this data shows that 30.8% of charges scheduled for a trial 
event resulted in a conviction, 6.2% resulted in a CWOF, 55.1% resulted in a not guilty finding, 
and 5.0% resulted in a dismissal or other non-conviction. 
Figure 1.  Trial Court Data for All OUI Offenses 
 
 
 
In contrast, with respect to Chapter 265 offenses (crimes against the person), the data 
shows that 17.0% of charges scheduled for a trial event resulted in a conviction, 6.5% resulted in 
a CWOF, 23.3% resulted in a not guilty finding, and 49.1% resulted in a dismissal or other non-
conviction result.   
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Figure 2.  Trial Court Data for Chapter 265 Offenses 
  
 
 
With respect to Chapter 94C drug offenses, the data shows that 25.2% of charges 
scheduled for a trial event resulted in a conviction, 9.5% resulted in a CWOF, 11.6% resulted in 
a not guilty finding, and 44.4% resulted in a dismissal or other non-conviction. 
Figure 3.  Trial Court Data for Chapter 94C Offenses 
 
According to this data, acquittals for OUI offenses were higher than for the other two 
categories of offenses, and convictions (including CWOFs) also were higher.  How can both be 
true?  Note the significantly higher percentage of dismissals in Chapter 265 and Chapter 94C 
cases (49.1% and 44.4% respectively) than in OUI cases (5.0%), which accounts for the fact that 
both acquittals and convictions (guilty plus CWOF) for OUI cases are higher than for the other 
offenses.   
This data has very limited utility, given the restrictions listed above.  However, it does 
confirm what most participants told us about dismissals: prosecutors rarely dismiss OUI offenses 
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compared to other offenses.  For example, many participants told us that the Commonwealth 
often is forced to seek dismissal in domestic violence cases, due to the reluctance of witnesses to 
testify.  Also, since this data is based on charges, not cases, the dismissal rates may be related to 
charge bargaining, whereby some charges are dismissed in exchange for guilty pleas on others.  
